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ABSTRACT 
The key aim in this study is to investigate the linkages, synergies and 
misalignments between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
(UNHCR) ‘top-down’ policy development in relation to the specific case on 
durable solutions with a detailed exploration of the ‘bottom-up’ views of actual 
refugees and displaced migrants. Put simply the aim is to provide more detailed 
insight into whether the ‘top-down’ policy initiatives of UNHCR also take into 
account and are synergised with ‘bottom-up’ approaches and concepts of the 
actual refuges. By taking this approach, the thesis argues that if we are to meet 
the growing challenges of today, then there is a need to have very clear 
assessments of the performance of ‘top-down’ policy initiatives established by 
UNHCR and, in particular, in relation to the past and present approaches to 
durable solutions. Here the focus should be on not just establishing and outlining 
UNHCR’s awareness of the perceptions, interests, and perceived predicaments 
of displaced people, but also actually on emphasising a focus that seeks to 
identify and address any misalignments between the top-down policy 
development of UNHCR and the real-time ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of the 
refugees. This is especially important since refugee groups have – in practice – 
significant political capacity and considerable interest in shaping durable 
solutions to suit their needs. However, this thesis also argues that evidence 
suggests that there is – at present - insufficient awareness among refugees on 
how the development of policy themes at UNHCR level are actually informed by 
the ‘bottom-up’ refugee perspectives and norm diffusion. Furthermore, on this 
basis, there are notable asymmetries between the ‘top-down’ policy development 
of UNHCR and the actual ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees that can explain 
why aspects of UNHCR’s durable solutions continue to be controversial and not 
always that successful. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Global forced migration, which includes refugees, asylum seekers, 
and internally displaced persons, is at an unprecedented high in our 
world’s history (Edwards, 2016). As of January 2015, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 50.5 million 
people were displaced around the world (UNHCR, 2016a). Time spent in 
refugee camps often extends for decades, on average 25 years (UNHCR, 
2015), which equates to generations being born into camps and not 
knowing any other life. In reality, very few refugees see any solution to 
their forced displacement. Most endure years and even decades away 
from their home country. 
However, it has long been recognised that “Refugee problems 
demand durable solutions”; indeed, this is the opening statement of the 
Principles for Action in Developing Countries adopted by the 1984 
Executive Committee of UNHCR (UNHCR, 1984). 
For example, as long ago as the 1980s UNHCR proposed three 
‘durable solutions’ to refugee crises (in preferred order): repatriation to 
the home country, local integration in the host country, or resettlement in 
another (usually developed) country. Consequently, these three durable 
solutions have become the hallmarks of United Nations (UN) principles 
towards refugees ever since. As described in the 2016 Report: “UNHCR 
global strategic priorities are: (a) a favourable protection environment; (b) 
fair protection processes and documentation; (c) security from violence 
and exploitation; (d) basic needs and services; (e) community 
empowerment and self-reliance; and (f) durable solutions.” (UNHCR, 
2016b). It seems fair to say then that durable solutions have thus gained 
significant attention at the global level. 
Yet, both political will and capacity are necessary for the 
achievement of durable solutions, and many obstacles stand in the way 
of all three solutions. Finding durable solutions, whether integration, 
asylum or return of refugees, has never been more important for the 
process of post-conflict peacebuilding than it is today (O’Neill, 2009; 
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Fagen, 2009; Coffie 2014). There is increased recognition that the issue 
of forced migrants is not merely a humanitarian and socio-economic issue, 
but also a political one that complements other activities designed to 
produce political, social, and economic stability in countries affected by 
war (Chimni, 2002; Koser, 2009). Since the majority of today’s refugees 
are in developing countries that can often ill afford the financial and 
human costs, there is an urgent need for a re-examination of current 
policies leading to a more equitable sharing of the burden between 
refugee-affected regions and the international community. More 
importantly, the present situation calls for new approaches to resolving 
the refugee dilemma. Specifically, the return of refugees is argued to be a 
major indicator of peace at the end of a conflict. As Fagen (2009, p. 32) 
notes, “finding a durable solution for displaced populations is a significant 
bellwether for the success of the overall peace process”. In an address to 
the UN Security Council, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR, 2009) argued that “the scale of return and success of 
reintegration are two of the most important tangible indicators of progress 
in any peacebuilding process” (quoted in Koser, 2009, p. 6). In simple 
terms, ‘durable solutions’ has become a barometer of success of 
peacebuilding. 
Yet, there are rather dynamic discussions pertaining to durable 
solutions; something that is made even more complex given the fact that 
there is substantial variation even on the terminology used. New ideas 
and partnerships have emerged, and new actors that have often 
developed their own language and literacy on the issue are involved. The 
global community, including UN agencies, policy-makers, civil society, 
international organisations, and the private sector are thus confronted 
with having to continually reflect on how to tackle these issues – seeking 
to balance where and how to draw (red) lines, or build walls on the one 
hand, and where and how to rethink the decisions around development 
and aid on the other, that will ultimately produce more preventive and 
sustainable solutions. Indeed, the diversity of the debate on durable 
solutions today is illustrative. Development actors and researchers have 
recently referred to the need for transitional solutions as a means to build 
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legitimacy for durable solutions (World Bank, 2015; ReDSS/ Hall, 2015). 
In addition, academic discussions have, for instance, zoomed in on the 
possibility of a fourth solution: highlighting ‘mobility’ as a durable solution 
(Long, 2014, 2013a) or ‘transnationalism’ as a durable solution (Refugee 
Studies Centre seminar, 2011). Finally, humanitarian and development 
actors have worked together – at policy and technical levels – to build a 
set of indicators and framework to define, measure and operationalise 
durable solutions. 
However, ‘durable solutions’ are often compromised and even fail 
due to a lack of attention to and consideration of the perspectives of the 
displaced persons. There is a need for a holistic approach to durable 
solutions that integrates ‘top-down’ policy with the ‘bottom-up’ views of 
refugees. 
 
1.2. Aim of the Research 
The key aim in this study is to investigate the linkages, synergies, 
and misalignments between UNHCR’s ‘top-down’ policy development in 
relation to the specific case on durable solutions with a detailed 
exploration of the ‘bottom-up views of actual refugees and displaced 
migrants. Put simply to provide more detailed insight into whether the 
‘top-down’ policy initiatives of UNHCR also take into account and are 
synergised with ‘bottom-up approaches and concepts of the actual 
refuges.1 By taking this approach, the thesis argues that if we are to meet 
the growing challenges of today, then there is a need to have very clear 
assessments of the performance of ‘top-down’ policy initiatives 
established by UNHCR and in particular in relation to the past and 
present approaches to durable solutions. And here the focus should be 
on not just establishing and outlining UNHCR’s awareness of the 
perceptions, interests, and perceived predicaments of displaced people, 
but also on actually emphasising a focus that seeks to identify and 
address any misalignments between the ‘top-down’ policy development of 
                                                             
1 According to Easton-Calabria (2015, p. 414), “‘bottom-up’ approaches refer to relief 
and development efforts built out of and upon the self-defined needs and interests of 
affected populations, which thus directly engages them in decision-making capacities”. 
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UNHCR and the real-time ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of the refugees. This 
is especially important since refugee groups have – in practice – 
significant political capacity and considerable interest in shaping durable 
solutions to suit their needs. This thesis also argues that there is – at 
present – an insufficient understanding among refugees on how the 
development of policy themes at UNHCR level are actually informed by 
the ‘bottom-up’ refugee perspectives and norm diffusion. And on this 
basis, there are notable asymmetries between the ‘top-down’ policy 
development of UNHCR and the actual ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees that can explain why aspects of UNHCR’s durable solutions 
continue to be controversial and not always that successful. 
Of course, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have 
always been portrayed as by-products of conflict. Both groups continue to 
be seen as passive victims in need of international assistance and 
protection. In fact, they can be both subjects and objects of political 
violence in forced migration crises (Eleftheriadou, 2018, Zeitzoff, 2016) 
To begin with, displaced people may respond to violent conflict by making 
decisions, within their constrained freedom of choice, about whether to 
leave home and/or where to relocate. For most refugees, life in exile is as 
bad as or even worse than the conditions fled in their countries of origin. 
Many are confined to temporary camps or detention centres close to the 
borders of their home countries where they are exposed to the risk of 
cross-border attacks. They depend on international or private charity for 
survival (Loescher and Manahan, 1989). For those refugees that are 
eventually resettled, many of them never emerge from the socially 
marginalised sectors of society. They continue to suffer alienation, 
underemployment, and unemployment (Ibid., p.2). Poverty among 
refugees includes being unable to plan for the future and living each day 
as it comes, dependency on others and breakdown in family, friendships 
or other support networks (Taylor, 2009; Phillimore and Thornhill, 2011; 
Allsopp et al., 2014). 
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1.3. Objectives of the Thesis 
Finding a durable solution for refugees is a dynamic and 
multifaceted two-way process where ‘top-down’ development of 
UNHCR’s policies on durable solutions needs to be equally informed by 
the ‘bottom-up’ identities and experiences of displaced persons as part of 
a ‘bottom-up’ norm diffusion that will shape the success and effectiveness 
of the durable solutions policy (especially in relation to resettlement, local 
integration and repatriation). 
The study therefore seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
(i) to investigate the experiences and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
displaced persons on durable solutions; 
(ii) to understand the ‘top-down’ drivers that have shaped UNHCR’s 
durable solutions policy to date (with specific reference to resettlement, 
local integration and repatriation) and to introduce a clear notion of 
‘bottom-up norm diffusion’ which provides value-added; 
(iii) to demonstrate that a constructivist perspective and a spiral model 
can provide ‘value-added’ - informing the thesis, and evaluating the 
linkages and synergies between refugees’ perspectives and experiences 
(as agents of change) and UNHCR’s politics and policy of durable 
solutions; 
 
1.4. Research Questions 
This research is guided by the following key research questions: 
1. To what extent are UNHCR’s durable solutions being successfully 
accomplished? 
Finding durable solutions to refugee situations can only be 
achieved if the international community is driving the process and is 
supportive. On this basis, UNHCR chose voluntary repatriation as the 
most durable and politically viable option, although the implementation of 
‘voluntary repatriation’ in practice is often challenging. The return of 
refugees, for example, may sometimes not be possible at all. In addition, 
the integration of refugees is often not welcomed – by the public and/or 
policy-makers – in the host country, on the grounds that integration of 
refugees may exacerbate political, social and economic tensions within 
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the host country. Furthermore, ‘resettlement’ is often not seen in some 
quarters as a ‘solution’ but rather as another practical form of 
displacement. Moreover, as a policy domain, ‘resettlement’ is often in 
policy terms, challenging to implement effectively, given that the policy 
often requires a high degree of policy and logistical coordination between 
host countries and UNHCR, in order to facilitate any resettlement process. 
Hence, this research question aims to understand the complexity and 
drivers of UNHCR durable solutions policy and how refugees have been 
considered successfully to date within it 
In addition, the largest obstacle faced by UNHCR is that the 
international community continues to place the burden of resettlement on 
host societies. Indeed, given the challenges of integrating refugees, it is 
often the case that industrialised countries often focus their efforts on 
restricting refugee access into their territories. Hence, it is important to 
understand not just whether UNHCR receives sufficient financial and 
political support to allow the organisation to confront the problems that 
cause people to flee from their countries of origin and promote 
development assistance, but the extent to which the durable solutions 
have been successfully designed ‘top-down’ in the fields of resettlement, 
local integration and repatriation, to enable the promotion of development 
assistance, monitor the repatriation, advise on laws and/or coordinate 
resettlement needs, must also be considered. 
 
2. What are the perspectives of refugees as key stakeholders and how 
much influence do refugees, as agents (of change), have in the diffusion 
of norms, given they are both enabled and constrained by UNHCR 
structures and policy? 
In many ways, refugees can be regarded as key (sometimes 
official and sometimes unofficial) stakeholders in UNHCR policy and in 
the development of durable solutions in practice. Indeed, refugees should 
also be regarded as agents who can (positively) alter the contexts of 
constraint and opportunity within which they operate, which are likely to 
lead to resource gains and losses. In addition, a constructivist perspective, 
by focusing on intersubjective understandings and identities and ‘norm 
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diffusion’, offers notable value-added and is well equipped to explain the 
specific background of agents’ preferences (see next section). 
Taking this a little further, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) argued that 
“migrant populations are often keenly interested in addressing human 
rights violations and have the skills, resources, and connections that 
enable them to advance their agendas”. In other words, Wiebelhaus-
Brahm highlighted that refugees do possess the ability to create and 
mobilise agency – often in a positive way. Gitau and Rhodes (2016) also 
explored the theme of refugee agency since they actually highlighted that 
‘top-down’ orchestrated UNHCR practices can impact the mental health 
of refugees. Yet, they suggested that refugee dependency – fostered by 
reliance on organisations or host states – undermines agency negatively 
and can lead to negative psychosocial consequences for refugees. 
Similarly, scholars have underscored the impact of community networks 
and the mobilisation of social resources in helping refugees restore their 
social fabric and rebuild the trust needed for successful peacebuilding 
and development during and after refugee camp life (Hayes, et al, 2016). 
It is crucial then to consider refugee perspectives and opinions 
before pursuing a process of integration into the host country (Bradley, 
2013). ‘Solutions’ to displacement may not be permanent in that many 
refugees and IDPs choose to move between multiple physical locations 
(Long, 2010, 2013b). Indeed, it is important to capture and understand 
the ‘bottom-up’ motivations and perspectives of migrants as key 
stakeholders that can inform durable solutions policy via norm diffusion 
upwards. Some, for example, hope to return home as soon as possible 
(particularly for cultural reasons), and will not establish themselves in the 
host country permanently. The same will happen with refugees who 
harbour the hope to be resettled in a third country. Indeed, not all 
refugees who are locally integrated want to be naturalised and live as 
citizens of the host country; some may desire to return home as soon as 
they have the opportunity to do so. These refugees – as stakeholders – 
will profit from local integration to a certain extent and thus from the 
outcomes of durable solutions policy, but it is also equally important to 
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capture that they may not have any intention to establish in the host 
country. 
 
3. What actions are needed to ensure a more effective and consistent 
achievement of durable solutions? How can UNHCR policies be adapted 
to enhance prospects for durable solutions? 
The key challenge may be that the means used to decide the 
future of displaced persons via UNHCR durable outcomes may lack the 
effective input of refugees or may suffer from forms of asymmetry in not 
considering the ‘bottom-up’ perceptions of refugees effectively. Mikavica 
and Monaghan (2016), for example, have emphasised there is a 
considerable need – especially as part of the process of peacebuilding – 
for development of practitioners to engage directly with younger 
populations of refugees and IDPs. UNHCR, the host country and home 
country most often decides refugees and IDPS fate so it would seem 
essential that genuinely representative refugee voices and perspectives 
should be included effectively and inform peacebuilding negotiations. 
Thus, when looking at any of the ‘solutions’ to a refugee situation that are 
to be ‘durable’, it is essential that the three components do not exist in a 
vacuum, nor in opposition to each other. Used in unison, they 
simultaneously encourage integration of those individuals who have 
developed solid economic ties to their host country or repatriate those 
who are truly ready to return home. The human rights of the refugees 
must be upheld when choosing the most appropriate solution. 
Furthermore, any durable solution for a refugee in exile requires the legal 
integration of that person into a community, either in his homeland, the 
country of asylum, or abroad, with access to full citizenship rights (Ryan, 
2009; Klepp, 2013; Easton-Calabria and Omata, 2018). 
Research questions are vital and set the scene for development of 
a clear research aim and objective that are inextricably linked as 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Research objectives and research questions 
Research objectives  Methods Research questions  
(i) to investigate the experiences and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of displaced persons on durable 
solutions;  
Interviews  
1. To what extent are UNHCR’s durable solutions 
being successfully accomplished?  
 
2. What are the perspectives of refugees as key 
stakeholders and how much influence do refugees, 
as agents (of change), have in the diffusion of 
norms, given they are both enabled and 
constrained by UNHCR structures and policy? 
 
3. What actions are needed to ensure a more 
effective and consistent achievement of durable 
solutions? How can UNHCR policies be adapted to 
enhance prospects for durable solutions? 
(ii) to understand the ‘top-down’ drivers that have 
shaped UNHCR’s durable solutions policy to date 
(with specific reference to resettlement, local 
integration and repatriation) and to introduce a 
clear notion of ‘bottom-up norm diffusion’ which 
provides value-added; 
Policy/Documents 
Survey 
Interviews 
 
(iii) to demonstrate that a constructivist 
perspective and a spiral model inform the thesis, 
to evaluate the linkages and synergies between 
refugees’ perspectives and experiences (as 
agents of change) and UNHCR’s politics and 
policy of durable solutions;  
Concepts/Theory 
Secondary 
documentary 
sources  
 
Source: Author’s Own 
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1.5. Introducing the Role of Norms 
The important point – and something that is instrumental to this thesis 
– is that the process of norm diffusion is made up of ideas and discussions. 
Hence in the context of this thesis, the perspectives of refugees can – at least 
theoretically – impact upon and possibly even help change the identity of 
post-conflict states and societies and even influence international 
organisations. 
In addition, the social roles of states are largely a product of the 
international environment, which means that expectations of appropriate 
behaviour are based on systemic characteristics. The precise definition of 
social expectations ultimately requires the formulation of a comprehensive 
role theory for the international system. Research on global norm diffusion 
reconstructs the processes that convert certain values into internationally 
authoritative norms as well as the dynamics that make those international 
norms meaningful in domestic contexts (and vice-versa). 
To a certain extent, this perspective overcomes the segmentation of 
international vs national and even vs sub-national domains. It helps us to 
explain why when looking at refugees we need to focus less on seeing each 
(international, national and sub-national) level as fragmented domains and 
highlight the real and potential impacts of their perspectives that can 
transcend and shape interactions between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. 
Furthermore, in the context of international society, norms are 
contested fields that unfold their validity in stages. In successful cases, they 
are pushed onto the international agenda by so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
which can be agents who seek to influence states, states’ migration policies 
and even international institutions until those norms that are championed are 
then transformed into widely accepted standards on the international level, 
and finally become internalised within national contexts (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1999, pp. 895). Yet, it is important to highlight that in the context of 
this thesis, it is assumed that norm diffusion may not and often does not occur 
in a linear ‘top-down’ manner from the global to the local. Rather, it represents 
a highly interactive, circular ‘glocal’ process of negotiation, appropriation and 
contestation in and, importantly for this thesis, between international, national 
and sub-national contexts. Hence, In the ‘bottom-up’ instance, refugees, non-
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state actors and policy networks can mobilise to support and even shape a 
particular global norm from the ‘bottom-up’ and can even possibly coerce elite 
decision-makers to change policy to represent something much closer to their 
own socially constructed ideas and perspectives. Equally, elite decision-
makers – be they at the state or even international level – can develop from 
the ‘top-down’ and internalise a shared understanding of the prescripts of a 
particular norm. In simple terms, by deploying a social constructivist approach, 
this thesis is able to highlight much more clearly the complex interactions of 
norm diffusion involving refugees and their perspectives at the interface 
between the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’. 
For this thesis, the central assumption is that refugees and agents can 
help to shape and ‘socially construct’ and therefore the key is to open up the 
‘box of interaction’. In some instances, the cooperation and interaction of 
global actors and refugees – as agents of democratic change – mean that a 
hierarchy of compliance is constructed and maintained. In many cases, the 
management of compliance is also devolved from the ‘top-down’ to the 
‘bottom-up’ and thus offers greater propensity for the views of agents (like 
refugees) to be influential. From this perspective, ‘top-down’ actors can 
promote a certain policy, they can force regulations and/or they can finance 
specific programmes (offer government funds or expertise). Nevertheless, and 
on the other hand, refugees bring important value to shaping (democratic) 
change and (particularly peacebuilding) efforts. For example, refugees can 
help to shape key norms that identify and influence the drivers of conflict and 
even help to build peace through, for example, their perspectives and actions 
towards land and property recovery and reform, community reintegration, and 
voluntary and safe repatriation. 
In summary, the dynamics that make norms internationally and 
domestically convincing have to be understood as an ongoing, interactive 
process of cooperation and negotiation on different levels, involving 
interactive reciprocity between these levels and as a vibrant process of 
interpretation, appropriation and contextualised reformulation in order to give 
us a more detailed insight into how norm diffusion facilitates cooperation and 
the transfer of ideas (Soh, et al., 2017). 
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1.6. Introducing the Bosnian War 
This research employs several research methods. First, it undertakes a 
case study approach focusing on UNHCR’s durable solutions programmes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina using interpretive and qualitative methods.  
Indeed, it is important to highlight why the particular case study of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is appropriate for this thesis. First, while the 
case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is particularly relevant in 
explaining key developments in refugee policies, the reaction of states to this 
refugee crisis on European soil also reveals the likely direction of future 
policies regarding involuntary migrants. In this context, it should be noted that 
many other humanitarian tragedies around the world have not received the 
substantial coverage accorded to BiH. The implication is that it will not be 
surprising if victims of displacement fleeing other continents are provided with 
even less protection from affluent European states. 
Second, the case study on the Balkans also illustrates how the states 
developed the exclusionary practices of temporary protection and protection 
‘at a distance’ that are now commonplace in current rhetoric and (in)action 
regarding the most recent flows of refugees (European Parliament, 2018). 
Third, another rationale for the case selection is that it is important to 
investigate if it is possible to draw lessons for the current wave of refugees 
from Bosnian refugees displaced during the Bosnian war. For example, in 
March 2018 UNHCR confirmed that “many asylum seekers face obstacles 
accessing the asylum procedure” due to onerous registration requirements 
and tight deadlines for lodging applications, which was also true at the time of 
the Bosnian crisis (United Nations, 2018).  
Fourth, this particular research consists of interviews with refugees that 
were accessed in a safe and secure learning environment. Conducting 
sensitive interviews around the topic of forced migration and suffering will 
always have the potential to raise anxiety and distress for participants. Indeed, 
King and Horrocks (2010) emphasise that any qualitative research interview 
has the potential to raise questions and bring back thoughts that an 
interviewee may find distressing. Fifth, as already mentioned above, the 
Bosnian war was important point in the development of durable solutions. 
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Each one is a result of a collaborative effort among the countries of origin, 
host countries, as well as, international humanitarian and donor organisations. 
 
1.6.1. Context: The Bosnian War 
The conflict in Bosnia began in 1992, shortly after the end of the Cold 
War. The primary reasons for the war are to be found in an orchestrated and 
planned aggression of the Serbian leadership to dismantle multi-ethnicity in 
Bosnia and annex as much Bosnian territory to Serbia as conditions would 
permit (Malcolm, 1996). The creation and consolidation of ethnically and 
nationally homogeneous political units arising from the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia were driven by the principle of self-determination (Salih, 2017). In 
conditions of political and social uncertainty, the members of any national 
group would choose to be sovereign instead of being ruled by any other 
national group (Dyrstad, 2012). As one Yugoslav observer put it (Gligorov, 
1994), “why should I be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in 
mine?” This underlying reasoning drove the process of dissolution, the 
descent into war and the specific way (ethnic cleansing) in which the war was 
conducted. Discourses of (in)security rely in turn on the identification of the 
Other as an important ‘move’ to stabilise the Self, making possible both its 
delimitation and its defence (Hansen, 2006). The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ has 
its origin in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution.2 The expression refers to the 
practice of removing specific groups from a given area exclusively on the 
basis of ethnic criteria (Guardian, 14 July 1994). The Commission of Experts, 
in its First Interim Report of 10 February 1993, stated that: “The expression 
‘ethnic cleansing’ is relatively new.” A synonym for ethnic cleansing is ‘forced 
population transfer’. Its goal is the creation of ethnically homogeneous nation-
states by removing ethnic and national minorities and proceeding to a process 
of cultural assimilation of those who remain. In this sense, ethnic cleansing is 
one of the instruments of nation-state creation and consolidation (Jackson 
Preece, 1998). Great powers have often endorsed such instruments in the 
name of stability, self-determination, and the development of democracy. 
                                                             
2 As early as 1914, a Carnegie Endowment report on the Balkan Wars points out that village-
burning and ethnic cleansing had traditionally accompanied Balkan wars, regardless of the 
ethnic group in power. The term ethnic cleansing, a literal translation of the Serbo-Croatian 
phrase etnicko ciscenje, was widely employed in the 1990s. 
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In an effort to respond to demands for greater autonomy, the 1974 third 
constitution of Yugoslavia gave the Muslims, the third biggest national group 
in Yugoslavia, the status of a separate nation. At the same time authority was 
devolved to the six Republics constituting the Yugoslav state. Although these 
changes were meant to appease and calm secessionist demands, they 
ultimately set in place the conditions for the rise in nationalist discourse. 
According to Hayden (2000), the constitutional choices made by Yugoslav 
federal republics since 1974 and the consequent rise of ‘constitutional 
nationalism’ pointed toward the triumph of the political concept of a national 
state: an understanding that the state, as a set of political institutions in 
control of a delimited territory, manifests the sovereignty of one ‘nation,’ 
ethnically defined. 
As the deteriorating economic situation throughout the 1980s 
reinforced social uncertainty and hampered the Federal state’s ability to 
provide stability and deliver public goods, political opposition progressively 
consolidated along national lines. The institutions of the existing Yugoslav 
state were progressively delegitimised. By the late 1980s, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia was inevitable, although the scale of the violence that 
accompanied the breakup was beyond prediction (Rusinow, 1995). 
At its 14th Congress in 1990, the Yugoslav Communist Party fell apart. 
By December of the same year, democratic elections were held in all six 
Republics that constituted the Yugoslav state, including Bosnia. Nationalist 
politicians gained a clear victory everywhere. The 1990 elections provided an 
opportunity for nations – that is, for the majority group within each republic – 
to gain democratic legitimacy through the elections. The nationalists who 
gained a clear victory did so on platforms that demanded a fit between the 
ethnically defined nation and the state. As Hayden (1996, p. 787) notes, 
 
…although this formulation was hardly new to European history, it did 
have sinister implications for minorities in states that were suddenly 
defined as the nation-states of their respective ethnic majorities. By 
definition, anyone not belonging to the ethno-national majority could 
only be a citizen of second class. 
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Where there was no harmony between the nation and the state, the 
policy of ethnic cleansing was implemented to achieve the goal of self-
determination (Donia and Fine, 1994). The consequences were dire in 
heterogeneous areas where the population was mixed, such as in Bosnia, 
where no nation had an absolute majority. According to the 1991 population 
census, of Bosnia’s 4.35 million people, 44 per cent identified themselves as 
Muslims, 31 per cent as Serb, and 17 per cent as Croat. 
In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, thus 
beginning the process of dissolution (Wachtel and Bennett, 2013). In the 
meantime, Germany persuaded the rest of the European Community to 
recognise Slovene and Croatian independence. Arguing that the main cause 
of the conflict was Serbian aggression and that international recognition of the 
two states would signal international protection based on the right to self-
determination, Germany was hoping to deter Serbia and end the war 
(Woodward, 1995, pp. 147, 183-189).  Later, the United States followed the 
same logic in the case of Bosnia. 
By accepting the principle of national self-determination for the 
independence of states – without regard to the Yugoslav conditions of 
multinationality and the shared rights to national sovereignty of the Titoist 
system, or a willingness to enforce their unilateral decision on borders – 
Western powers were making war over territory inevitable. The struggle to 
create new states out of the Yugoslav federation was a struggle to get 
international recognition; the fight for international opinion had been and 
would continue to be as important as the fight on the ground (Woodward, 
1995, p. 198). 
In October 1991, Muslim and Bosnian Croat parties adopted a 
resolution in favour of the independence of Bosnia. Bosnia’s declaration of 
sovereignty was followed by a referendum for independence in February 1992. 
Bosnia declared itself independent on 3 March 1992. Hostilities started in April, 
when Bosnian Serbs responded by trying to partition the Republic along 
ethnic lines, and join Serbia, in order to form a “Greater Serbia” (Woodward, 
1995). Divisions within the international community soon became apparent, 
resulting in mediation efforts that often worked at cross-purposes. An 
additional division soon emerged between those who wanted to reach a 
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diplomatic compromise to stop the war and those who maintained that such 
compromise should not sacrifice human rights and reward ethno-nationalist 
aggression. The mediators’ attempts to stop the war were not successful until 
the United States took the lead and provided some coherence to international 
efforts. Under pressure from the United States, in March 1994 Muslims (who 
by then had adopted the ethnic term ‘Bosniak’) and Bosnian Croats signed an 
agreement creating a joint Federation. This agreement provided the parties 
with the necessary tactical military cooperation to roll back the advances of 
Bosnian Serbs and create the foundations for a post-war power-sharing 
cooperation between the two groups. By summer 1995, the balance of forces 
on the ground shifted against the Bosnian Serbs. In early August, Croatia took 
over the ‘Krajina Serb Republic’, provoking the flow of about 200,000 Croatian 
Serb refugees, but at the same time removing what was perceived as a 
constraint to successful negotiations. On 28 August, when shelling by Bosnian 
Serbs killed thirty-eight people in Sarajevo’s downtown marketplace, NATO 
decided to act. In early September 1995 at Geneva, the parties and their 
international patrons agreed to basic principles of Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue its legal existence with its 
internationally recognised borders. 
In retrospect, Dayton’s achievement was not simply that of stopping the 
war, but also of providing a blueprint for saving the country from 
dismemberment. The DPA promised to set up a structure where more 
substantive goals could be pursued, such as reversing ethnic cleansing and 
arresting war criminals. Under pressure, the parties agreed to “ensure the 
highest level of internationally recognised human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, art. II, 1). 
According to Carl Bildt (1998, p. 392), “[t]he Peace Agreement for 
Bosnia was the most ambitious document of its kind in modem history, 
perhaps in history as a whole.” Others diminished the importance of the 
document. According to Henry Kissinger, US policy was misguided in 
recognising the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because Bosnia’s multi-
ethnic composition is antithetical to successful statehood and deprived it of 
the key attribute of “historical European nation-states.” Most observers, 
however, agreed with the chief US negotiator Richard Holbrooke (1998, p. 
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205) that “implementation would be at least as difficult as negotiations 
themselves.” 
 
1.7. Defining the Key Contexts 
Introducing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: How Did It 
Move into Refugee Policy? 
UNHCR was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 
the aftermath of WWII to provide international protection and care to refugee 
victims of persecution (United Nations, 28 July 1951, Article 1, paragraph C4). 
It has developed into an entity that currently assumes responsibility for a 
broad range of people,3 many of whom have different protection needs from 
those of refugees (UNHCR, December 2011, p.1). UNHCR’s 65-year 
development has taken the organisation far beyond what was envisaged or 
even imagined when the General Assembly promulgated its 1950 Statute with 
narrow authority and limited scope. UNHCR has taken on different 
responsibilities; it has become more active in countries of refugee origin by 
granting humanitarian aid, monitoring human rights violations and trying to 
prevent the flow of refugees. It covers both the victims of war and gross 
human rights violations, as well as people who have not yet crossed an 
international border. The extent to which UNHCR is still a ‘Refugee’ 
organisation is hard to tell, as additional commitments have been adopted 
alongside its primary mission and have changed its focus. UNHCR has been 
diverted from solely refugee protection and is now being asked to focus on 
human rights protection and to provide humanitarian aid in certain 
circumstances. There is nothing unusual about an organisation growing in 
status and expanding its scope of action. From persecution and refugee 
protection to vulnerability and protection of civilians, such is UNHCR’s 
conceptual journey to better respond to complex humanitarian crises. 
                                                             
3 United Nations, 28 July 1951, Article 1, paragraph A2: As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it. 
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In essence, UNHCR now stresses that forced displacement can and 
must be resolved through the prevention of conflict, the protection of human 
rights, and the promotion of sustainable development (Macrae, 1999). Thus, 
its previous strict humanitarian function has given way to a more overtly 
political focus as it takes on issues that obviously fall well outside the 
definition of a refugee. Given the broad scope of activities – which reflect the 
transnational nature of issues surrounding involuntary migration – coordinated, 
complementary efforts undertaken by various actors are necessary for the 
accomplishment of its task. 
As UNHCR’s new focus on ‘resolving the refugee problem’ is 
unequivocally intertwined with ‘peacebuilding’ efforts, neither approach can 
achieve its goals of ensuring peace and human security without the success 
of the other (UNHCR, 2006; Price 2010). To determine whether this rhetoric 
has been translated into reality, it is necessary to examine the disappointing 
results of recent international efforts to arrest conflict to determine that it has 
not. 
 
Durable Solutions: Defining Resettlement, Local Integration and Repatriation 
First, resettlement in a third country of asylum offers protection for 
refugees who are debating their next steps (and when to begin healing) after 
sometimes brutal and barbaric events that often cause fatalities among family 
and friends (van Selm, 2004, p. 40). However, resettlement policies and 
programmes reflect the ideologies of host countries as well as their beliefs 
about the needs of refugee populations. The policies and programmes, 
however, reveal limited insight into the perspectives of refugees and offer little 
foresight into the achievability of integration and incorporation over time. For 
one thing, durable solutions often equate refugees’ needs with those of 
general immigrants despite significant findings to the contrary (Humpage, 
2001; Korac, 2001). 
Second, local integration refers to refugees who can participate while 
sustaining what is considered a normal life in the environment of the host 
region enjoying freedom and civil liberties in a community (UNHCR, Solutions). 
Whereas achieving integration means active involvement in the host country 
society in multiple ways, the primary objective of host countries for refugees 
 28 
during resettlement is singular: economic self-sufficiency (see UNHCR, 2005, 
Handbook for Self-Reliance). In 2016, the UN adopted the Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) (UN General Assembly, A/RES/71/1, 
2016) as a four-pillar response to the increased number of refugees in the 
past decade. Of its four pillars, self-reliance – or self- sufficiency – was 
relevant to the second pillar and the one which clearly lists integration as a 
goal. Hence self-sufficiency is considered one of the primary factors for 
successful integration into a host community. Nevertheless, it has been 
recognised that refugees are not provided with effective tools to achieve either 
short- or long-term self-sufficiency. Restrictive government policies regarding 
foreign qualifications, inadequate support and funding for labour market 
retraining, and ineffective, often underfunded, language instruction during the 
resettlement period contribute to refugees being funnelled into the low-wage 
service sector of the labour market or the public welfare system (see for 
example, Msabah & Bowers-Du, 2017; Campbell, 2011; Bloch, 2007a, Bazen 
and Marimotou, 2001; Burkhauser et al., 2000). 
Third, repatriation refers to refugees returning to their place of 
citizenship or origin after conflict or war (UNHCR, 2008a). Repatriation can be 
voluntary or involuntary, whereby the government or international agencies 
step in and mandate the direction of the refugees’ future, whereas 
refoulement is the expulsion or return of the refugees to a place where there 
is a threat to their freedoms; with refoulement, asylum must be present to 
preserve a secure and safe dwelling (1951 Convention). 
The order of ‘preferability’ for policy-makers among these solutions has 
varied over time; however, voluntary repatriation is generally considered as 
the ‘ideal’ solution (Long, 2013b; United Nations, 1997). Return is also 
regarded, for example, as a solution to the challenges presented by 
protracted refugee situations in Africa and Asia (Crisp, 2005; Loescher and 
Milner, 2005; Loescher et al., 2008). As observed by Harrell-Bond (1989, p. 
42), policy-makers therefore regard repatriation as a durable solution to the 
refugee crisis; hence, there is a need to create favourable conditions for large-
scale return of refugees. Refugees themselves generally assume that most of 
them will, eventually, return to their own country or community (Allen and 
Morsink, 1994; Kibreab, 1999). These issues have brought returning refugees 
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within the scope of political action, policy design and academic research. The 
participation of refugee returnees in the process is, however, often overlooked. 
They are rarely present during peace negotiations, and peacebuilding 
activities often marginalise them (Adelman, 2002; Fagen, 2009; Koser, 2009). 
This is akin to what Said (1978) explained as the concept of ‘otherness’ in 
military orientalism. Said’s work on Orientalism is related to the notion of the 
subaltern as he explains the way in which Orientalism produced the silence of 
the Orientals. The term ‘subaltern’ generally refers to marginalised groups 
rendered without agency. Neumann (1999) pointed out that because of the 
subjective use of cultural differences and groups’ specific cultural aspects, 
any difference, however small it may be, can be used for dividing groups and 
distancing them from one another. In implication then, we are never safe from 
engaging in othering. 
The ‘solution’, therefore, must not only address the persecution but 
also the underlying structural causes of migration, such as poverty, 
discrimination, marginalisation, and exclusion (Marks, 2011), by either 
preventing or remedying the conditions that compel flight (Coles, 1988). 
In addition, refugees and returnees form an integral part of the healing 
and rebuilding process. Thus, in concurring with Korac (2003, p. 53), the 
current study argues that the search for a solution should be understood as ‘a 
two-way process, rather than a kind of medication that refugees take in’. In 
this two-way process, refugees participate in the processes in which a 
solution is identified and implemented, and are not regarded merely as 
recipients of a solution imposed by states and UNHCR. 
To the extent that durability of solutions is at stake, UNHCR has an 
inherent interest in fostering reconstruction and reconciliation. “In many 
instances, the peaceful reintegration of refugees is closely linked to the 
multifaceted process of peacebuilding. In recognition of this link, UNHCR 
pursued expanded collaboration with political leaders, human rights monitors 
and reconstruction and development agencies” (Ogata, 1997, pp. viix). In 
Adelman’s words (2002, p. 273), the conventional wisdom has it that “peace 
depends on refugee repatriation, and every peace agreement must provide 
for it.” Peacebuilding requires just solutions for refugees and displaced 
persons. In UNHCR’s experience, such solutions are indispensable for lasting 
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peace and true stability. Ending suffering should be regarded as both a 
humanitarian and a political imperative: it is a function of peacebuilding. 
Return movements are expected to help stabilise insecure border regions, 
serve as an expression of confidence in the peace process, and allow 
formerly exiled populations to contribute to peacebuilding and development. 
There is a strong link to the idea of transitional justice, that is, the ideal that an 
expulsion of people is not accepted (McGinn, 2000; Sooka, 2006; Williams, 
2007). These issues have been present in peace agreements, for example, in 
Cambodia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Burundi (Phuong, 2005, p. 6). 
Debates about the role of refugees in conflict or peacebuilding and 
development start from the premise that an unspecified but critical number of 
refugees have the interest, ability, and capacity to take an active role in 
homeland affairs. For example, a conference in Canada in 20064 called for 
the role that diasporic groups play in peacebuilding and development in the 
homelands. The underlying assumption was that organised immigrant groups 
in industrialised countries are positioned to play important roles in 
peacebuilding and development and can be defined as diaspora communities: 
groups that maintain a sense of community identity and loyalty with their 
homeland over time (Kleist, 2008). Milner also focused on the potential 
contribution that refugees can make to peacebuilding in their country of origin 
if they benefit from skills training and self-reliance while in exile (Milner, 2011). 
Importantly for this thesis, research by Bohnet et al. shows that “any solution 
to protracted IDP and refugee situations requires an integrated approach of 
peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development aid” (Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 
8). In this respect, it is important to capture the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees as a part of an integrated approach. 
There are numerous barriers to participation for forced migrants 
including lack of resources. People who have left conflict and post-conflict 
situations cannot always participate actively and visibly in homeland affairs 
                                                             
4 The University for Peace organised an Expert Forum on ‘Capacity Building for Peace and 
Development: Roles of Diaspora’ in Toronto, Canada, October 19-20 2006. The Forum 
brought together almost 100 expert participants including senior government officials; 
representatives of international organisations; representatives of civil society organisations; 
and researchers from around the world for an in-depth discussion regarding roles of 
diasporas. 
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because of fear and danger. Sherrell and Hyndman coined the phrase “global 
minds, local bodies” to capture limitations on the physical mobility of Kosovar 
refugees in British Columbia who nonetheless see themselves as active 
members of the Kosovar nation and political community (Sherrell and 
Hyndman, 2006). 
International responses to refugee crises management can be seen in 
three dimensions. The first dimension is the migrants themselves and their 
needs in their host countries. Finding solutions for refugees, including 
facilitating their return to and reintegration into their own communities in an 
appropriate way, is the second dimension. The third dimension is the fact that 
for host countries, there is no security, development, or humanitarian 
instrument to assist communities that are often devastated socially, 
economically, and environmentally by the sudden influx of massive numbers 
of non-citizens. Similarly, little is understood about how refugees can affect 
host country involvement in neighbouring conflict situations. This has been a 
major gap in the international toolkit. 
 
Refugee 
Traditionally, UNHCR was restricted operationally by the legal 
definition of refugees outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The Convention defined a refugee as any person who: 
 
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear or for reasons other 
than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself to the 
protection of that country (UN, 1951, p. 3). 
 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
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former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (United Nations, 28 July 
1951, Chapter 1, Article 1, paragraph A2). 
 
In this conceptualisation, the ‘state’ was integral to both the definition of 
the problem, in the crossing of an international border, and the proposed 
solution, the granting of asylum. In other words, UNHCR could only assist 
displaced persons once they had crossed their country’s external border. 
Those displaced internally were not recognised as such, since they remained 
within the internal territory. The 1951 Convention is inadequate for refugee 
protection because it is not flexible in the face of what are perceived to be the 
new refugees; those fleeing, for example, from ethnic violence. 
Most organisations frame displacement in a more casual manner, in 
which terms such as ‘refugee’ or ‘internally displaced’ are virtually 
interchangeable. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) abides by a more fluid definition of refugees than that of the 1951 
Convention. Through its mandate under the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is 
responsible for assisting the victims of armed conflict – a group that includes 
both refugees and the internally displaced. Hence, unlike UNHCR, the ICRC 
does not make the traditional distinction between refugees and the internally 
displaced. In short, ICRC protects victims of war, while UNHCR protects 
refugees. 
UNHCR expand its operational realm to include internally displaced 
persons. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, its operations included not 
only refugees and internally displaced persons, but also vulnerable groups 
close to the areas in which UNHCR was providing assistance. UNHCR has 
recognised that: 
 
…the dynamics of today’s mass population displacements require an 
approach that is both comprehensive and integrated: comprehensive in 
the sense of dealing with the sequence of events and actions from 
prevention to emergency response to solutions, and integrated in the 
sense of bringing together the entire spectrum of issues and actors. 
(UNHCR, 1996). 
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The first major change in the regime resulted from the recognition that 
a singular situation (WWII) had given way to an ongoing phenomenon, and 
that limiting the scope of the regime to that displacement prompted by ‘events 
occurring before 1 January 1951’ was not sufficient. The 1967 Protocol to the 
Convention removed this reference. Subsequent regional agreements were 
reached in response to the perception of empirical variation in refugee 
circumstances, as well as to the growing magnitude of the predicament. While 
the crossing of an international border remained a part of all the 
conceptualisations, more flexible thinking was demonstrated in the expanding 
lists of possible reasons for flight. From a primary focus on fear of persecution, 
the possible causes came to include, among others, the sorts of 
circumstances most likely to prompt internal displacement. 
The definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use is 
one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their 
country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by 
generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation 
of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order. 
Over time, a shift from traditional security approaches to a more 
integrated approach – hanging upon concepts of ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘human 
security’ – took place prompted by the changing reality of conflict in the post-
Cold War era (Roberts, 1998; Duffield, 2001). Of particular concern for the 
current study is the absence of discussion on the engagement of refugees 
and returnees, although both scholarship and the legal framework see 
peacebuilding as a precondition for the successful return and reintegration of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Indeed, it has been agreed that understanding the views of refugees 
has notable value. Refugees are the ‘human barometer’ of political stability, 
justice and order in much of the world (Winter, 1994, p.2). Refugees constitute 
evidence for political failure or success in today’s human society. On one 
hand they are a barometer of current thinking towards durable solutions and 
on the other hand they are interested in judging their effectiveness. A 
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considerable number of refugees living in a given place is often a good 
indicator of a breakdown in governance in their place of origin, an indicator of 
governmental abuse in the home country, or of warfare, or that coherent 
governance has ceased to exist (so-called failed states). 
The international refugee regime is a construct that emerged at a 
particular geographical and temporal juncture and that continues to evolve 
reactively to a changing empirical context. It is ‘made’ at myriad levels: its 
basic parameters are established by international legal documents, and its 
character is formed through the interventions of practitioners, the analyses of 
scholars and the lived experiences of displacement on the ground. The history 
of refugee law reveals that it is not founded purely on the principles of 
humanitarianism or the advancement of human rights, but on compromises 
designed to reconcile the sovereign prerogative of states to control 
immigration with the reality of forced migrations of people at risk. 
 
1.8. Organisation of the Study  
The chapters of this thesis together relate to a number of core 
conceptual and policy questions that need to be addressed if our ability to 
resolve the refugee crisis is to be enhanced. Paramount among these 
questions is the role that UNHCR and refugees themselves should play. 
Chapter Two examines the politics of forced migration and explores 
debates in international relations to forced migration. 
Chapter Three explores the theoretical model of the thesis, findings 
and concepts of norm socialisation and diffusion model. The chapter 
introduces and discusses the study’s adopted theoretical framework and 
includes an overview of the constructivist literature and norm development: 
norms, normative structures and norm entrepreneurs. It stipulates the move 
towards everyday resilience and the ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms and the 
potential role of refugees as ‘norm entrepreneurs’. 
Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the methodological 
approach outlined above and the reasons for choosing a qualitative, 
evaluative, single case study. It presents the overall research methodology 
and design of the study and discusses both the strength and the limitations of 
this study. In addition, it elaborates on the data collection methods, or 
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techniques, and expands on the operationalisation of the two concepts of 
forced migration and peacebuilding, which are central to this study. 
The next four chapters (5, 6, and 7) present the empirical research on durable 
solutions. Chapter Five, therefore, discusses how Bosnian refugees 
experienced resettlement in a host country, to discover how Bosnian refugees 
perceived UNHCR resettlement programmes, and their ideas regarding the 
programmes’ strengths and weaknesses and recommendations for 
improvement. It includes findings on resettlement in relation to a constructivist 
perspective. Chapter Six examines the process of integrating refugees into a 
new host society, which involves not only the refugee, but the host society 
and state as well. It builds on the constructivist perspective to show how local 
integration issues are being looked at and discusses findings from interviews 
in relation to Local Integration. In Chapter Seven, the starting point for 
examining the links between returnees and peacebuilding is analysing the 
transformations in their resources (material, social, political, and cultural) that 
result from the interaction of the agency of refugee returnees and structures 
during their migration experience. While repatriation is currently the preferred 
solution to the presence of refugees, it faces many obstacles to its 
implementation. This chapter introduces the idea of working within the 
refugee-generating country and explores the difficulties associated with 
returning refugees to war-torn regions. It presents findings on returning as a 
way of presenting primary interview material. 
Chapter Eight (Conclusion) provides a conclusion and examines the 
norm diffusion from the refugees to UNHCR discussion to show how the 
findings from refugees have been diffused back to the UNCHR policy 
frameworks from the ‘bottom-up’. 
 To summarise this chapter, it is evident that while international or 
national policies are created and implemented predominantly by host and 
donor governments, international organisations, and international and local 
NGOs, the actual success of these policies depend on those whom they 
address. A number of studies in the development and refugee literature point 
to the fact that refugees themselves are actors in the process of policy 
implementation, as their acceptance or rejection of certain programming might 
determine the fate of these policies. As Mehta and Gupte (2003) point out, an 
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emerging literature is now acknowledging the need to recognize the 
universality of recipient rights while simultaneously taking a deeper look at the 
individual’s situation, treating individuals as responsible actors, and creating a 
legitimate space for involving refugees in decision-making processes. 
Refugees’ perceptions of policies and programmes combined with their 
understandings of rights and own priorities have a direct influence on the 
outcome of policies and ultimately on the livelihoods of refugees. 
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CHAPTER 2: Context of Study: The Politics of Forced Migration 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the first place, it is important to understand what is meant by ‘forced 
migration’ as a background context informing this thesis. Briefly, forced 
migration represents a political process in which refugees and IDPs respond 
to a violation of basic human rights. The term ‘forced’ does not necessarily 
mean that people simply leave their homes without any consideration. 
Instead, it implies that civilians are ‘coerced’ into making respective choices 
based on their expectations and perceptions of the likelihood of (i) being 
attacked and (ii) receiving assistance. Consequently, as argued throughout 
the thesis, refugees and IDPs participate in political decision-making 
processes that affect their lives. 
Indeed, such an understanding of ‘forced migration’ has implications for 
the way we also perceive the development of the contemporary refugee 
regime at the international level that may have implications for how such 
decision-making processes may also affect their lives in practice. Briefly, this 
can be summarised in four ways. 
First, the politicisation of (forced) migration (Castles et al., 2014) has 
ensured that migration – more than ever before – has become an almost 
continuous and key issue in national and international politics, and thus there 
are high degrees of contestation and controversy within these decision-
making processes that influence the lives of refugees. Put simply, the 
international refugee regime under UNHCR serves to balance, on the one 
hand, contestations deriving from conflicts over the degree of international 
legitimacy enjoyed by UNHCR to shape the key norms relating to human 
rights and, on the other, the often diverging political pressures on states to 
also act to protect human rights in their own independent way (Loescher, 
2008). Hence, not only is the relationship between ‘bottom-up’ refugees and 
‘top-down’ policy-making expected to be full of contestation, but this also 
partly derives from the contextual background that forced migration suffers 
from major contestations between policy-makers ‘at the top as well’. 
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Second, as part of this wider politicisation and political process, some 
European sociologists even disagree as to whether the respective UNHCR 
policy could be regarded as a de facto human rights instrument (Koser, 2007; 
Lavenex, 2006). There are disputes as to whether UNHCR policy can be seen 
as anything other than setting the rather general background norms governing 
the politics of forced migration. Hence, in terms of norm diffusion its role is 
actually in setting the general norms to be diffused, rather than as a policy 
instrument that can turn general norms into specific outcomes affecting 
refugees’ lives on the ground. Third, even if we accept that UNHCR policy can 
shape specific policy instruments, there is also contestation that it may 
actually be facing a climate where these are likely to be less successful over 
time, and that the national power of states remains central to facilitating or 
blocking UNHCR policy instruments. Some critical studies have shown that 
the decreasing rates and quality of refugee protection (such as the negotiation 
of only temporary protection to Bosnian refugees) reflect the resurgent power 
of states to limit access to refugees. As Khalid Koser argues (2007, p. 242), in 
the 1990s, the “balance of power between states and the international refugee 
regime has shifted” further from human rights obligations to refugee 
protections rights to privilege national interests. This weakness of UNHCR 
has been continually demonstrated during respective conflicts, for example, in 
the context of the large-scale Syrian influx to Lebanon when Lebanon rejected 
ratification of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. Such practical instances and experiences have – in practice – 
heavily affected UNHCR’s own ability to execute its international protection 
mandate over time (Janmyr, 2018). 
Fourth, most scholarship has also highlighted that any perceived 
effectiveness of UNHCR policy instruments to be influential in delivering norm 
diffusion of preventing forced migration and furthering conflict resolution is 
intrinsically linked to the wider state of the international political climate and 
wider estimations among the international community of achieving lasting 
peace in areas contributing to and driving ‘forced migration’. Hence, in 
practice, it is likely that the ability of UNHCR policy to shape norm diffusion on 
forced migration is also affected by wider estimations of whether this can also 
be conducted in areas where conflict resolution can be achieved and some 
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degree of peace established and restored. In simple terms, UNHCR norm 
diffusion on forced migration tends to be more successful at times when the 
likelihood and negotiation of peace agreements seems (more) viable in 
practice. For example, in Africa, the signing of the Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement (28 August 2000) between the Tutsi-dominated government of 
Burundi and mainly Hutu opponents, provides an example of how ‘track-two’ 
negotiations can incorporate norms governing arrangements towards 
displaced populations and have a significant impact in shaping attitudes to 
forced migration on the ground. (Worby, 2004). 
Fifth, in those instances where UNHCR policy may indeed shape norm 
diffusion that may eventually help displaced populations to return and 
reintegrate, then it is also the case that the literature also asserts that this can 
simultaneously address the root causes of a conflict and help prevent further 
displacement (RSG, 2007). While constructivist scholars have begun to 
investigate the impact of norms on various aspects of international politics, 
limited effort has been expended to scrutinise how norms relating to individual 
and group rights inform post-settlement peacebuilding. In simple terms, this 
brief analysis of the contextual background also shows that where UNHCR 
policy diffusion can be successful – be it in very selective and limited ways – 
there can be a ‘knock-on’ impact on whether further forced migration may take 
place in the future. 
With these background contexts in place, this chapter now examines 
the context of the politics of forced migration in more detail in order to identify 
key factors influencing migratory patterns, the consequences of international 
and national refugee policy, the creative responses of people on the move to 
the constraints and opportunities of shifting political contexts, and the 
refugees’ influence on conflict and peace outcomes. In particular, the intention 
is to outline the particular context of migration patterns at the time of the 
Bosnian War, and more specifically, to draw out ten important reflections that 
provide the backdrop for our later more detailed analysis and empirical 
findings. 
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2.2. Migratory Patterns: Ten Important Reflections 
In contemporary research into forced migration then, the most 
frequently cited definition of forced migration, which has been adopted and 
promoted by the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration 
and Forced Migration Online, is as follows: 
…a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and 
internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as 
people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or 
nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects (Refugee Study 
Center, 2012). 
This definition focuses on the causes and consequences of three 
categories of forced migration induced by conflict, development policies, and 
natural disasters, with an emphasis on the experiences of those affected. 
Importantly for this study, this prevailing definition is largely dictated by rather 
practical political and policy concerns (shaped by ‘top-down’ practitioners) in 
order to pragmatically handle humanitarian demands, rather than being based 
on fundamentally analytical ones. 
With this in mind, such a broad and rather pragmatic definition of 
forced migration captures the notion that forced migration is seen as having 
multifaceted implications for policy-makers (including those of UNHCR). 
Nevertheless, although the concept of forced migration should naturally 
encompass different forms of migration, including internal displacement and 
development-induced displacement, traditionally, however, it has 
predominantly focused by ‘top-down’ policy-makers on the narrow sub-
category of refugees and those forced to flee due to violence, war, and 
insecurity (Hammerstad, 2005). Thus, while the general definition remains 
quite broad, the practical realities have been that ‘top-down’ policy has utilised 
some expediency in ensuring that in practice it has been translated into 
focusing on rather narrow sub-categories of refugees. This has important 
implication for this study in the following ways. 
First, when translating forced migration as a policy process, this has 
come to also reflect the growing and key observation among ‘top-down’ 
policy-makers that these narrow sub-categories of refugees may not have 
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their destination in mind before they leave and that they are most likely to find 
a destination in the middle of movement. In other words, people respond, 
even in very constrained opportunities, to the triadic relationship of their 
countries of origin, their countries of destination, and the international 
community. 
Second, ‘force’ has been largely interpreted by policy-makers as more 
or less close to representing the violence of conflict carried out by one or 
more armed groups in the competition for territory or government. That is, this 
definition focuses on population movement as a result of armed conflict, 
including genocide, political persecution, civil war, and international wars (Ball 
et al., 2002; Morrison and May, 1994; Moore and Shellman, 2006). In 
particular, there has been specific recognition that, government and armed 
groups have deliberately targeted civilians in order to mobilise the support of 
their constituencies or to exploit resources that are held by targeted groups. 
Governments and armed groups use violence both to prevent the defection of 
specific groups and to induce their compliance, particularly in civil wars and 
other internal conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006; Lichbach, 1995). This violence 
endangers the lives and security of individuals, and it becomes an imminent 
force. Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight that this terminology has 
also enabled a degree of discretion to be exercised by policy-makers from the 
‘top-down’ since not all of these people leave home in the face of violent 
conflict. Internally displaced civilian populations move from one place to 
another, seeking safety and protection inside their own country – although 
from the perspective of forced migration in this thesis – it is noted that the 
focus of the policy-makers has largely been on cross-border rather than 
internal forced migration. 
Third, the responses of neighbouring states and the international 
community affect the decision-making processes of forced migrants. 
International humanitarianism is not new in the history of international 
relations. It has evolved alongside the evolution of international conflict and 
cooperation. International humanitarian agencies can provide displaced 
people with better opportunities to be secure in many ways, especially when 
governments do not have the willingness and capacity to do so. As one 
former high-ranking UN official has written: “The coordination of global 
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humanitarian relief operations is as much about politics as it is about efficient 
and effective management” (Barber, 2015, p.187). But sometimes 
governments and armed groups exploit international humanitarian efforts to 
maximise their own interests and influence. Thus, both conflict and 
humanitarian responses should be taken into consideration simultaneously in 
order to draw a plausible causal inference. 
Fourth, the concept of the forced migrant does already include some 
degree of international legitimacy even if there are major issues of 
contestation. Hence, this thesis recognises that any discussion of forced 
migration is working from some kind of legal foundation at the international 
level. This is important for our later analysis of the ‘bottom-up’ perception of 
refugees since their status is at least recognised and therefore needs to at 
least be partly understood within the context of international agreement where 
some norm diffusion has – most probably already taken place. This includes 
understanding the interesting dichotomy whereby refugees are recognised by 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and IDPs, who are 
not. Hence, forced migrants are assumed to make decisions based upon their 
expectations of both being victimised and being secure, exercising some 
degree of choice. Hence, providing insight into some of these degrees of 
choice is important in relation to empirical investigations of this thesis. 
Fifth, such understandings of the degrees of choice of migrants must 
also be seen and interpreted with practical qualitative caveats. Few migrants 
exercise either maximum choice or no choice. As Van Hear (1998, p. 42) 
states, “[a]lmost all migration involves some kind of compulsion; at the same 
time almost all migration involves choices.” Although many terms such as 
‘forced,’ ‘compelled,’ ‘impelled, and ‘compulsory’ are used interchangeably to 
describe the phenomenon, most forced migrants are projected somewhere 
between the ends of the maximum choice and no-choice continuum of forced 
migration. 
Sixth, it is important to pay attention to the impact on societies and 
views on societal roles towards forced migration and thus not to see any 
discussion of the ‘bottom-up’ perceptions of refugees in isolation. Societies, all 
over the world, have welcomed victims of persecution and violence over the 
centuries, even before the instruments for the regulation of the refugee law 
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came into force (Holmes, 1988, p. 405).5 The international community has 
generally welcomed refugees, protecting their rights and hosting them, but in 
recent years some more negative trends have been highly discernible with 
national political climates, and in particular, domestic populations becoming 
more resistant to accepting large numbers of particular types of refugees as a 
matter of course. Governments have often found it difficult to reconcile their 
humanitarian impulses and obligations with the domestic needs and policies 
to assure the critical voices among domestic populations towards accepting 
forced migrants, especially at present with this exceptional number of 
migrants. States have struggled and keep struggling, trapped between 
maintaining solidarity with the refugees, while placating the concerns of their 
citizens, who feel threatened by the ongoing influx. Ultimately, the 
responsibility to protect refugees is borne by nation-states, with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees facilitating cooperation with 
countries to best reach goals. On this premise, refugees have been hosted all 
over the world but largely on the perceived conditionality that when conditions 
in their homeland are restored to normal, this will allow them to then return 
safely and with dignity. Moreover, governments cooperated with UNHCR, 
allowing the organisation to operate in their territories and providing funding 
for their own refugee programmes (Jastram and Achiron, 2001, p. 5). 
Seventh, forced migration crises have come to be regarded by ‘top-
down’ policy-makers as chronic features that have a largely negative impact 
on both human experience and the conduct of international relations. The 
absence of the clear Cold War ‘structure’ allowed for greater forced migration 
and became a key issue because of media and political attention and the 
strain on resources. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the 
world has observed more dramatic fear of attacks, disorder, and coerced 
displacements of innocent populations than ever before. When the number of 
forced migrants is small, forced migration may not matter. However, as that 
                                                             
5 The right to seek asylum in a church or any other holy place was first codified in law by King 
Ethelbert of Kent around 600 A.D. There were similar laws which were implemented by other 
kings throughout the world. For example, throughout the course of the nineteenth century, 
Britain acted as a safe European refuge for political exiles fleeing repression on the continent. 
It was described as ‘the flag under which so many refugees, Russian, Italian, French, 
Hungarian and of all nations, had found asylum’ (quoted Holmes, 1988, p. 405). 
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number increases, forced migration produces both the best and worst ‘reflex’ 
tendencies among top-down policy-makers. In many respects, forced 
migration demands compassion, leading both to calls for help and a fear of 
difference in international relations, state policies, and individuals’ lives. In 
international relations, refugees and IDPs are “products of humanity’s worst 
instinct” as well as “some of its best instinct” – “the willingness of some 
persons to oppress others” as well as “the willingness of many to assist and 
protect the helpless.” To states, they can be “threats or weapons” as well as 
“trophies or embarrassment.” For individuals, they matter simply because “it 
could be me” (Helton, 2002, p. 7). 
From this perspective there is a possibility that a willingness to address 
the causes of flight and provide solutions helping forced migrants may 
increase efficiency of assistance. This can lead to norm diffusion from 
‘bottom-up’ views and suffering to the top-down sphere where more attention 
could be given to international cooperation if refugee responses are to be 
workable and enduring. It is not just about ‘burden-sharing’ but success 
depends on the international community’s appreciation of sharing all aspects 
of crises situations and taking into account the interests and views of those 
displaced. 
Eighth, at the international level, the mass flights of innocent people 
can be influential in promoting change by senior policy-makers and/or at least 
them being seen as ‘change agents’ by refugees. The literature has identified 
that this is actually possible in several ways. First, the indignity and 
deprivation of displaced people under persecutors or tyrants often inspires the 
international community and ‘top-down’ policy-makers to cooperate in 
confronting this flesh-and-blood reflection of oppression (Cohen and Deng, 
1998a, b; Loescher, 2001). Due to the so-called ‘CNN effect,’ leaders in 
wealthy democracies are demanded by their constituents to do more, do it 
better, and do it more quickly to deal with the tragic image of refugees and 
IDPs around the world (Robinson, 2002). 
Ninth, at the state level, refugees and IDPs are important because they 
can be seen by policy-makers as a potential resource and/or rationale for 
actual peacebuilding and state-building. If refugees become active from the 
‘bottom-up’, it is often argued that it will be difficult for international forums to 
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ignore their voice(s). In addition, there can be real added value-added for the 
careers of policy-makers if they can be individually tied to policy actions or 
norm diffusion that may eventually lead to discernible fundamental changes 
among individual lives and communal identities that will be observed in terms 
of race, ethnicity, language, and religion (Deng, 2006; Salehyan, 2007). 
Refugees then, can be ‘used’ by ‘top-down’ policy-makers and be regarded as 
the trophies of wider political competition and achievement in – what some 
regard as – zero-sum political game(s) between international policy-makers. 
For example, at the end of the Cold War era, the arrival of uninvited exiles 
precipitated state-chosen policies that both discouraged asylum seeking and 
facilitated the ability of exiles to live and prosper in territories close to their 
home countries. When militarised camps harbouring refugee warriors become 
endemic, for instance, all refugees and IDPs are often lumped together due to 
the inability of international organisations and state governments to effectively 
determine who deserves protection and who is guilty (Hoffman and Weiss, 
2006). The containment policies of host governments, which are typically 
created from fear that anarchy from their neighbouring countries will seep into 
their own country, contribute to the increasing number of IDPs who are would-
be refugees (Nahm, 2007). 
Conversely, adopting critical and restrictive policies also offers 
opportunities for policy-makers to shape competing norm diffusion that argues 
against welcoming refugees and that peace building is actually built on 
restrictive immigration policies (Hörler Perrinet et.al. 2018). Hence, change 
itself remains contested and the trend is actually towards less coherence in 
terms of the trajectory of policy change affecting forced migration over recent 
decades. There are numerous instances in recent decades, such as 
Denmark, and even the UK via BREXIT debates, were the policy tightening 
has focused on promoting the greater rejection of refugees and asylum 
seekers (Berry et. al., 2016). Policy change agents in some instances have 
sought to restrict the numbers of refugees in order to achieve policy change 
that seeks to harden domestic security. Moreover, abuses of the asylum 
systems have fuelled scepticism, and led to further debates around restricting 
aid and to conduct change to provide for more selective targeting of those 
refugee groups deemed to be in need. For this reason, refugees have been 
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refused admission or have been expelled from asylum countries; those who 
reached the hosting countries have been sent back to their home countries. 
There have been growing instances that the wider international climate has 
been more (not less) tolerant of the intimidation of refugees by sceptical local 
communities, with growing criticism of the failures and wisdom of migration 
policies that promoted integration of migrants into the hosting societies (Berry, 
2016). Moreover, evidence suggests that the respective hosting local 
population often worries about competition with the migrants, who are seen as 
exploiters of the economic and natural resources (von Hermanni and 
Neumann, 2019). Some countries have become increasingly worried about 
the economic and social costs of asylum, as some donor governments are 
struggling with the domestic expenses of receiving refugees and supporting 
them over long periods of time in other nations (Kancs and Lecca, 2018; 
Casati, 2017). This issue led to a clash between less developed countries that 
oppose the wealthier states, which are restricting their parameters in hosting 
refugees and reducing the support resources (Jastram and Achiron, 2001, pp. 
6-7). 
Tenth, at the individual level, refugees and IDPs are significant not only 
because they are the personification of harsh change with agony and despair 
but also because they are the reflection of failures of governments and 
international organisations. In this way, refugees and IDPs have wider impact 
on how society rates and sees itself. Listening to the voices of the refugees 
would mean that policy-makers would have to be accountable for refugee-
related policies. As Helton (2002, p.12) says, forced migration crises raise “a 
basic doubt about the ability of people to live together.” Refugees and IDPs 
are a real manifestation of the injustice and misery associated with the 
concept of deprivation. This is the obvious case when forced migration crises 
become protracted (Crisp, 2003a, b). Although forced migrants in protracted 
situations barely have the physical means to move or support themselves, 
material assistance and protection services are often selective due to the 
debate over the principle and practices of state sovereignty (Deng, 2006). In 
the worst case, the threats to their lives are exacerbated because of the 
political indifference of states and international organisations. 
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Reflecting on this section, to redress a historic neglect of refugees' own 
agency in the international community's approach to forced migration, policy-
makers must look to use forced migrants' own political and economic 
capacities, placing human mobility, autonomy and dignity at the centre of 
international programmes for relief, protection and reconstruction. 
This thesis views refugees as political actors who influence and are 
influenced by processes and outcomes of forced migration. Forced migrants 
make provisional decisions, with constrained freedom of choice, about 
whether to leave home and whether to cross international borders. They do 
not always respond in the same way to the same root causes. They make 
their decisions based on both their expectation that they will be victimised and 
their expectation that they will be protected by the international community. 
 
2.3. The Consequences of International and National Refugee Policy 
International migration is part of a transnational shift that is reshaping 
societies and politics around the globe. Until recently, governments generally 
did not see international migration as a central political issue. UNHCR's 
‘search for solutions’ recognises this complexity of migration flows (UNHCR, 
2007; UNHCR, 2008b; UNHCR, 2008c; UNHCR, 2017). It is premised upon 
the notion that forced displacement can and must be resolved through the 
prevention of conflict, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of 
sustainable development. The second aspect of UNHCR mandate is to “seek 
permanent solutions to the problem of refugees” (The Statute, par 1). Official 
solutions to refugee crises have long been limited to three options: voluntary 
repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum or third country 
resettlement. 
Minority Returns and Voluntary Repatriation: 
UNHCR considered the first option, repatriation, to be the most 
favourable (Long, 2010, p.4; Güler, 2016). It is also considerably easier for 
UNHCR to repatriate than to persuade a third country, usually industrialised 
and developed, to accept increasing numbers of refugees. For example, when 
the EU experienced an unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants in 
2015 and 2016, the support for refugee policy began to wane, with increased 
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hostility towards migrants entering the political discourse. Certain countries 
along the migrant route began to close their borders. This dramatic increase 
in those seeking protection sparked a heated debate in Western countries 
about the impact of refugees on the receiving societies and on adequate 
policies for dealing with this phenomenon. One crucial aspect of this debate is 
the extent to which Western countries can effectively integrate asylum 
seekers into their labour markets and societies (Moraga and Rapoport, 2015; 
Hatton, 2017). 
 Countries of first asylum, located primarily in the south, are also 
becoming increasingly intolerant of hosting refugees that reach their borders 
(For example, in 2015 Indonesia became increasingly restrictive for Rohingya 
and Bangladeshi refugees). Repatriation, therefore, remains the preferred 
‘solution’ and the official repatriation policy of UNHCR has changed 
dramatically over the past few decades in order to reflect these circumstances 
(UNHCR, 2017; O’Connor, 2013). 
Voluntary repatriation is where refugees volunteer to return to their 
country of origin. Article V of the OAU Convention, “which is the only 
multilateral treaty provision so far concluded for repatriation of refugees” 
(Goodwin-Gill, 1983, p. 263), stresses the voluntary nature of the repatriation, 
the importance of collaboration between the country of origin and the country 
of asylum, and the principles that refugees who decide to return should not be 
penalised and that returnees are to be provided with assistance by the 
country of origin, the asylum state, and international and intergovernmental 
organisations to facilitate their return. 
UNHCR first introduced the policy of ‘minority returns’ following the war 
in Bosnia, in which over half the population was forcibly displaced. Prior to the 
1992-1995 war, most of the original ethnic Croats and Muslims remained in 
the Serb-controlled regions. Similarly, only a small percentage (4 per cent to 7 
per cent) of ethnic Serbs remained in the joint Croat–Bosniak-controlled 
Federation (Bieber, 2006, p. 32). In other words, an ethnically mixed country 
had become almost completely unmixed in a matter of four years. Following 
Muller:  
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As a result of this massive process of ethnic unmixing, the 
ethnonationalist ideal was largely realized: for the most part, each 
nation in Europe had its own state, and each state was made up 
almost exclusively of a single ethnic nationality. During the Cold War, 
the few exceptions to this rule included Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Union, and Yugoslavia. But these countries’ subsequent fate only 
demonstrated the ongoing vitality of ethnonationalism (2008, p. 111). 
 
Return policy assumes that negotiations between refugees’ countries 
of origin, UNHCR, and donor nations can result in a win-win situation 
(repatriation) through the country of origin and that UNHCR, representing 
itself, refugees and donors, can come to an agreement. The return of 
refugees and displaced persons, for example, requires not only political will 
but also minimally enabling economic conditions: returnees who lack the 
means to support themselves and their families are unlikely to be able to 
sustain themselves in vulnerable minority situations. 
One problem stands out. Historically, UNHCR has allowed refugee 
repatriation without their consent, hence exposing them to more conflict and 
life-threatening environments. There are many examples of this, for example: 
more than 20,000 Tamils repatriated from Switzerland; more than 300,000 
Bosnian refugees repatriated from Germany (Black and Koser, 1999); and 
200,000 Rohingyan Muslim minority refugees repatriated from Bangladesh to 
Burma (Loescher, 2001). Evidence suggested that there were conflicts, 
remigrations, and even the possibility of ‘disappearances’ (a euphemism for 
‘killings’) involving these and/or other returnees (Amnesty International 1997a, 
b; Van Hear, 1998; Black and Koser, 1999; Loescher, 2001; UNHCR, 2002). 
In one of her speeches made to the Executive Committee of UNHCR, Miss 
Ogata argued that refugees would be better off if they were to go “home” 
rather than stay in camps (for example, Statement by Mrs Sadako Ogata, 
UNHCR, 23 November 1996). As Loescher (2001, p. 5-7) explains, this was 
implemented as part of the so-called voluntary repatriation program (VRP) in 
which refugees were advised to return ‘home’ in order to benefit from 
UNHCR’s temporary assistance for reintegration and/or to suffer the 
consequences of the termination of aid and protection if they failed to do so. 
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Initially, refugees could not be repatriated unless the situation from which they 
had fled had visibly improved and there was no perceived threat to their well-
being upon return. From the 1980s, however, new categories were created 
which enabled repatriation to take place under less than ideal conditions. 
According to one UNHCR official, the organisation moved away from the 
original principles guiding repatriation because states are increasingly 
demanding that refugees return as quickly as possible, and furthermore, it is 
nearly impossible to objectively determine the level of safety in many ‘post-
conflict’ settings (Interview 4). Thus, it appears that the concept of 
non-refoulement has been gradually debased. Other measures carried out by 
countries of asylum, however, such as reductions in food aid, relocation of 
camps, and harassment by security forces are all inducements for refugees to 
return before the situation has improved. 
With no jurisdiction over the local authorities and based outside of the 
camps, it is very hard for UNHCR to physically protect refugees in situations 
of repatriation. The countries of origin usually have a poor record as regards 
respecting human rights, hold limited abilities to restore economic, social and 
political life, as well as experience difficulties in maintaining effective judicial 
systems, that together may bring long-term stability. It can be argued, 
therefore, that the facilitative role of UNHCR in repatriation is not so much a 
solution to the refugee crisis, as evidence of their inability to act without the 
permission of host country governments or support from major donors (Betts, 
2018). Furthermore, with the organisation’s budget being stretched further 
each year, repatriation is the most cost-effective way to deal with refugees, as 
once they are back in their country of origin, the repatriated are technically no 
longer under the jurisdiction of UNHCR. The shift away from absolute 
standards regarding the desire by refugees to repatriate given their 
assessment of the situation in the home country toward a comparative 
evaluation by agency officials regarding whether refugees would be more 
secure at home or in the camps has the direct implication of privileging the 
agency’s knowledge claims over those offered by refugees. 
The High Commissioner proposed an integrated approach known as 
“Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs)” 
(UNHCR, 2004). This approach brought together humanitarian and 
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development actors and funds, envisaging the allocation of greater resources 
to facilitate a more conducive environment inside the countries of origin, to 
deter any recurrence of mass outflows, and to facilitate sustainable 
repatriation. This initiative was piloted in Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and 
Afghanistan, and promoted cooperation among the government, development 
actors such as UNDP, the World Bank, UNICEF and WFP, the donor 
community and bilateral aid agencies. 
Even among critics of UNHCR’s, donors’ and asylum states’ promotion 
of and preference for return as a durable solution (Chimin, 2003), a key norm 
has become universally accepted; namely that return is the most desirable 
solution and, at least, the prevailing assumption remains that every refugee 
desires to return ‘home’. 
The limitations of the solutions just described prompted discussions 
about Preventive Protection and Safe Havens. Preventive Protection6 
envisaged a long-term solution by proposing a shift in focus away from 
refugees as a problem and toward addressing the causes of refugee flows, so 
that people were not displaced to begin with. Safe havens7 are proposed as 
an alternative to ‘Preventive Protection’. The problem, however, remained that 
people were to be kept close to the conflict, and the proposition largely 
ignored the issue of later threats that this proximity might pose. The acute 
situation of Internally Displaced Persons fast became a crisis of global 
proportions and attests to the unavailability of this solution (Loescher and 
Milner, 2005). 
Resettlement: 
As to alternatives to voluntary repatriation, third country settlement 
(asylum) and second country integration were the normal practices of the 
refugee regime until the late 1980s. Resettlement to a third country of asylum 
was defined by UNHCR as: 
                                                             
6 The concept used by UNHCR to help justify its shift of focus from external asylum to internal 
assistance. In 1992 Ogata mandated an internal working group to come up with suggestions 
for preventive strategies (UNHCR, 1992, quoted in Loescher, 2001, p. 297). Such ideas 
suited the interests of UNHCR’s donors, who wanted the Bosnia displacement crisis 
contained within the Balkan region. 
7 Safe areas were humanitarian corridors established in 1993 in the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the Bosnian War. UN Security Council Resolution 819 and 824 (1993). 
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“…the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they 
have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them 
– as refugees – with permanent residence status. The status provided 
ensures protection against refoulement and provides a resettled 
refugee and his/her family or dependants with access to rights similar 
to those enjoyed by nationals.” (UNHCR, 2011, Chapter 1, p. 9) 
The practice of resettlement is considered both a solution to the 
refugee situation and an avenue for other countries, especially those in the 
West, to share in the burden of hosting refugees by countries in the Global 
South (Milner, 2009). Because UNHCR’s preoccupation was with returning 
and containing refugees, states were concerned with the passing of strict 
immigration laws, and TNCs’ interests were the deterritorialising of spaces so 
that they could be made civil and convenient for profit maximisation: these 
were not considered at all as possible alternatives. 
Generally, UNHCR is involved in seeking out this solution for refugees 
through settlement officers; it is ultimately, however, the receiving country that 
makes the final decision on who is accepted. Milner (2009) suggested that 
states’ adoption of resettlement is influenced by both domestic pressure and 
foreign policy motivations. Third country resettlement is dependent on the 
willingness and cooperation of foreign governments in order to be 
implemented. As UNHCR Resettlement Handbook notes, 
 
No country is legally obliged to resettle refugees. Only a small number 
of States do so on a regular basis (...) Accepting refugees for 
resettlement is a mark of true generosity on the part of Governments 
(UNHCR, 1997a, p. 5). 
Looking at the effectiveness of this option in the context of this thesis, it 
is notable that less than one per cent of the world’s refugees were resettled in 
third countries in 1993 (Loescher and Loescher, 1994). The end of the Cold 
War marked a decrease in the perceived political-strategic interest in refugees, 
whose presence – up until that point – had been deemed substantive (and 
much needed) proof of the failure of the Communist system (Roberts, 1998). 
The increasing reluctance of states to accept refugees in the post-Cold War 
 53 
era coincided with willingness of both governments and multilateral institutions 
to finance humanitarian assistance in or near the country of origin. For 
example, the international response to the crisis in Syria places significant 
emphasis on resilience including through the Regional Refugee & Resilience 
Plan that the United Nations coordinates, and which is known as 3RP 
(Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 2017). 
Currently, to achieve a more equitable sharing of burdens and 
responsibilities, to build capacities to receive and protect refugees and to 
resolve their problems on a durable basis, one of the objectives of Goal 3 of 
the Agenda for Protection (2003) is to use resettlement more effectively as a 
tool of burden-sharing between states (Dowd, 2017; Thomson, 2017). 
Resettlement goes far beyond the relocation of refugees to a third state; it 
involves a process of being received and integrated within a new society. The 
Working Group on Resettlement (WGR) is examining this issue with a 
particular focus on the strategic use of resettlement, on expanding 
resettlement opportunities and on enhancing resettlement capacities. 
Third country resettlement was and continues to be considered the 
least preferred policy option. It is the most expensive of the three policy 
options for the international community and signals the total refusal of a 
country to accept refugees except for a short time. For example, the complete 
refusal of Southeast Asian countries to accept Vietnamese refugees for local 
settlement has meant a considerable strain on the availability of third country 
resettlement places. It has also forced the international community (e.g., 
UNHCR and many concerned governments such as the U.S. and Australia) to 
continually lobby these governments to prevent refoulement of Vietnamese 
boat people (Moreno-Lax, 2017). 
Local Integration: 
This leads to the last of the traditional solutions, which is settlement in 
the country of first asylum. Integration of refugees in the first country of 
asylum, also referred to as local integration, has always been a guiding 
principle of the global refugee regime. According to the 1951 Convention, 
restoring refugees to dignity and ensuring the provision of human rights 
includes an approach that would lead to their integration into the host society 
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(article 34). Indeed, as noted by Harrell-Bond (2000), the 1951 Convention 
uses the word ‘assimilation’, which implies the erasure of differences between 
refugees and their hosts, as well as permanence within the host society. 
As with third country resettlement, local integration is contingent upon 
approval of the host government, which may not be forthcoming in situations 
of mass influx, given the likelihood of scarce resources as well as religious 
and ethnic tensions. Although the majority of the world’s refugees are in the 
developing world, countries of asylum do not regularly grant them the right to 
local integration but more often limit their generosity to temporary asylum in 
closed refugee camps. 
It is evident, therefore, that these traditional solutions often fail to 
ensure the safety of refugees or resolution of the situation leading to their 
displacement. As Erika Feller, director of UNHCR’s Department of 
International Protection, notes, “The Convention [Relating to the Status of 
Refugees] is no panacea for all the problems of displacement. Root causes 
are outside its scope” (Feller, 2001, p. 6). Many would agree that this 
statement applies equally to the mandate of UNHCR. 
With regard to cases where local integration of refugees in countries of 
asylum is a viable option, the High Commissioner proposed a strategy called 
‘Development through Local Integration (DLI)’. In situations where the State 
opts to provide opportunities for gradual integration of refugees, DLI would 
solicit additional development assistance with the aim of attaining a durable 
solution in terms of local integration of refugees as an option and not an 
obligation. 
For example, as documented by UNHCR, since the 1980s countries 
such as Angola, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Cameroon have not only opened their borders to 
the influx of refugees, but have also offered them the option of local 
integration over recent decades and in response to subsequent and prevailing 
crises. For example, in 1981 Tanzania granted 25,000 Rwandan refugees 
citizenship. In 2003, it offered 3,000 Somali refugees the possibility of 
naturalisation; and most recently, in 2008, about 218,000 Burundian refugees 
were granted citizenship opportunities (Fielden, 2008; Milner, 2009). 
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For the purpose of this thesis, the summary of durable solutions is 
outlined in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Summary of Durable Solutions 
Voluntary 
repatriation* 
Resettlement** Local integration*** 
Preferred solution Option of last resort ‘Forgotten solution’  
Tool to remove  Tool to burden-sharing Neglected by states 
Preconditions: 
1. Safety and 
dignity 
2. Being well-
informed 
3. Chance to re-
start life at home 
Tensions: 
1. Reintegration to 
local community 
(tensions 
between those 
who fled and 
those endured) 
 
Preconditions: 
1. Protection 
2. Non-
refoulement 
Tensions: 
1. Another country 
that has agreed 
2. It is seen not as 
a right for 
refugees but as 
a scarce 
resource to be 
distributed 
among only a 
few of the total 
refugees 
 
Preconditions: 
1. Self-reliance 
2. The local 
population of 
the country of 
asylum and the 
refugees can 
co-exist 
Tensions: 
1. Unstable 
asylum 
practices. 
2. Full access to 
rights 
3. Integration 
problems 
 
Sources: 
*UNHCR, Handbook Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, 1996; 
and UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 2004 
** UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, 2011 
*** UNHCR, Handbook of Self-reliance, 2005
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The solutions to displacement that are proposed and implemented are 
an example of the complexities and contradictions of discourse and practice in 
refugee situations. Refugees look for opportunities to improve their lives 
through their choices and responses to their new environment. Commenting on 
the implications of forced displacement on the lives of refugees, Martin (2004, 
p. 13) asserts “for most refugees, the experience of forced migration requires 
continuing response to change, including the need to cope with traumatic new 
circumstances” and such should be the focus of UNHCR’s durable solutions. 
There is increasing recognition that programming in the context of forced 
displacement cannot be credible or effective unless it incorporates and reflects 
the perspectives of refugees (Nah, 2010; Cohen, 2008; Brown and Mansfield, 
2009). 
Trajectory of UNHCR Programming 
Now that there has been more detailed discussion of what constitutes 
the three relevant dimensions of durable solutions in relation to this thesis 
(namely voluntary repatriation, resettlement and local integration), it is not 
worthwhile to just explore what this implies in terms of our understanding of 
UNHCR programming. After all, and as the conceptual framework of this thesis 
envisages, UNHCR programming represents one of the key processes 
whereby top-down norm diffusion might take place in practice. 
In particular, this implies that it is also valuable to consider whether the 
process and impacts of UNHCR programming of refugees does enable 
UNHCR to provide a ‘top-down’ mechanism/interface and actually work to 
ensure the protection of refugees in practice and in particular with the view that 
they may eventually act as citizens capable of choice and action during their 
displacement? On the other hand, it might also be the case and it is envisaged 
in this thesis that any absence of UNHCR’s ‘two-way’ dialogue and debate with 
their refugee constituents regarding protection issues could be taken as a 
reflection of the organisation’s belief that refugees are incapable of choice and 
action due to their displacement? 
Shifting away from the root causes of displacement, it is important to 
note that UNHCR was largely preoccupied with supporting humanitarian relief 
efforts within the respective countries experiencing conflict and crisis. Through 
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the 1990s, it spent more time and resources on large relief operations (for 
example, there are 6.1 million IDPs in Syria and since 2012 UNHCR has been 
supporting them through the provision of protection and community services, 
distribution of core relief items, shelter assistance, health care services, and 
educational support). In 2017, UNHCR implemented the Syria Humanitarian 
Response Plan to respond to large-scale humanitarian and protection needs 
(UNHCR, Syria overview). Yet, in the main, this move into humanitarian 
assistance by UNHCR officials was defended as a new form of protection. The 
1999 UNHCR Global Report stated that “identifying vulnerable groups and 
prioritising assistance to ensure their physical security, access to food, safe 
accommodation, and primary education’ are all components of the daily 
practice of protection” (Feller, p. 4). Critics of this policy have pointed out that 
the gradual shift in focus from legal protection to emergency assistance 
“spawned a new cadre of logistics personnel and managers whose priorities 
are effectiveness of aid delivery rather than protection” (Loescher, 2001, p. 29). 
Emergencies in these cases are perceived “in terms of logistics and not as 
failures of politics, the development process or ethnic relations” (p. 29). It also 
shows unwillingness to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians. Hence, it is 
important to highlight for this thesis that the attention and activities of UNHCR 
was not always focused on the three dimensions of durable solutions in the 
context of helping refugees. Rather it was part of a wider array of remits that at 
the time of the 1990s included a very large preoccupation with organising 
humanitarian relief. 
At the same time, three further observations on UNHCR programming 
are of relevance to this thesis. First, it can be observed that while UNHCR 
programming may have been largely ‘top-down’ oriented and this was indeed 
promoted by the immediacy of organising and implementing humanitarian relief, 
UNHCR programming did leave some policy ‘space’ for taking in the view of 
refugees as least in theory if not always in practice. At the time, UNHCR 
programming was very much driven by the desire to formulate ‘how’ refugees 
participate in the process of seeking solutions. There was thus a growing 
‘window of opportunity’ for an active interface with refugees through durable 
solutions policy even if this may not have been that active in practice. Second, 
despite the emphasis of a two-way dialogue with refugees emerging within 
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UNHCR programming, this was largely in contrast with the approach of states 
and organisations that assume the necessity of making and implementing 
decisions for them (refugees). Hence, there was something of a policy gulf 
between the trajectory of UNHCR programming that seemed to be moving 
towards a better interface with refugees, and the more cautious and traditional 
‘top-down’ lines of key participating states aware of domestic political climates 
that have hardened towards the repatriation, resettlement and local integration 
of refugees. 
Thus, and concurring with Korac (2003, p. 53), the current study argues 
that the search for a solution should be understood as “a two-way process, 
rather than a kind of medication that refugees take in”. In this two-way process, 
refugees participate in identifying and implementing the solution, and are not 
regarded as recipients of a solution imposed by states and UNHCR. Indeed, 
there may have been (i) opportunities to build this more concretely through the 
particular trajectory of UNHCR planning, although in practical terms, (ii) this 
would in practice be not that easy given the perceptions and dispositions of key 
states faced with a more unsettled domestic political climate on refugees. 
Understanding Capacity Building as Protection 
Furthermore, it is also important to highlight in the context of this thesis 
the way capacity building was increasingly viewed as a form of protection 
representing a widening of the way that UNHCR envisaged providing a 
supportive environment in which to promote durable solutions. Put simply, an 
emerging feature of UNHCR’s (humanitarian assistance) programming was the 
shift away from traditional protection strategies towards a stronger focus on 
capacity building. According to UNHCR, capacity building came to focus: “on 
existing initiatives, commitments and potential as distinct from relief, which 
addresses needs and problems’. Importantly, capacity building also provided 
for growing interactions with stakeholders and interested groups since UNHCR 
aimed ‘to build a network of partners at various levels’ that would be, ‘highly 
participatory by nature and requires shared commitments and objectives on the 
part of external and domestic actors.” (1999). Hence as a set of activities, 
capacity building now implied: “provision of technical support, including training, 
advisory services and specialised expertise in favour of national/local 
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institutions or structures, aimed at fulfilling UNHCR’s primary objectives of 
protection and solutions” (Furley et al., 1999, p. 3). 
Importantly for this thesis then, UNHCR programming and emerging 
ethos on capacity building as protection did specifically allow room for a 
stronger dialogue with interested networks, which could of course include 
refugees and, at least in theory, the incorporation of their ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives on durable solutions at the very least. 
It should also be noted, however, that such ‘capacity building as 
protection’ would also envisage a strong role of states, which would be both a 
facilitating and constraining factor on such a dialogue with refugees at various 
points. Importantly, this has three important implications for the way this 
interprets the importance of the capacity building as a protection ethos 
underpinning UNHCR programming on durable solutions. First, UNHCR 
involvement in capacity building initiatives in countries of asylum became 
focused – in the first instance – around fostering state responsibility for the 
management of asylum systems in line with international standards and 
practices. Hence, UNHCR programming ultimately envisaged a central role for 
states and this would become the prevailing feature of UNHCR dialogue where 
the main focus of responsibility would remain with state actors in the first 
instance. Second, and once accomplished, then UNHCR programming would 
largely seek “to strengthen the capacity of those institutions tasked with its 
implementation” (Ibid, p. 5). Activities closer to the people became identified as 
key within this emerging capacity building framework, with a stronger focus on 
promoting reconciliation between communities and strengthening national 
protection, particularly at the local level. These activities are viewed as a 
means of preventing repeat instances of displacement (Ibid., p. 6). Hence, the 
opportunities to a wider dialogue with refugees to incorporate any ‘bottom-up’ 
dimension would remain largely subservient to state interests and dialogues 
and compartmentalised in various parts of UNHCR programming ethos. Thirdly, 
and nevertheless, it is possible to argue that UNHCR (humanitarian assistance) 
programming thereby increasingly recognised the role of community resilience 
in managing refugees and this reinforces the key contention of this thesis that it 
remains important to examine and understand any interface/ nexus between 
UNHCR programming and the view of refugees, seeing it as – at least 
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potentially – a two-way process with important ‘bottom-up’ dimensions and top-
down considerations. 
Assistance Targeting as part of UNHCR Programming 
Another important background observation informing this thesis in 
relation to UNHCR programming relates to the assistance targeting of returned 
refugees as a central activity and a common goal. Two observations are 
noteworthy here. First and veering away from the traditional protection 
mandate, UNHCR increasingly supported the principle of assistance targeting 
of returned refugees. This later became embodied in another key assistance 
initiative of the organisation known as the ‘Quick Impact Project’ (QIP) (United 
Nations Secretariat, 2013, p. 2). Used to stabilise recently returned refugee 
communities (in order to ensure that they do not return to the country of 
asylum), QIPs constituted small-scale development projects aimed at 
alleviating extreme poverty and intended to lead to the rapid rehabilitation of 
communities. 
Second, this greater focus on refugee return through capacity building 
and limited and targeted development assistance exposes a key shift of 
UNHCR operational priorities from countries of asylum to countries of origin. 
Importantly, this represented something of a double-edged sword when it 
comes to how we interpret the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees (see 
Chapter 7). On the one hand, this shift actually strengthens the ability of host 
countries to return refugees prematurely, long before the politics and security 
situation in the country of origin are able to ensure their safety. At face value 
then, the possibilities for greater disparities and controversies between 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees and ‘top-down’ orientations of refugees 
would seem more likely. From a broader policy perspective, these activities 
could be deemed detrimental to refugee populations, as the solutions to their 
displacement are reduced to issues of relief and limited development 
assistance while the root causes of the conflict leading to their displacement 
remain. 
Indeed, increased incidents of refoulement not only result in refugees 
being forced back across borders against their will but could also be deemed 
by some as reflecting the ultimate denial of human rights. In such cases, the 
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ability of refugees to perceive themselves as citizens is highly limited. The 
absence of consensus on definitions of concepts in international human rights 
law, in international law and in refugee law has been a significant contributing 
factor to problems that emerge in guaranteeing protection of the rights of 
refugees. Individual countries are therefore at liberty to define and implement 
the law as they deem most appropriate for their domestic situation without an 
obligation to an established international standard. It is impossible for refugees, 
even those who try very hard, to know what to expect in countries of proximate 
refuge, countries of asylum or even countries of resettlement. 
 
2.4. The Creative Responses of People 
With this discussion of definitions and UNHCR programming now in 
place, it is also important to highlight that there has also been much work done 
on understanding that refugees as actors are not simply passive, but are also 
rather creative and active. Hence, it is important to note that while UNHCR 
process and programming may be largely focused on dialogues and networks, 
it is also necessary to see refugees as dynamic actors who indeed are not 
averse to making life-changing decisions. 
If individuals leave home when facing violent conflict, they have to 
decide where to go. Those who cross international borders are expected to 
have better chances of having access to international assistance. However, not 
all people cross international borders even in the same conditions. Forced 
migrants’ choices of becoming IDPs (as opposed to refugees and the refugees’ 
choice of a destination state), are a function of their relative expectations of 
being victimised and of economic opportunities at their destinations (Moore 
and Shellman, 2006). 
In their works, Moore and Shellman (Ibid.) focus on factors affecting 
choices of the forced migrants to become either refugees or IDPs, and 
refugees’ choices of the destination after they have decided to flee. The level 
of violence in a country of origin affects the likelihood that displaced people flee 
(Azam and Hoeffler, 2002); at the same time, social, political, and economic 
conditions in neighbouring countries also pull those individuals into those 
countries (Castells, 1996; Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003). On the other 
hand, neighbouring countries often prevent those displaced people from 
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moving into their territory because mass flight causes fundamental changes in 
individual lives and communal identities that can be observed in terms of race, 
ethnicity, language, and religion (Kaufman, 2004; Salehyan, 2007b). 
Studies on push factors and pull factors in forced migration crises have 
provided valid insights into forced migrants’ movements (Davenport, Moore, 
and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004). Many of them find that if economic 
opportunities at home are negative, fewer people are likely to move out of 
regions that have higher levels of economic development. Furthermore, they 
conclude that “refugees do prefer to relocate in countries with higher average 
wages” and their numbers tend to be lower from countries with better economic 
opportunities (Moore and Shellman, 2007, p. 828). These findings suggest that 
economic opportunity is likely to play an important role in affecting people’s 
decisions to leave or stay, as well as where they go once they decide to leave. 
Interestingly, the role of the international community has received less 
attention in empirical analyses, and certainly there is limited work to suggest 
that international organisations like UNHCR seriously see refugees as such 
‘dynamic actors’ rather than as passive information sources that need to be 
consulted as part of better process. The level of humanitarian engagement in 
forced migration crises may play an important role as a preventive factor as 
well as a pull factor. Since leaving one’s home country is costly, displaced 
people are more likely to leave their countries of origin if there is a higher 
chance of having access to international assistance and protection in 
neighbouring countries (Moore and Shellman 2006). In this case, a large 
number of refugees are expected to depart for the neighbouring countries. 
However, if the international community is actively engaged with countries of 
origin, displaced people do not need to travel beyond borders; rather, they are 
likely to stay inside their countries of origin because they may have access to 
international assistance inside their countries. Furthermore, if neighbouring 
countries are reluctant to host refugees, displaced people are even less likely 
to go to those countries. 
Edwards (2009) offered a computational model to explain the 
mechanism through which information is shared among individuals who are on 
the move and how the flow of information impacts people’s choices. He asserts 
that “while conflict almost always drives displacement, more precisely, it is the 
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information about the conflict that drives displacement” (Ibid, p. 40). Certain 
events provide cues to individuals, these are transmitted to other individuals, 
who then process the information and decide first whether or not to flee, and 
then where to flee. The act of transmitting and processing information about 
threat at the societal level, it is argued, is critical to understanding forced 
migration decisions (Ibid, p. 41). 
While this study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of 
the role of networks in explaining flight behaviour, the insights from the model 
can also be applied to understanding the role of social networks in allowing 
individuals to stay in their homes. Information transmitted through social 
networks can play a critical role in influencing individuals’ choices of whether to 
flee or stay behind, and not only by providing information about threats, but 
also about countermeasures available to members of the community. 
Moreover, in their study of migration, scholars have long argued that 
individuals who have deep roots and large investments in their communities of 
origin and strong kinship ties are reluctant to leave home (Irwin et al. 2004). 
UNHCR lists the following factors as ‘obstacles to flight’: lack of 
knowledge of route, lack of money to pay fare, poor security along the route, 
adverse climatic conditions, impassable terrain, closed borders, among others 
(UNHCR, 1996). These factors, which are constant, do not cause forced 
migration but they affect the decision-making process of individuals. Research 
on forced migration concludes that people have a choice either to leave or stay 
even under highly adverse circumstances (Moore and Shellman, 2006). 
Drawing on theoretical insights from the utility maximisation literature in 
microeconomics, this ‘choice-centred’ argument makes a significant 
contribution to laying a foundation for analysing forced migration within a 
constructivist framework. This literature, however, stops at pointing out that 
such choices are available and does not examine the reasons behind 
individuals’ choices, or the strategies they employ to cope with conflict or 
adverse circumstances. 
International humanitarian responses may have a marginal effect on 
forced migrants’ decisions at this stage; however, they may affect forced 
migration on two levels: the expected cost-benefit structure of forced migrants’ 
decision-making and the policy choices of governments. First, the existence of 
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humanitarian advocacy groups and IGO agencies in a country is likely to 
increase the expectation of individuals that they can be assisted and protected. 
With a higher level of humanitarian operations in countries of origin, the 
expected benefits available to forced migrants in their countries of origin 
increase so that forced migrants do not have to pay the expensive travel cost. 
Second, humanitarian operations in a country may affect the policy choice of 
the government of that country. When international humanitarian agencies 
such as UNHCR conduct field operations in a country of origin, their activities 
are likely to draw international attention, and the government and armed 
groups of the country cannot avoid damaging its legitimacy if they take military 
actions against its civilians (Haddad, 2008). 
Although leaving home is costly to forced migrants, leaving a country is 
even more costly than just leaving home. The definitional difference between a 
refugee and an IDP simply lies in whether a forced migrant has crossed his or 
her country’s borders. However, the levels of assistance and protection that a 
forced migrant may receive are significantly different based on whether he or 
she is given refugee status. Because of the principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs among sovereign states, remaining within a country makes it 
difficult for displaced people to access the protection of the international 
refugee regime. Displaced people make their decision to leave their countries 
of origin based on their expectation to get assistance and protection as well as 
the subjective probability of being targeted; a host country undertakes a 
refugee policy based on its financial resources, internal security, and its 
international reputation; and the international community must make its 
decisions about the extent to which it will become involved. 
This brief analysis suggests that any future discussion of the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives may also actually need to be placed in a context where there may 
less of a consensus between the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ as to how independent and 
assertive refugees can actually be in practice. It is certainly important to note 
that refugees are not just largely passive actors involved in flight activities 
driven by the pull factors of host nations, which is often the focus of state 
perspectives at this time. Rather there remains an opportunity to understand 
that UNHCR programming may need to see refugees as assertive creative 
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people where prevention factors of their countries of origin are also part of any 
equation governing their ‘bottom-up’ attitudes towards UNHCR. 
 
2.5. Peacebuilding 
There is some limited research that considers the contributions that 
refugees and IDPs can make to peace processes, recovery and peacebuilding 
in their country of origin (Fagen, 2009; Bohnet, 2016). These contributions may 
result from new skills that they acquire in exile. The engagement of refugees in 
political activities related to their countries of origin has the potential to affect 
democracy-building efforts back home. A diaspora can advocate for 
democratic reforms in its country of origin, participate in post-conflict elections 
as voters, candidates or supporters of political parties, form governments-in-
exile and political movements, and establish transnational networks (Betts and 
Jones, 2016; Ragab, 2013). This recognition has resulted in recommendations 
that special attention be paid to providing refugees and IDPs with training 
opportunities, such as language training, vocational training, professional 
development and peace education. Research advocates that the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission should take up these issues and mainstream 
consideration for refugees and IDPs in peace processes and peacebuilding 
efforts. “Refugee populations are increasingly seen not as passive victims, but 
as active agents engaged in the politics of the country of origin, host country 
and region” (Loescher et al., 2007). UNHCR considers that a coherent and 
constructive approach to the issue of migration and development must give 
due recognition to the role that forced migrants have to play in the process of 
peace building and reconstruction in conflict-affected states. Furthermore, the 
Global Compact on Refugees (2018) recognises the importance of 
reconciliation and confidence-building measures to prevent countries of origin 
from relapsing into conflict by “facilitating the participation of refugees and 
returnees (notably women and youth) in relevant processes and decision-
making, including peacebuilding activities” (UNHCR, 2018). 
This study endorses the definition of peacebuilding as a process of 
transmission of international norms from the international to the local domain 
(Paris, 2000, p. 36). Peacebuilding is “a concrete example of constructivism in 
action, a strategy designed to establish norms of conduct in the countries that 
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are being rebuilt in order to minimise, if not eliminate, the risk of a resumption 
of hostilities” (David, 2001, p. 3). Peacebuilding encompasses activities by 
many actors who collectively engage the entire society, civilian as well as 
military, grassroots and mid-level as well as top level. MacGinty recommends 
the “concept of hybridity and hybridization” of thinking about peacebuilding 
(2011, p.2). MacGinty, in his model of hybridity, wishes to “capture the 
dynamism associated with peace, conflict, and the interaction between local 
and international actors in seeking to bring conflict to an end” in what he sees 
as “the constant processes of social negotiation, coalescence, cooperation, 
and conflict that are associated with the creation of hybrid forms of peace and 
processes of peacemaking” (2011, p. 208). Locals may also support or be co-
opted by liberal peacebuilding. Thus, there is a spectrum of actions on which 
we may find subversion, cooperation and agonism (MacGinty, 2011, p. 77 and 
86). Lederach (1997) and others (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Hemmer, 1997) criticise 
reliance on ‘top-down’ interventions which are focused on top political leaders 
in the hope that they will bring the rest of the society along. Regardless of the 
level of actor on which programmes focus, Lederach argues that we need to 
“build a peace constituency within the setting (...) the international community 
must see people in the setting as resources, not recipients (...) citizen-based 
peacemaking must be seen as instrumental and integral, not peripheral, to 
sustaining change” (Ibid., p. 94). People in conflict settings are not only 
resources, but also actors, and it is therefore important to build programmes 
based in and around local culture and in cooperation with local organisations. 
‘Bottom-up’ peacebuilding is an important co-requisite or alternative 
because it empowers people instead at the grassroots to transform the society 
and the conflict. Their engagement through non-formal mechanisms of political 
participation such as civil society and diaspora organisations, protests and 
other forms of transnational activism – including the use of social media tools – 
present notable opportunities for mobilising refugee diasporas beyond the 
borders of their host countries. Bellamy and Williams, for instance, highlight 
how liberal and neoliberal intervention have “helped to create particular types 
of war economies, political structures, warlordism and weak states” (Bellamy 
and Williams, 2004). Others like Roberts call for a more emancipatory 
alternative, grounded in the local (Roberts, 2011). Authors writing from such a 
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perspective argue that liberal state-building is liberal only in rhetoric; the actual 
motivations underpinning post-conflict state-building have more to do with 
stability and status quo than with exporting Western norms and values. Roger 
MacGinty points out that peacebuilding must occur within a strong, established 
well-functioning and civil society. He contends: 
 
While institutions, large and small, do have a crucial role to play in 
peacebuilding, ultimately it is the people who experience peace and 
conflict in their homes, workplaces, schools and everyday lives. There is 
the danger that the professionalization of peacebuilding gives too much 
authority to ‘experts’ and ‘peacebuilding professionals.’ It is often 
individuals, families and communities who have to do the ‘heavy lifting’ 
of peacebuilding by learning to live with their neighbour from another 
religious group or learning to work alongside someone who shares very 
different political views (2013, p. 6). 
All members of society should participate in transforming abusive 
episodes to allow for the transformation of the human and socio-economic, 
cultural and political institutional structures and realities. This transformation 
can help increase justice in social structures, transform relationships, rooting 
them in peace, and facilitate constructive dialogue. 
One could see virtually all social, economic and political development 
efforts in a conflict zone as peacebuilding because they potentially help correct 
the roots of the conflict, as implied by Boutros-Ghali (1995). Cousens (2001) 
helpfully refines this broad definition, limiting peacebuilding to such efforts that 
prioritise developing capacity to solve conflicts non-violently, especially through 
political processes. For example, a project to simply rebuild war-damaged 
homes would not qualify as peacebuilding. It would come closer to the 
definition if it happened to involve personnel from both sides of the conflict. 
Such a cooperative reconstruction project would clearly be peacebuilding if it 
were designed to teach conflict management skills and promote longer-term 
cooperation. 
Peacebuilding interventions aim to change a changing context. The vast 
majority of peacebuilding projects and programmes aim to support or catalyse 
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change at the individual, interpersonal, organisational, institutional, or cultural 
level. They aim to do so in a context that is rapidly shifting, where political 
alliances are being redrawn and renegotiated, renewed war and violence are a 
constant threat, public and private investment are surging, former combatants 
are trying to find new work, crime rates are increasing, and expectations for a 
‘peace dividend’ are high after years of war. 
Scholarly and best practice literature argues that increased 
peacebuilding effectiveness requires that peacebuilding organisations question 
their underlying assumptions about the causes of civil war and peace. Oliver 
Richmond argues that the failure of liberal peacebuilding to evaluate its claims 
has created a crisis of legitimacy with the local populations that it aims to help 
(Richmond, 2009). Richmond (2010 a, b) talks of reconstruction and the 
production of a post-liberal peace. For Richmond, the post-Cold War 
reconstruction model has been modestly successful at state-building (i.e., 
liberal state institutions), but generally has failed at peacebuilding (i.e., positive 
peace addressing the root causes of conflict). Richmond points to an inherent 
gap between international norms and the specific cultural contexts of 
reconstruction. Therefore, the limitations shown by this rationalist method of 
state-building seemed only natural when it came to “dealing with issues 
relating to justice, reconciliation, identity, gender, culture, or welfare” 
(Richmond, 2010, p. 26), most of which encompassed the seeds of violence 
and instability. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), the “theory 
of change represents how the interveners (policy-makers, program designers, 
implementers) assume that their strategies can bring about their goals (vision 
of peace) in this context.” 
Several authors recommend that peacebuilding organisations deal with 
the uncertainty about the war-to-peace trajectory in the countries in which they 
intervene by increasing the feedback that they receive from the local 
population. For peacebuilding organisations to be facilitators and catalysts of a 
country’s social change process, they would need to be highly sensitive to the 
different needs and perceptions in the country (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). 
“Perceptions alter citizens’ expectations of gain and the decisions they make in 
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regards to reform... [I]f local actors distrust third parties, they will remain fearful, 
suspicious, and unwilling to compromise” (Talentino, 2007, p.154). 
Understanding and managing the numerous perceptions and needs of the host 
state and society and engaging with the various actors in a way that 
encourages their buy-in and ownership would require a high degree of 
sensitivity and adaptation to the context. 
The local and national actors, and the everyday reality in which they live, 
should be the focus of any peacebuilding effort. Richmond says that “A post-
liberal peace requires that international actors use a range of methods that 
enable local actors and the most marginalised to engage with a discussion of 
their own requirements for needs provision and their own understanding of 
rights and institutions” (2011, p. 239). These mechanisms and tools can also 
serve as important ways of connecting refugees to their countries of origin, as 
well as of raising awareness among the international community of political 
developments in their countries of origin and exercising pressure on their host 
countries to act in support of democracy in the countries of origin. 
It is clear that refugees are imperative contributors to peace and should 
therefore play a direct role in peacebuilding initiatives as a part of durable 
solution initiatives. Initial lessons from this study highlight how, for their part, 
humanitarian actors need to refocus their attention on humanitarian advocacy, 
monitoring the impact of peacebuilding interventions and policy changes, 
keeping the perspective of refugees at the centre of policies and peacebuilding 
interventions, and ensuring that refugees’ and returnees’ needs and rights are 
considered holistically. 
2.6. Conclusion 
Being at home or in place is a very basic need for survival. Losing one’s 
place, or being displaced from one’s place, is a significant struggle, and it 
disturbs the regularity of living and disrupts continuity of growing and causes 
long lasting trauma that needs to be dealt with. 
Violent conflict around the world forces millions of people to flee their 
homes every year, placing significant burdens on the international community 
as well as home governments in dealing with the plight of these forgotten 
populations. But for every person that flees a conflict situation, there are also 
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many people who stay behind, raising important questions for researchers and 
policy-makers alike. This chapter shows three important elements that 
underpin our later discussions. 
First, building on a ‘choice-centred’ approach to the study of forced 
migration, this chapter investigated individual behaviour in order to better 
understand the factors that affect people’s choices under a highly dangerous 
circumstance. The core argument driving this research on forced migration is 
the assertion that people make a choice even under “extraordinary 
circumstances” (Moore and Shellman, 2006, p. 59). 
Second, UNHCR’s greatest asset to date is undoubtedly its ability to 
adapt to the changing needs of refugees. The role of UNHCR can best be 
described as a delicate balancing act between the needs of refugees and the 
powerful interests of nation-states. The emergence and evolution of 
international norms relating to the protection of refugees and IDPs has 
changed the perception of states on forced migration. As a result, states 
gradually accept international humanitarian assistance and protection for IDPs 
as they do for refugees. Peacebuilding efforts need to integrate attention to the 
specific needs of displaced persons, returnees and refugees. 
Third, this chapter also offers the view that refugees and IDPs are 
agents during the peacebuilding process and that irrespective of the type of 
assistance, they are important actors in the decision and process. Peace 
conditionality can be applied at the local level, too. In its ‘Open Cities’ 
programme in Bosnia, for example, UNHCR allocated reconstruction aid to 
municipalities that demonstrated a commitment to the right of refugees and 
internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Refugees clearly have a 
stake in peace agreements. For most of them, peace – or even security without 
peace – will enable them to leave the camps, and perhaps return home, 
reclaim their land, and re-establish their livelihoods. 
Fourth, displaced people are far from passive or reactionary actors and 
demonstrate their agency in various forms and capacities during the 
peacebuilding process. Refugees and IDPs have repeatedly proved that they 
do not simply have to be passive actors waiting for aid. Business people 
arriving in the camps often begin trading again: in refugee camps there are 
blacksmiths, tailors, fruit vendors and many others earning a living despite the 
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challenges. Many refugees and IDPs have successfully integrated into their 
host states and become part of the productive economy. There must be more 
programmes that are specifically aimed at rehabilitating and integrating forced 
migrants, employing vulnerable people and training them to tackle community 
needs such as rebuilding roads, collecting refuse and improving irrigation 
systems.  
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CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Considerations 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Most scholars – as discussed initially in Chapter 1 – agree that 
international norms, shared understandings and expectations of appropriate 
behaviour that are held by a community of actors matter. International norms 
are central to international relations because they constitute key instruments to 
influence state behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse and Sikkink, 
1999; Acharya, 2004). The process by which international norms diffuse is 
called norm diffusion (Krook and True, 2010; Towns, 2012). In this chapter, this 
thesis will explore the conceptual terrain of constructivism in further detail in 
order to further refine the conceptual underpinnings offered by a constructivist 
approach. In particular, the chapter will evaluate the key literature and draw 
upon the development of an analytical model of norm evolution (that is 
primarily derived from constructivism). In addition, and as highlighted initially in 
Chapter 1 – the constructivist approach provides pertinent conceptual insights 
into the relationship between structure (institutions and laws) and agents (civil 
society, refugees) that will later inform the evaluation of the role of refugees’ 
agency in the latter parts of this thesis. 
Briefly, constructivism – with its focus on the role that ideational factors 
play in international relations – emerged as a separate approach in the 1980s 
through the works of influential constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt 
(1987), Friedrich Kratochwil (1990) and John Ruggie (1989). Among the more 
commonly discussed questions in norms diffusion are the conditions under 
which norms emerge (Hyde, 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and how 
norms spread, or diffuse, across the international system. The latter considers 
both the spread of norms from state-to-state (Cao, 2010; Dolowitz, 2000; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Hyde, 2011) as well as through IGO networks 
(Brewington, Davis and Murdie, 2009; Carpenter, 2007a, 2007b).  
Most scholars implicitly adopt the view that states will and do conform 
their behaviour to international norms. Those doing so either subscribe to: (i) 
the constructivist position that argues that international norms reflect a growing 
homogenous normative culture among states (Kratochwil, 1984; Wendt, 1987; 
Adler, 1997; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) or (ii) the neoliberal institutionalist 
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position that conform in order to avoid international sanctions, costs to their 
reputation, or to gain the long-term benefits that come from the institutionalised 
relationships within which the norms are embedded (Keohane, 1984, 1989; 
Axelrod, 1986; Axelrod and Keohane, 1993; Klotz, 1995). 
Conventional and critical constructivists do share theoretical fundamentals. 
Both aim to empirically discover and reveal how the institutions and practices 
and identities that people take as natural are, in fact, the product of human 
agency, of social construction (Hoffman, 1987). For example, conventional 
constructivists – Wendt, Katzenstein, Adler, Finnemore – consider states 
identities being relatively stable intersubjective construct. Critical constructivists 
make assumptions that states identities are developed and redeveloped 
constantly. Unlike the conventional approach, the focus of critical 
constructivism is the analysis of language’s role in mediating and constructing 
social reality. Christiansen et al. (1999, p 535-7) provides a detailed and 
comprehensive evaluation, for example, of the differences between 
constructivists. In their analysis, while the differences care acknowledged, the 
authors stress the ability of constructivists to talk beyond the middle ground 
(Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 535-7). The crucial point emphasised by 
Christiansen et. al. is  that currently no single, unified constructivist theory 
exists; rather there is a range of constructivist positions. According to Jackson 
and Sorensen (2010, p.165), in terms of new contribution to IR theory 
conventional constructivism can be regarded much more productive than 
critical constructivism. Therefore, this study will be based more on the 
assumptions of the conventional constructivism. 
At this point, it is appropriate in this chapter to explore the norm diffusion 
mechanisms through which new norms disseminations are explored. Three 
observations are important in this context. First, according to the literature 
(Guild and Moreno-Lax, 2013) current norms often limit the role of refugees 
and their full participation and can inhibit opportunities for resilience in the face 
of severe social, economic, and extreme events. 
Second, to meet the new global challenge of responding to the needs of 
refugees via the exploratory investigation of resilience, one must first set forth 
a theoretical conceptual framework of resilience (Ledesma, 2014). This chapter 
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looks at the move towards everyday resilience and the ‘bottom-up’ 
mechanisms available to refugees. 
Finally, the literature indeed confirms that the most important actor 
working in the interests of forced migrants in the area of refugee politics is 
UNHCR, due to its legal mandate (Loescher, 2017). It is also notable, however, 
that the literature often pays little attention to and even downplays the role of 
refugees in shaping those policies and thus there is a notable contribution to 
knowledge to be made in considering not just what role refugees’ perspectives 
actually play but also in ensuring that forced migrants themselves must be kept 
as an important dimensions at the heart of any wider analysis. Furthermore, 
and as this chapter further explores, there is a real opportunity to consider the 
potential role of refugees as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ operating at the interface 
between, and linking ‘bottom-up’ with ‘top-down’ approaches. 
In order to consider norm diffusion in detail, this study will now provide 
an overview of constructivist literature in international relations with a focus on 
the main building blocks involved in norm development: norms, normative 
structures and norm entrepreneurs. In the next section, it introduces an 
analytical model for tracing norm evolution to identify the crucial role of the 
norm entrepreneur in the emergence and diffusion phases of norm 
development. It identifies the conditions that facilitate successful norm 
development and the key mechanisms employed by norm entrepreneurs. 
 
3.2. Constructivist Approach 
In general, Constructivists approach international politics from a more 
sociological perspective than the microeconomic foundation of realism and 
neoliberal institutionalism. While the latter approaches treat states as rational 
and their identities and interests as given (Wendt, 1992, pp. 391-2), 
sociological approaches examine an actor’s interests and preferences, and 
treat them as constructed socially and learnt through non-instrumental 
communication and persuasion (Checkel, 2001, pp. 559, 564). 
Realist positions see states as solely egoistic, interest-driven and self-
centred. As Morgenthau (1948) observed, the international system is 
anarchical and universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of 
states. Moreover, he noted that political leaders “act in terms of interest defined 
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in terms of power”. Coleman (1992, p. 110) noted the idea that migration flows 
can effectively threaten a state’s order: “inflow of migrants into a state’s 
territory bears risks“. Large inflows of state immigration can contribute to the 
dissolution of social structures and generate tensions. On the other hand, 
neoliberalism tells us about the human rights agenda many states favour, 
about the urgent need for states to cooperate, and that non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organisations (IOs) can play an 
important role in solving the problem. However, liberalism also reveals that a 
refugee regime remains weak and dependent on particular states. It reveals 
lack of pragmatism to offer long-term solutions and alternatives, and its failure 
as a response to engage in a common refugee policy (Loescher, Betts, Milner, 
2008, pp. 104-133). Neoliberal policies tend to focus on their own interests and 
lack a significant scope on the ‘other’ (referring to the refugees – see Chapter 
1). 
Constructivist approaches unpack the notions of preferences, structures 
and interests by exploring the social meanings attributed to material objects 
and structural positions. For example, Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 39) argue 
that ‘power’ is not restricted to coercive influence wielded by states, but 
logically includes prior social processes that constitute actors with differential 
capacities. Constructivism is not necessarily competing with the traditional IR 
theories, but is rather complementary to them.8 Constructivists broaden the 
focus of the study of IR as well as expand the traditional theoretical discourse 
by putting ideational phenomena under the analytical microscope – and 
thereby offer a fruitful way of analysing the formation of norms in international 
relations. According to Fearon and Wendt: “constructivism is centrally 
concerned with the role of ideas in constructing social life” (2002, p. 57). 
The actor’s preferences and interests are therefore defined in the 
process of defining situations and depend on social contexts (Wendt, 1992, p. 
398), including “internationally held norms and understandings about what is 
good and appropriate,” which give meaning to international political life 
(Finnemore, 1996, pp. 2-3). The state may be the prominent unit within the 
                                                             
8 The opinion that constructivism can play a complementing and supportive role with the 
traditional theories, instead of a competing role, is a common opinion that is shared by many 
academics. For example, see Adler (1997); Checkel (1997); Bjorkdahl (2002). 
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system, but the rise of actors such as NGOs and multilateral organisations has 
illustrated the problem of using a theory which assumes the unrestricted 
dominance of the state. Constructivists challenge assumptions underpinning 
the creation of any actor; rather than assuming actors to represent something 
close to being ‘pre-given units’, they see the units as socially constructed 
(Palan, 2000). While operating under the assumption of social construction, 
mainstream or conventional constructivists do not discount the material 
aspects of politics, only that materials must be given value through social 
understanding (Wendt, 1999). 
Constructivists also do not deny that actors may indeed behave in a 
rational manner according to an analysis of costs and benefits, but rather that 
rationality is not a fixed assumption for actors with the same characteristics. 
Mainstream constructivists do not reject positivist epistemology and aim to 
articulate the effects of social constructs by examining areas such as cultural-
institutional contexts. Actors in international politics develop their relations with 
and understandings of others through norms and practices. In the absence of 
norms, any exercise of power or any action would be meaningless. Identities 
and interests are partially defined by norms, which define an identity. 
Importantly, given the focus in this thesis on the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees, structure is regarded by constructivists as meaningless without some 
intersubjective set of norms and practices. 
People act towards others on the basis of the meanings that they have 
for them. States do act differently toward their enemies compared to their 
friends (Wendt, 1992). This is because they consider enemies to be a threat to 
them, whereas they do not consider their friends as such. For example, Iran’s 
nuclear capability would be more threatening to the United States than that of 
Great Britain because of their different significance for the United States. It is 
collective meanings that constitute the structures, which organise actions. 
Actors acquire identities by participating in such collective meanings. Identities 
are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they 
carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests 
in the process of defining situations. As Audie Klotz put it: 
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(t)hrough international and domestic decision-making processes, 
various avenues exist for norms, as embodied in individuals’ beliefs or 
embedded in social discourse, to influence the determination of national 
interests and political goals (...) through social interaction individual 
ideologies develop into shared, intersubjective, community conceptions 
of normality and deviance, which produce relatively consistent 
interpretations of the empirical world (1995, p. 32). 
 
Importantly for this thesis, the constructivist approach to norm diffusion 
explores how the collectively held understandings or intersubjective ideas 
about social life in one country influence the identities, interests, behaviours, 
practices and decisions of actors rooted in another country (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 2001; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Unlike rationalist accounts of 
diffusion, constructivism does not start from the premise that the interests of 
potential adopters are given. Additionally, although some level of domestic 
demand for policy solutions is required for the diffusion of models and 
principles, demand does not always have to emerge from a country’s leaders 
or even the elite cadre of policy-makers. There is then a place for other actors 
who may not always form part of a country’s elite. Indeed, the demand for, or 
supply of, foreign models and beliefs among active, organised, and 
strategically placed domestic actors may be sufficient to create an environment 
in which domestic leaders also become interested. Elite interests, such as 
those of key policy-makers may alternatively change, due to interactions with 
the prevalent views in their surrounding environment (this may be the local, 
domestic, or international environment). Finally, elite actors (including leaders) 
may become fundamentally convinced of the value of the principles and ideas 
in question. In sum, intersubjectively held beliefs about social life that flow into 
a country from an external source may constitute, regulate or enable elite 
policy-makers and leaders (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986), increasing the 
likelihood that they will embrace a democratic regime change, or policies that 
improve the quality of democracy. By and large, constructivist perspectives on 
the international diffusion of norms argue that states will embrace international 
norms because they embrace their underlying values. In other words, actors 
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will aspire to emulate or adopt a well-functioning model of international norms 
because they consider it normatively superior. 
Foreign principles and models may follow various trajectories as they 
come into contact with domestic actors, however. Domestic actors at various 
levels of analysis (based, in part, on their own intersubjective beliefs) may 
either embrace foreign models or principles, or call them into question (Cortell 
and Davis, 2000; Legro, 1997; Sikkink, 1991). Harnisch (2012) argues that role 
theory explains foreign policy behaviour by exploring the roles played by 
societies in international systems. Often, the interaction between international 
and domestic norms sets a dynamic process in which domestic actors and/or 
transnational activists work actively to make foreign models or principles more 
legitimate to local actors (Checkel, 2001; Farrell, 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1999; Tarrow, 2005). For example, they may introduce the foreign concept 
strategically into the domestic environment by reframing (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1999), grafting (Risse-Kappen, 1994), localising (Acharya, 2004), and 
taking on a new role (Harnisch, 2012). Similarly, international actors may 
access influential, well-placed domestic actors who share their preference for 
the policy in question or share beliefs, and utilise these actors to advance the 
model or principle of interest (Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Checkel, 1999). 
Foreign practices can also become dominant domestic norms once a critical 
mass has embraced them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999), or as elite actors 
legitimate them via official policies or laws. Yet, it is also the case that such 
observations might equally apply to the perspective and beliefs of more non-
traditional domestic actors, such as, refugees, if their perspectives have key 
resonance in a particular selective policy environment, like that of durable 
solutions. 
So far, it seems to fair to say that the constructivist scholarship 
concerning international diffusion has not carefully explored and tested the 
above arguments with respect to refugees. Kurki and Sinclair (2010) argue that 
much constructivist research ignores the structures of power because of its 
focus on discourse and its emphasis on material resources. They suggest that 
mainstream constructivism is too focused on a narrative of critical liberal 
progress and too committed to traditional forms of agency. 
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Indeed, constructivist approaches often leave much of the social context 
of world politics unaccounted for.9 Nonetheless, scholars who study how 
individuals learn via social communication advance concepts that similarly 
emphasise structure, norms and beliefs. For example, the structural 
equivalence model of social learning argues that the actions and choices of 
individual A, a total stranger with whom individual B may not even engage in 
political discussion, may nonetheless influence individual B if the former 
belongs to a social group whose principles appeal to the latter (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1991). The logic behind the structural equivalence model is that 
people are likely to accept the practices they observe among individuals who 
belong to groups that share with them the same intersubjective beliefs about 
what is appropriate. Actors may even adopt behaviours and beliefs they know 
to be ineffective (irrational), so long as the transmitter of these goods belongs 
to the same “moral reference group” as the adopter or to a group for which the 
adopter has deep respect and admiration. 
Although there has been significant interest in the idea of norm diffusion 
in recent IR scholarship (Winston, 2018; Ring, 2014; Bettiza, 2014), the 
concept of a norm can be especially problematic given that it can be 
understood in both a prescriptive sense, whereby a norm tells an actor how it 
ought to behave, and in a descriptive sense, whereby the norm merely 
describes some observable pattern of behaviour among the actors (see, for 
example, Axelrod, 1986). The section below engages with the discussion of 
norms. 
3.2.1. Norms 
The existence of international human rights norms can provide a set of 
guidelines in the areas of refugee and IDPs protection.10 Indeed, for this thesis, 
several of these guidelines are worth focusing upon. First, some norms are 
social phenomena, because they are held in place by shared expectations 
about the appropriate solution to a given problem, and there is no need for 
                                                             
9 These weaknesses are represented in constructivists’ recent attempts to deal with 
international law (Krasner, 2000; Brunnée and Toope, 2012). 
10 Theda Skocpol and Fiorina Morris explain that “individuals who regularly interact with one 
another in face-to-face settings learn to work together to solve collective problems.” (2004, pp. 
13) 
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social enforcement. As social phenomena, norms provide both an enabling and 
a constraining structure of ‘appropriateness’ to politics. Hence, in the context of 
refugees, key norms will both act as inhibitors and facilitators of key beliefs and 
identities that will shape their ‘bottom-up’ perspectives towards durable 
solutions. In particular, a logic of appropriateness helps to govern the kinds of 
behaviour which actors consider, and likewise aids the definition of 
responsibilities and identities within a community. Second, norms are formed 
and enforced only with respect to behaviours that have some significance. 
These are sustained by the threat of social disapproval or punishment for norm 
violations (Coleman, 1990). In considering refugees, this is especially pertinent 
given that they often regard themselves as regularly subjected to social 
disapproval and even constrained by existing norms. A third enforcement 
mechanism arises through the internalisation of norms of appropriate 
behaviour. Actors that subscribe to norms around the poor treatment of 
refugees for example, may eventually come to view the promotion and 
protection of the rights of refugees as key to their self-identification. 
International politics is a social activity and takes place within a certain 
framework which is defined by norms and guidelines (Byers, 2008). This 
means that norms must contend with existing acceptable terms of behaviour; 
because of this, norms go through a process that Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) term a “life cycle”. Indeed, this thesis particularly regards the concept of 
a norm life cycle as offering useful value-added to this thesis and inform the 
later empirical evaluations and discussions. It is now appropriate to consider 
this particular aspect a little further. 
First, as part of this ‘norm life cycle’, norms usually emerge ‘top-down’ 
and are promoted by norm entrepreneurs, through the use of language and 
framing (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Payne, 2001; Acharya, 2004; Santa-
Cruz, 2005). International organisations – or more accurately in this thesis – 
international policy-makers at UNHCR -–very often act as these norm 
entrepreneurs, and during the first stage, ‘top-down’ persuasion is the 
entrepreneur’s main tool to push the norm forward (Elgstrom, 2000). The norm 
can then gain an ‘organisational foothold’, which allows it to be placed on the 
agenda and strengthens the norm itself (Kingdon, 1995; Finnemore, 1996). If 
entrepreneurs succeed, then norms can reach a ‘tipping point’, at which other 
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actors – usually at the state level – adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998). The norm moves to stage two and ‘cascades’ when it reaches a 
‘threshold point’: that is, when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a 
critical mass of key actors usually at the nation state level, and when the norm 
has become internationally institutionalised to a certain degree (Ibid.) the norm 
can be said to have reached ‘prescriptive status’ (Risse and Ropp, 1999). 
When the norm is then used frequently, and is integrated into domestic 
language, it becomes more firmly accepted (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Santa-Cruz, 
2005) through repetition and socialisation (Payne, 2001). In the case of 
refugees, it might, for instance, then be expected that we start to strongly see 
norms appearing in their own referencing to key questions and in their 
discussions with and about international policies like durable solutions. Thus, 
the dominant mechanism in the second stage is international socialisation 
through international legitimacy and esteem. Finally, the norm becomes 
internalised (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Byers, 2008). The motive to follow 
the norm at this stage is conformity, and usually the norm is taken care of in 
specific institutions or bureaucracies. These steps grant a good lens through 
which to review important points of norm development and help to determine 
when and how UNHCR is participating in norm development through the life 
cycle process (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Norm Life Cycle (in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Norm Diffusion from ‘bottom-up’ perspective (compiled by Author) 
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Figure 2 shows how norm entrepreneurs (refugees) are not only 
addressing the issue behind their emerging norm, but are also active in 
diffusing the norm into UNHCR. It is a complex and interactive process of 
norms diffusion. This research enriches the existing model because it adds 
that it is essential to see that norm diffusion does not cascade in such a 
straightforward manner as shown in Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle 
model. It is not just a case of ‘top-down’ norm diffusion but that the very 
interaction around norms also allows for ‘bottom-up’ norm diffusion in practice. 
In this way, the ‘bottom-up’ perspective captures cross-cultural dynamics of 
norm diffusion between and across levels of analysis, as norms are promoted 
and travel upward and downward. This allows exploring displaced persons at 
the ‘tipping point’ not solely as active norm-makers, but also as independent 
norm-makers. They can be norm-makers in the sense of them being norm 
entrepreneurs. 
Norms are cultural constructions that generate and maintain a 
collectively agreed upon standard of appropriate behaviour (Finnemore, 1996; 
Checkel, 1999). According to Risse-Kappen, norms are “causally 
consequential in international relations” (1996, p. 365). Norms describe the 
boundaries of what can and should be done in various situations and how 
states should behave (Kowert and Legro, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Byers, 
2008). And thus, from the perspective of this thesis, can be regarded as 
incorporating both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics, trajectories and 
trends. International actors (Finnemore, 1993) and transnational communities 
(Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998) can also play a role in institutional 
change and bureaucratic reform. But the mechanism here is not just 
imposition of interests by outside international actors; rather, it is regarded – 
and rather crucially in the context of this thesis – as a learning model whereby 
domestic actors get new information and reformulate interests due to their 
interaction with international or transnational actors. As such, normative 
standards create behavioural expectations between members (Finnemore, 
1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Price and Tannenwald, 1996). Furthermore, states 
learn about what their appropriate behaviour should be from international 
organisations, as well as other actors (Shannon, 2000), through the emulation 
of institutional norms and also by means of socialisation (Adler, 2007). Norms 
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are constitutive and generative. They can change what states want and 
provide them with strategies for pursuing those ends. Entities can be, and 
regularly are, socialised by the international society in which they exist. Since 
norms help to constitute state identities, a study of them is warranted if 
predicting state behaviour is desirable. 
Norms gain legal status and legitimacy when they are internalised by 
those who are expected to follow them (Koh, 1997; Sills, 2004): this is the 
‘customary’ part of international law (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). “Norms play a 
crucial role in international law” (Peterson, 2007, p. 276) because of their 
relation to customary law, which is an important source for determining the 
rules of international relations. To be accepted and effective, however, norms 
should be generated using an accepted and appropriate formation process 
(the middle steps of the norm life cycle) and be logically linked to the goals of 
regimes (Dworkin, 1986), which are essential since regimes encompass 
bodies organised to enforce norms in a particular issue area (Sills, 2004). 
Impartial and inclusive decision-making, which motivates participation, lends 
legitimacy to norm creation and enforcement (Tyler, 1990; Payne, 2001). 
International organisations provide authority through which legitimate power 
can reach states (Herman, 1996; Byers, 2008; Hurd, 2009), offering an 
explanation as to how regimes and international organisations are able to act 
as efficient norm dispersers (Adler, 2007) and explaining why they are 
targeted at the organisational foothold stage and do the most work for the 
norm in the tipping point and cascade phases of the life cycle. The UN is 
noted as one such body (Hurd, 2009). This is an excellent reason to make an 
international organisation, such as UNHCR, the focus of the research in this 
thesis, as it is able to provide legitimacy. 
Finnemore and Sikkink claim that the standards of appropriateness 
which a norm demands are determined by the judgements of a community or 
society. These standards are based on the values and expectations of that 
society as a whole, or at least the majority of the society. Correspondingly, it 
is possible to determine whether a norm exists by looking at the rules and 
behavioural expectations of states which can be ascertained, as already 
mentioned, through secondary trails of communication and evidence. Norms 
can also be identified, however, by looking at the kind of behaviour that 
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generates disapproval or outrage from other members of a community. 
Domestic and international norms are not separated or fundamentally different 
in nature but hang together. 
The three stages of the life cycle of norms constitute the basic 
approach and theoretical framework that this thesis will use in examining the 
international community’s understanding and response to the crisis in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It can also provide value-added in helping us to also 
understand the role and extent of norm diffusion present with the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of refugees and thus provides useful conceptual insight that can 
inform the later empirical research. With this introduction, the thesis will now 
turn to a deeper examination of the normative life cycle model. The thesis will 
then proceed to the application of the norms. 
3.2.2. Rethinking Life-Cycle Model 
This section therefore examines the respective life cycle mode in 
greater detail. After the end of the Cold War, states’ decisions to intervene in 
places where massive humanitarian crises were occurring came under 
increased scrutiny. In particular, there has been great interest in the reasoning 
which leads to such decisions, as it indicates what factors international actors 
find convincing when examining their policy options. Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
model discussed in earlier posits that these sorts of political decisions can be 
understood by looking at changes in the international normative environment. 
The authors’ basic premise is that the influence of norms causes actors to 
behave in a certain way. As norms change and develop, one can observe 
behavioural changes which accompany this phenomenon. Their ultimate 
hypothesis is that by accounting for the ways in which norms change, one can 
account for both stasis and change in the international political environment 
and actions taken therein. 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s model tries to give a full account of normative 
change at the international level. They posit that international norms develop 
according to a ‘life cycle’, where, at any point, norms can be categorised as 
being at one of three stages. Each stage has different causes, characteristics, 
and expectations for action, or what Finnemore and Sikkink call “behavioural 
logics”. Increased acceptance of a norm will result in slow changes in 
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behavioural logics, so when one observes states adhering to a certain logic, 
one can identify which stage a norm is at. 
This was later adapted into a five-stage process by W. Andy Knight 
(2011) (Figure 3) who infused it with the understanding that norms change as 
they proceed through the life cycle, and that the battle over their meanings 
and relevance is an integral part of the life of a norm. The five stages are: 
1. The Conception Stage – The emergence of a new norm is aided by 
a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who calls attention to an issue that must be addressed. 
The entrepreneur is “embedded in the socio-political fabric, who is alert to the 
emergence of opportunities and acts upon them” (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 1). 
Critically for this thesis, such norm entrepreneurs can be found not just inside 
policy-making institutions but much more widely including non-state actors, 
like refugee organisations and communities. What is more important for this 
analysis is that norm entrepreneurs must possess powerful methods of 
persuasion in order to compel others to buy into the new norm. Sjöstedt 
argues that it is necessary to take the role of national and domestic identities 
into account in order to explain why some idea diffusion processes succeed 
while others do not (2013). Indeed, this also seems a critical point from the 
perspective of this thesis given that refugees are actually potentially involved 
in processes of resettlement, local integration and integration in which 
national and domestic identities are being discovered and re-discovered 
potentially. Norm entrepreneurs have two main mechanisms through which 
they attempt to influence decision-makers: by framing issues so that they are 
not only applicable to the existing normative context but also call for the 
immediate need for change (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 52); and by activating one 
norm over another, which might include blaming and shaming strategies 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). For instance, UNHCR could threaten to withdraw 
major funding from a country programme or change the nature of key policy 
guidance that impacts on the refugee communities and which is vital to that 
country’s (and within that key sub-national groups) survival, if it continued to 
turn away refugees at its border. 
2. The Normative Contestation or Normative Fit Stage – Since new 
norms arise from dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and with an 
old norm, it follows that the new norm emerges into a contested space. During 
 87 
this stage, “a new norm either clashes with an existing and more dominant 
norm, or when the decision is made to attach the new norm to an existing one 
due to its potential ‘adjacency’” (Knight, 2011, p. 4). Indeed, from the 
perspective of this thesis, it is expected that actually there may be cases of 
key contested norm diffusion where norms are regarded with degrees of 
contestation from the experience of policy-makers at the international level of 
UNHCR or indeed, within the contemporary perspectives of refugees from the 
‘bottom-up’. Hence, it is important to recognise that – as Finnemore and 
Sikkink pointed out – norms are continuous rather than dichotomous entities 
(Legro, 1997). During this stage, the norm sharpens or dulls, and the actor 
reconciles or maintains its behaviour. Much of UNHCR’s work, for instance, in 
the area of promotion of refugee policy/law is about convincing government 
officials to adopt ‘top-down’ and internalise the fundamental refugee policy 
and even legal principles (who is a refugee and the principle of non-
refoulement) through ‘framing’. Put more simply, in seeking to link such 
principles to the fundamental values of their audience, such as fundamental 
religious beliefs, the tradition of offering shelter to refugees in the country, or 
the history of a country’s own refugees who found asylum in third countries. 
Persuasion, socialisation, incentives, threats, and force are all mechanisms 
used by states to promote norm acceptance, the choice of promotional 
mechanism is influenced by the relationship of the promoter and the 
promotee. 
3. The Diffusion/Cascading Stage – The threshold between stages 
two and three is referred to as the tipping point. This occurs when norm 
entrepreneurs have successfully convinced a critical mass of actors to adhere 
to an emerging norm. The norm then cascades – usually according to 
Finnemore and Sikkink ‘top-down’ to other actors and attains widespread 
acceptance. Finnemore and Sikkink hypothesised that tipping rarely occurs 
before at least one-third of the states in the system adopt a norm (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). For instance, the invitation extended to states of 
Central Europe to join the exclusive EU ‘club’ was utilised for over a decade 
by UNHCR as a strategic tool, as it cajoled these states into incorporating the 
EU asylum ainto their national legislations. However, once again it is also 
important to note that in this thesis, such a ‘tipping point’ might also exist ‘from 
 88 
the ‘bottom-up’ where the views on key norms and norm mobilisation of sub-
national reaches a ‘tipping point’ so that it is now possible to detect their 
perspectives on norms influencing and appearing upwards as part of a more 
reciprocal and interactive notion of norm diffusion assumed in this thesis. 
4. The Internalisation and Institutionalisation Stage – Once the 
norm has reached this stage, it is so widely accepted that it is taken for 
granted. That is, norms are so internalised that conformity to the norm is not 
questioned. “Actors begin to conform to the new norm in a routinised, 
reflexive, and almost non-reflective manner” (Knight, 2011, p. 5). Norms 
become internalised through various channels such as codification, 
institutionalisation, and universal adherence.
 
5. The Resistance, Accommodation, or Dissolution Stage – In 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, there are only three places to situate a norm: 
norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. Knight added this 
final stage to acknowledge that even robust, established norms will one day 
be challenged by an emerging norm. When that happens, the established 
norm will need to be reconciled to accommodate the emerging norm, or the 
established norm can weaken and possibly fade away altogether. For 
example, safety and security are frequently invoked by states when 
negotiating how to help refugees. Currently demands are being made for a 
strict limit to the number of refugees being received in the European Union, or 
even for them to be sent back to their countries of origin, since Europe will not 
succeed in integrating all the refugees who are arriving there. 
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Figure 3: Five-stage process (adopted from W. Andy Knight, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
Conception 
Stage 
The 
Normative 
Contestation 
or Normative 
Fit Stage 
The 
Diffusion/Casc
ading Stage 
The 
Internalisation 
and 
Institutionalisa
tion Stage 
The Resistance, 
Accommodation, 
or Dissolution 
Stage 
UNHCR uses persuasion 
or threat 
UNHCR uses ‘framing’ to 
promote or convince 
states to internalise 
refugee agenda 
Refugees can renegotiate 
their relationships with 
states or UNHCR by 
organising and putting 
pressure on their 
governments to listen to 
their voices. 
 
Living in exile can 
create new spaces for to 
organise and engage in 
political activism to 
promots refugee agenda 
Tipping 
point 
Norms are 
internalised 
Refugee 
norms are 
challenges. 
States 
invoke 
security or 
safety 
concerns 
 
 90 
Similarly refugees can affect change at the international or domestic 
level. For example, the decision of refugees against complying with UNHCR’s 
and government’s policy of relocation is an example of them rejecting and 
bypassing these structures. The way they express this decision can be in the 
form of open refusal to move and thus explicit challenging of official policies, 
or covert bypassing as they secretly hide and relocate to other areas. 
Refugees’ actions matter and shape structures in their immediate 
surroundings and can trigger shifts in policies and discourses at local, national 
or international levels. As such, taking refugee agency seriously in planning 
and implementation processes pertaining to legal structures as well as the 
citizen-state relationship, is essential to achieve meaningful and efficient 
outcomes. 
When UNHCR and the Refugee Convention were established in 1950 
and 1951, IDPs were excluded from the international refugee regime. During 
the past half-century, the growth and direction of the agency has been framed 
by the crucial events of international politics. UNHCR has tried to project 
refugee norms into world politics which are dominated by state-driven 
concerns of national interest and security. Most of UNHCR's tactics have 
concentrated on persuasion and socialisation to enforce compliance and it 
has held states accountable for their policies and principles, especially 
adhering to human rights norms in their asylum and refugee admissions 
policies. 
 
3.2.3. Diffusion Mechanisms 
Concepts of international diffusion offer compelling explanations for 
how international forces influence domestic politics. Broadly speaking, they 
argue that political changes outside of a country’s borders influence the 
probability that a similar change will occur within that country as well (Strang, 
1991). 
How does policy/norm change then occur? Under what conditions are 
international human rights norms, principles, and rules internalised and 
implemented domestically? While constructivists have devoted much attention 
to the process of norm diffusion, they have neglected to systematically 
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explore the mechanisms through which international norms reach the 
domestic arena (Checkel, 1999, p. 85). Indeed, in a small way, this thesis will 
seek to further contribute to knowledge as to how such a mechanism may 
have influence in the context of the interface of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
dynamics. Moreover, constructivists have mainly focused on successful cases 
of norm diffusion, failing to consider the cases where norms are deeply 
contested in the domestic arena. Despite some successes, deeply contested 
cases are much more common in peacebuilding operations than clearly 
successful ones. 
Put simply, diffusion is the spatially clustered process by which a norm 
is transmitted from one actor to another (Elkins and Simmons, 2003) and thus 
can easily incorporate notions of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ trajectories and 
dynamics within such clustering Scholars of diffusion processes emphasise 
the interdependence of actors within the international system. If one actor 
adopts a certain norm it increases the likelihood that another one will follow 
this adoption as well (ibid.). The main argument in this literature is the fact that 
states do not act independently of one another, and that choices by some 
states affect those who decide subsequently (Braun and Gilardi, 2006). 
Diffusion of norms demonstrates the social mechanisms through which 
UNHCR may hope to influence state behaviour in refugee protection. 
Most of the literature on norms starts from the assumption that 
normative changes are generated at the international level through 
convergence of ideas about the appropriate way to conduct political action. 
Alternatively, normative shifts can happen as a result of the global spread of 
domestic ‘best practices’. As domestic actors in one political environment 
change the way they approach political problems or find a new model for 
dealing with a particularly critical political issue, these models will gain 
international traction, be accepted as examples to follow, and will then be 
promoted by international actors to be replicated in other domestic 
environments across the globe. While it may often be the case that norm 
diffusion is largely a ‘top-down’ process from the international level 
downwards, this thesis will also seek to show that this can also be a ‘bottom-
up’ and more reciprocal interaction. 
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The global spread or diffusion of international norms is the bedrock of 
the constructivist understanding of how the world system works. The 
fundamental premise is that change in world politics occurs through shifts in 
understanding of what is normatively appropriate behaviour for states and 
state actors to engage in, and correspondingly what kinds of behaviours are 
no longer deemed normatively legitimate and sustainable (March and Olsen, 
1998). 
The internal adoption of norms represents an interactive a process of 
socialisation (Risse et al., 1999). The goal of socialisation is for domestic 
actors to internalise norms to the point that acceptance and even compliance 
can be guaranteed even in the absence of external pressures. Risse et al., for 
their part, all argue that this diffusion (socialisation) of international norms 
crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks 
among domestic and transnational actors who, as they put it, manage to link 
up with international regimes. 
In general, though, two main models of socialisation have been 
discerned in the literature: the ‘state-centric approach’ (Waltz, 1979; Keohane 
and Nye, 1974) and the ‘transnational social networks model’ (Sikkink, 1998). 
The former, in accordance with traditional IR theory, adopts the assumption of 
the state as a unitary actor, and the latter approach extends the literature 
beyond the state to the transnational realm. However, this thesis draws upon 
and is more in accordance with an emerging third model in the literature 
known more commonly as the ‘domestic social incorporation model’ (Florini, 
1996). This model examines the way in which international norms affect or 
have an impact upon the consciousness of domestic (as opposed to non-
domestic) non-state and sub-state actors, who then utilise these norms within 
their domestic settings to bring about greater correspondence with 
international norms. This third model then incorporates more strongly the 
potential for ‘sub-state actors’ like refugees to play an impact from the 
‘bottom-up’ within recognised processes of norm diffusion. 
This brings up another facet of change. When a set of norms reaches 
acceptance, those adversely affected by the change will mount resistance to 
it. State resistance, in particular, should not be surprising. Change certainly 
remains possible through consistent and comprehensive approaches. 
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So, let us consider in a little more detail two different diffusion 
mechanisms that seem particularly pertinent to this thesis. These can be 
identified in general terms as a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ model 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Checkel 1999). 
In the first instance, non-state actors and policy networks mobilise in support 
of a particular global norm and coerce elite decision-makers to change state 
policy in accordance with its prescripts (Checkel, 1999, p. 88). In the second 
instance, change is not induced through political pressure, but occurs through 
local actor(s). 
To be successful, human rights advocacy has to occur at both levels: 
governments need to be pressured ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ (Brysk, 
1993). This distinction resonates with the one found in the peacebuilding 
literature on ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ approaches (Cousens, 2001; Doyle 
and Sambanis, 2000). While the former approaches focus on what 
international agencies and organisations have to offer,11 the latter take as 
their point of departure the particular needs and capacities of individual cases. 
Okafor places great emphasis on combining ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches (and thus from the perspective of this thesis would seem to 
support the logic of focusing on the interactions between the two) since: 
“institutions are of highest value to struggles for progressive social 
transformation when they are creatively deployed by, and imbricated in the 
domestic struggles waged within states by the local popular forces that 
operate in those states” (Okafor, 2007, p.1). 
                                                             
11 Supporters of this model argue that focusing only on state actors interacting on the 
international plane presents a truncated picture of the impact of international norms and 
institutions on states. Instead they bring into the picture domestic and international Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), Principled 
Issue Networks (PINs), as well as international organisations (Risse et al., p. 40). Keck and 
Sikkink (1998), for example, establish the importance of PINs and TANs for the diffusion of 
international norms in the human rights and environmental issue-areas. Other scholars like 
Peter Haas, maintain that epistemic communities are one principal mechanism by which such 
ideas are developed and disseminated. The members of epistemic communities often 
introduce national measures consistent with their beliefs, and utilise the enforcement 
mechanisms of the bureaucratic units in which they operate (Haas, p. 51). Audie Klotz 
attempts to demonstrate how the norm of global racial equality and sanctions were effectively 
used against South Africa by a transnational anti-apartheid coalition of governments, 
nongovernmental organizations and individuals (Klotz, 1995, p. 6). 
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Risse et al., for their part, use a ‘five-phase spiral model’ to understand 
the conditions under which socialisation and internalisation of international 
regimes, principles, norms and rules take place within the domestic context 
and thus affect political transformation processes. In particular, in an attempt 
to further elaborate the conditions under which principled ideas and 
international norms affect domestic institutional change, they apply this model 
to a wide range of comparative studies (Risse et al., 1999, pp. 4-5). Phase 
one of the model is what they call the initial state of repression on behalf of 
the state. During this stage, norm-violating states enact policies of oppression 
on the one hand. On the other hand, domestic human rights organisations 
attempt to document any human rights violations, and bring them to the 
attention of the international community. If phase one is successful, a 
transition to phase two takes place. This involves denial on the part of the 
state. In phase three, the norm-violating state makes some tactical 
concessions, leading to the fourth or prescriptive phase. During the latter 
phase, the norm-violating state is confronted with fully mobilised human rights 
networks and an increasing internalisation of human rights norms. This forces 
the norm-violating state to either liberalise its policies permanently or accept 
some form of constitutional or governmental change. The final phase of the 
model then is behaviour consistent with the rule, which involves an 
institutionalisation of human rights norms into actual state practice. 
Having outlined the main features of constructivist theories above, it 
becomes necessary to see how constructivists use these concepts to present 
their theories on the effectiveness of forced migration issues. The 
constructivist approach argues that UNHCR strongly influences state 
responses to refugees. For example, UNHCR can frame the norms in such a 
way that they become widely accepted. Supportive policy-makers and thereby 
respective states can then become norm leaders, using their status at the 
international level to persuade others to adhere to the new norm (Coleman, 
2013, p. 166). Given that new norms emerge into a contested normative 
environment, those norms must fit with the existing normative environment. 
Entrepreneurs use framing that legitimises and motivates collective action. 
However, changing policy agendas of governments, migration and asylum 
drives, exclusion and control demonstrate powerful restrictions upon migrants’ 
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agency. Refugees are not necessarily without agency when they face given 
structures, and neither are these structures fixed and immune to the potential 
influence of refugees’ actions. Refugees are similar to other human beings, 
except for the structural conditions they are situated in, which account for 
distinctive experiences. In order to provide a more systematic mapping of the 
ways in which refugees exercise agency, this thesis now addresses how 
traumatic experiences can form the basis of refugee resilience and help them 
to exercise their agency. 
 
3.3. Resilience 
The study of resilience processes has evolved over the past three 
decades and is often marked by three waves. During the first wave, 
researchers identified characteristics that differentiate individuals who thrive 
even when faced with tremendous adversity (Richardson, 2002). During the 
second wave, researchers were motivated to better understand the processes 
of resilience identified during the first wave. Hence, the second wave is 
marked by the transition from ‘what’ questions to ‘how’ questions (i.e., 
questions of description versus questions about underlying processes) 
(Wright and Masten, 2005). Resilience emerged as a “process of coping with 
adversity, change, or opportunity in a manner that results in identification, 
fortification, and enrichment of resilient qualities or protective factors” 
(Richardson, 2002, p. 308). In this wave, attention to behaviours and to 
psychological and background dynamics shifted to the forefront. The third 
wave of resilience research fostered the processes’ development. Disruption 
and subsequent reintegration typify life patterns; however, resilience theory 
suggested that an intrinsic, motivational force resided within all individuals 
(Richardson, 2002). Accordingly, during the third wave, researchers were 
concerned with creating resilience through means of risk intervention and 
mediation (Masten, 2006). 
Definitions of resilience have developed over time through 
contributions from numerous researchers. Kumpfer (1999) suggested that 
understanding resilience is a particularly challenging task because it has 
previously been so broadly defined. Connor and Davidson (2003) explained 
that previous research “demonstrated that resilience is a multidimensional 
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characteristic that varies with context, time, age, gender, and cultural origin, 
as well as within an individual subjected to different life circumstances” (p. 
76). In addition to these factors, resilience has otherwise been described as “a 
dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of 
significant adversity” (Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker, 2000, p. 543), “as virtually 
all internal and external variables or transactional and moderating or 
mediating variables capable of affecting a youth’s life adaptation” (Kumpfer, 
1999, p. 182), and as “a class of phenomena characterized by good outcomes 
in spite of serious threats to adaptation or development” (Masten, 2001, p. 
228) 
In 2002 in the Harvard Business Review article, ‘How Resilience 
Works’, Coutu stated that resilience is not a matter of virtue but rather “merely 
the skill and the capacity to be robust under conditions of enormous stress 
and change” (Coutu, 2002, p. 51). She suggested the concept of resilience 
was characterised by three components. The first of these building blocks 
suggested that approaching given situations with a realistic perspective was 
an essential factor of resilience. Coutu acknowledged the positive role of 
optimism in summoning the will to endure certain circumstances; she stated, 
however, that “for bigger challenges, a cool, almost pessimistic, sense of 
reality is far more important... The fact is, when we truly stare down reality, we 
prepare ourselves to act in ways that allow us to endure and survive 
extraordinary hardship” (p. 48). In essence, individuals who observe 
unanticipated circumstances through a temperate, pragmatic lens are better 
conditioned to persevere. 
The second building block involves the pursuit and construction of 
‘meaning’. Coutu described this as the manner in which “resilient people build 
bridges from present day hardships to a fuller, better constructed future” (p. 
50). ‘Meaning’, however, can be indefinable, obscure, or ambiguous. There is 
no guarantee that successfully making meaning of one set of circumstances 
or during one situation assures that meaning will be retained or re-discovered 
in the future. Coutu suggested that strong value systems could effectively 
address these types of complications. She asserted that values, whether 
positive or negative in nature, were absolutely critical to the resilience of 
individuals and organisations, because they “are core to us and never 
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change; they frame most of our important decisions” (p. 52). Consequently, 
individuals – such as refugees – are empowered by the strength of their 
values because they instil aspects of meaning to events. 
Lastly, Coutu suggested skill in ‘bricolage’, the French term meaning 
‘bouncing back’, was the third building block of resilience. Bricolage can also 
be defined “as a kind of inventiveness, an ability to improvise a solution to a 
problem without proper or obvious tools or materials” (p. 52). In general, the 
term ‘bricolage’ encompasses skills such as resourcefulness, ingenuity, 
imagination, originality, and cunning. ‘Bricoler’s’ are adept at visualising 
prospects or options when placed in unexpected situations. In contrast, 
individuals lacking these skills are far less likely to both demonstrate 
resilience or overcome challenging circumstances. Consequently, traditional 
protocols that may limit creativity may also enable concepts of resilience to 
flourish during periods of instability or unrest. 
Bonanno (2004) also deconstructed resilience in “Loss, Trauma, and 
Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive 
After Extremely Aversive Events?” Bonanno noted that resilience has 
frequently been “underestimated and misunderstood… or as something seen 
only in rare and exceptionally healthy individuals” (p. 20). The foundation for 
Bonanno’s suggestions was influenced by research proposing that resilience 
could be achieved through multiple channels. In one example, he noted that 
resilient adults may frequently rely on certain techniques in times of duress 
and may achieve successful results, while the same techniques employed 
during calm or tranquil times would be unfavourable. Additionally, he identified 
and briefly defined four routes to resilience including hardiness, self-
enhancement, repressive coping, and positive emotions and laughter. 
In 2010, Buzzanell proposed a communicative framework for resilience 
during a Presidential Address to the International Communication Association 
titled ‘Resilience: Talking, Resisting, and Imagining New Normalcies Into 
Being’. Buzzanell framed resilience as a process, not necessarily a quality of 
an entity or structure. The framework was built upon a definitional foundation 
originally offered by Richardson as “the process of reintegrating from 
disruptions in life” (p. 2; see also Richardson, 2002, p. 309). Buzzanell 
explained that these processes were triggered by an event in an individual’s 
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life. The event could vary in severity along a spectrum of disruptions including 
loss, disaster, trauma, and upheaval in what one knows and values 
(Buzzanell, Shenoy, Remke, and Lucas, 2009). The processes that construct 
resilience may exhibit discursive, behavioural, and neurological elements. In 
addition, an individual’s psychology, learning capacity, developmental 
background, and dependency on social capital or networks are also reflected 
in resilience processes. 
Herrman et al. (2011) assert that resilience fundamentally refers to a 
positive adaptation or ability to maintain or regain mental health despite 
experiencing adversity. They point out that various disciplines have studied 
this phenomenon; however, no consensus on an operational definition exists. 
This is a strength-based approach that facilitates cultural awareness 
around a context-specific refugee experience. The ability of individuals and 
groups to successfully navigate their environments to resources that support 
them psychologically and physically increases resilience (Ungar et al., 2013). 
In discussing international interventions associated with projects of 
statebuilding, Chandler (2012) suggests that resilience plays an important role 
in the shift away from classical liberal interventionist discourses and towards 
greater emphasis on preventive intervention. This means a focus on “the 
empowerment and responsibility of agency at the local societal level, rather 
than upon the assertion of the right of external sovereign agency” (p. 216). 
Chandler observes: 
 
In discourses of resilience, there is a clear assumption that 
governments need to assume a more proactive engagement with 
society. This proactive engagement is understood to be preventive, not 
in the sense of preventing future disaster or catastrophe but in 
preventing the disruptive or destabilizing effects of such an event. In 
this sense, the key to security programs of resilience is the coping 
capacities of citizens, the ability of citizens to respond, or adapt, to 
security crises (Chandler, 2013b, p. 210). 
 
Hence, what this brief analysis in this section concludes is that there 
has been a notable shift from the state to society and to individuals, and 
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discussion of individual resilience has played a role in this. Chandler in this 
rather concise key observation notes that: “Here, agency is distributed away 
from the formal centres of political power (the focus of liberal ontologies) and 
towards the margins or the ‘everyday’ where the ‘tactics’ of ordinary people 
contest and disrupt the strategies and understandings of the powerful” 
(Chandler, 2013a, p. 178). Hence, this analysis supports the choice of this 
thesis to further explore the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees that not only 
are now more susceptible to these new forms of agency that are distributing 
political power to the ‘everyday’ but also have directly experienced key events 
where norm contestation and diffusion are likely to be discernible and notable. 
3.3.1. Refugees’ migration experiences 
When Steel et al. (2006) investigated the long-term effects of migration, 
they concluded that the effects of refugees’ traumatic migration experiences 
are immeasurable, long lasting, and shattering to both their inner and outer 
selves. Equally, Mollica’s (2000) discussion on forced migration demonstrates 
that nostalgia, isolation, depression, anxiety, guilt, anger, and frustration are 
so severe that many refugees may want to go back to their country of origin 
even though they fear the violent consequences. Kusnir (2005) looked at the 
experiences of Salvadoran families migrating and the multiple tensions that 
the dislocation brought on. He illustrated that most have experienced multiple 
losses, such as the loss of a significant other, the loss of home, and even the 
loss of their sense of self. He found that the added psychological distresses 
for survivors of torture exacerbated this stress of migration but notes that few 
studies demonstrating the negative psychological after-effects in victims of 
torture have been compared to survivors with a matched, non-tortured group 
(Kusnir, 2005). George (2009) looked at the influences of traumatic 
experiences, both pre- and post-migration, on refugees’ psychological distress 
by examining historical, political, and social factors. The author differentiated 
acute versus anticipatory refugees; acute refugees, who left their home 
country within a few days or hours of disaster, had higher levels of 
psychological distress than anticipatory refugees, who planned and 
anticipated the move. She also noted a typology of refugee settlement; new 
and traditional. The key differences between new and traditional refugees are 
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that new refugees are culturally, racially, and ethnically vastly different from 
their hosts, and are likely to lack kin or potential support groups in their 
country of resettlement, whereas traditional refugees are culturally and 
ethnically similar to their host, and are likely to be welcomed and assisted by 
family and friends who speak their language and can cushion their 
adjustment. George’s results demonstrate that post-migration trauma related 
to settling into a new environment can positively predict psychological 
distress. Richmond (2002) explored the economic conditions that contribute to 
disparity in less developed countries. According to his argument, economic 
inequality combined with demographic pressures and environmental crises 
have generated ethnic conflict, civil war, terrorist threats, and forced 
migration. He notes that wealthier countries are placing more restrictions on 
admitting refugees and allowing them to escape persecution. Despite the 
large number of refugees in Europe and North America, Richmond 
emphasises that African and Asian countries bear the greatest burden of 
refugees. 
Papadopoulos (2007) argues along similar lines that a refugee’s 
response to adversity is not limited to being traumatised but also includes 
resilience and what he calls adversity-activated development. A similar study 
is Overland’s (2011) grounded theory approach to the study of resilience 
among adult survivors of the Khmer Rouge era. She defines resilience as an 
imminent capacity and distinguishes coping as behaviour, and asked 
participants why they were healthy as opposed to why they were sick. 
Overland found that individuals who were highly resilient did not lose a sense 
of their responsibility for their own lives, refused to become victims, and 
reaffirmed their self-reliance through work. In other words, their sense of self 
in the world was constructive and something that came with responsibility. 
Sossou, Craig, Orgen, and Schnak (2008) reported on the coping 
strategies of resettled Bosnian refugee women through a qualitative 
investigation of their experiences as refugees and factors that contributed to 
resiliency. Sossou et al’s findings highlight the importance of family, 
spirituality, and the availability of social support services that assisted with 
adjusting to resettlement. The implication is that resilience factors include 
individual qualities, such as self-determination, optimism, inner strength, and 
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hope, while environmental factors, including community and social support 
services, are also essential to understanding resilience. Furthermore, an 
examination of the refugees’ social standings back home, educational levels, 
occupational skills, and even their previous exposure to urban and Western 
cultures were all factors in the individual qualities of resilience and rapid 
acculturation (Sossou et al., 2008). As the findings demonstrate, the most 
significant indicator of positive coping strategies was family values. As such, 
there is a need to understand and use family systems, and family 
relationships and involvement, in planned interventions (Sossou et al., 2008). 
There is a clear shift in policy towards building resilience. UNHCR 
published its Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for 2017-2018 
reinforced by a global commitment to invest in resilience in countries 
neighbouring Syria. 3RP partners strive to address the needs of the most 
vulnerable through effective humanitarian- and resilience-based interventions, 
while building a more sustainable response emphasising use of cash-based 
interventions for food and other basic needs assistance, integrated education, 
protection and youth services, and a focus on service delivery through local 
and municipal systems to reduce duplication and build national capacities (pp. 
6-7). 
 
3.4. Norm Entrepreneurs and Normative Structure 
Resilience must be analysed in relation to an existing normative 
structures. Norm entrepreneurs (Miles, 2015; Davies, 2017; Madokoro, 2019) 
and their agency fit together in a complex mosaic of interrelated parts to 
influence a normative order. “Norms do not float freely, unencumbered by 
physical reality,” as Kowert and Legro describe: 
 
They are attached to real physical environments and are promoted by 
real human agents (...). But the relationship of normative to material 
structures is rarely examined or explicitly theorized, despite the 
likelihood that the influence of norms may be related to... the qualities 
of the actors that adopt or promote them. (Kowert and Legro, 1996, pp. 
490-1). 
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It is imperative that studies of international norms studies are 
particularly careful to specify as explicitly as possible the respective 
mechanisms by which norms are linked to their physical environments by 
entrepreneurs. 
Norm entrepreneurs are actors that are active in the promotion of 
norms (Finnermore, 1998). A norm entrepreneur is an agent of social change 
with an ability to shape the collective behaviour of others. They are agenda 
setters or problem-solvers introducing new ideas into the international debate. 
According to Acharya (2010), new norms emerge in a context of pre-existing 
regional norms and beliefs. This often involves efforts to change the 
constraints and recognise opportunities of social interaction. Despite the 
intuitive notion that actors play a role in establishing and altering normative 
structures, constructivists have been criticised for failing to demonstrate how 
agents influence norm dynamics. 
Norm entrepreneurs, utilising Annika Björkdahl’s, definition, can be 
conceptualised as follows: 
 
By identifying opportunities, actors committed to a particular idea set 
out to change the existing normative context and alter the behaviour of 
others in the direction of the new norm (2002, p. 46). 
 
They are actors who are strongly committed to a particular idea and 
are willing to undertake actions and promote discourses that seek to bring the 
idea ‘upwards’ at an international level. In some ways then, it seems – at least 
at face value – rather easy for notions of norm entrepreneurs(hip) to be 
compatible with ‘bottom-up’ thinking and perspectives; and for refugees to be 
candidates to undertake forms of norm entrepreneurship from the ‘bottom-up’. 
For, in essence, the main impetus for norm development resides with the 
actor promoting ideational change. 
Yet, we need to be careful here. Constructivists tend to neglect agency 
in empirical research. It remains structure-heavy, offering more theories of 
how norms shape states’ identities and actions and fewer theories of how 
states make those very structures. Jeffrey Checkel (1998, p. 325) claims that 
“constructivism lacks a theory of agency,” and “as a result, it overemphasises 
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the role of social structures and norms at the expense of agents who help to 
create and change them in the first place.” An agent-focused analysis is 
appropriate in light of the criticism that constructivists, despite arguing that 
actors and structures are mutually constituted, have tended to advance a 
structure-centred approach in their empirical work. Although this study will 
give analytical priority to agency, it will attempt to explore the relationship 
between the actor and structure, seeking as it does to explore the role of the 
norm entrepreneur in the process of norm development. 
Kingdon (1984, 1995) argued that policy change occurs only when a 
‘policy window’ opens. This is when an opportunity for change arises, when 
problems come up for decision-making by government and can be attached to 
solutions. They are infrequent and fleeting and can occur either due to a 
regular event such as an election, or to a crisis or major shift in political 
power. When a policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs, or advocates for 
specific proposals, can push for their preferred solutions. There are more 
solutions in the policy choice than there are policy windows for using them, 
and solutions or policies come to the window when it opens. Taking this a little 
further then, it could be the case that this thesis examines the durable 
solutions policy as incorporating policy windows where policy entrepreneurs 
may seek to influence and promote change from the ‘bottom-up’. Yet, it is also 
important to highlight that policy entrepreneurship may not be successful most 
of the time. Not all and possibly not even many windows of opportunity for 
change that occur will be accompanied by policy entrepreneurs selecting 
them for attention. There can be and are many instances, where either lack of 
attention/inaction or even inappropriate action results in failure of the 
proposals or possibly, the selection of only some for attention while others are 
ignored. Policy entrepreneurs play an important role in deciding which policies 
get chosen. They must be in a good position in terms of political and technical 
perspectives to take advantage of a policy window when it opens and attach 
their preferred policies to problems before the window closes (Kingdon, 1984, 
1995). 
The identity of the norm entrepreneur is crucial to the selection of 
potential norm candidates, the choice of diffusion strategies and the arenas 
favoured for the norm entrepreneurial activities. A large body of literature in IR 
 104 
attests to the importance of identity in world politics (Wendt, 1994; 
Katzenstein, 1996). Different types of actors can be norm entrepreneurs. 
Some constructivist scholars have sought to understand how actors operate 
and the conditions that might contribute to their success. Much of this 
research, however, has focused on the role of activists, international 
organisations, and epistemic communities. Empirical research has identified 
the agenda-setting and pre-negotiating phases when national governments try 
to formulate their position in multilateral negotiations as particularly conducive 
for the impact of advocacy groups (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; 
Price, 1995). It is recognised, however, that non-state actors are less likely to 
be influential in the actual negotiating processes. Although the trend of the 
literature on norms focuses on non-governmental organisations and social 
movements, Howard and Neufeldt (2000, p. 31) demonstrate that scholars 
who “ignore states and state actions miss significant factors in the process of 
norm creation.”. Hence, from the perspective of this thesis then, it is expected 
that non-state actors, like refugees are also likely to be groups where 
involvement in policy entrepreneurship and advocating policy change will 
more likely lead to failure rather than success. 
Importantly, norm entrepreneurs can include individuals, organisations 
or can even be as large as states – yet perhaps the key is to highlight that 
there is a strong focus on the role of networks and networking of particular 
types and forms. Keck and Sikkink in Activists Beyond Borders (1998) nicely 
supplement Risse, Ropp and Sikkink as they explore how transnational 
advocacy networks pressure states “from above and below” to accept human 
rights discourse and norms. They argue that transnational actors use four 
kinds of tactics in their efforts to persuade and pressure: (1) information 
politics (to create and move politically usable information); (2) symbolic 
politics (to call upon symbols and actions that make sense of a situation for 
others); (3) leverage politics (the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a 
situation where weaker members are unlikely to have influence); and (4) 
accountability politics (efforts to hold powerful actors to their previously stated 
policies or principles) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p.16). 
In this thesis, these concepts are instructive in that they call attention to 
how there is a perceived focus on the use of both power and ideas in the 
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norm socialisation process. Sjöstedt (2013) argues that – while the diffusion of 
ideas by entrepreneurs forms an important basis – it is crucial to take the role 
of national and domestic identities into account in order to explain why some 
idea diffusion processes succeed while others do not. Identity serves as a 
catalyst or gate-keeper of idea diffusion (p. 148) and shapes the way people 
think about power and ideas as norms. She further highlights that, in broad 
terms: 
 
The greater power an entrepreneur has, the more discursive space an 
issue will get, and the more likely that it will get the attention of a 
decision-making unit. The status of the entrepreneurs in terms of 
reputation, credibility, perceived knowledge on the topic, spatial scope, 
etc., also plays an important role (…) (p.150). 
 
In a sense, this thesis is distinctive in linking together these two bodies 
of literature – one which addresses international norms and another which 
addresses the spread of beliefs and practices. Some of the norms diffusion 
literature (largely among law and constructivist scholars) has, of course, 
partially attempted this also. Perhaps the most notable contribution in this 
regard represents that of Keck and Sikkink (1998), who developed a theory of 
how transnational advocacy networks (TANs) influence states’ human rights 
behaviour. According to their definition, these TANs consist of “international 
and domestic NGOs, foundations, and some governmental and 
intergovernmental officials who share collective understandings and a 
collective identity with regard to human rights norms” (1998, p. 21). Keck and 
Sikkink argue that TANs play an important role in urging and even getting 
violating states to improve their human rights practices by pressurising the 
violating states from both above (via international organisations and agents) 
and below (with domestic organisations/agents). One way in which this 
happens is when domestic groups seek to bypass their own government and 
seek out international allies to pressure their state from the outside. They call 
this the ‘boomerang effect’. Indeed, turning back to the thesis then, this work 
offers several insights. First, it is important to see refugees as non-state 
actors or networks who may share common viewpoints as human rights 
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norms and may be interested in pressuring for change from below and thus 
undertake socialisation practices. Yet, it is also a case that the expectation is 
that this work and norm diffusion activity from below is also likely to be only 
partially and even remotely successful and thus the focus may actually be 
about seeing how the interface between top-end policy-making and refugee 
perspectives from below is constituted at this point. 
Finally, moving on from these qualitative studies to take a more 
quantitative approach to evaluating the role of networks in changing 
behaviour, Goodliffe et al. (2012), for example, examined how dependence 
networks influenced higher level (for example, states’) decisions to join the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Theorising that either socialisation or fears 
of sanctioning could drive national elites in states to accept any sovereignty 
costs associated with joining the ICC, Goodliffe et al. (2012) discovered that 
IGO, trade, and alliance dependencies with states that have already joined 
the ICC made states more likely to join the institution themselves. This finding 
provides solid evidence for the notion that network ties influence the 
behaviour of national elites (states) and even international policy-makers (UN) 
in important ways. Hence, this thesis attempts to utilise such observations 
around the role of dependencies to inform analytical assumptions with respect 
to the role and nature of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on norm diffusion analysed 
later. 
3.4.1. Various Actors as Norm Entrepreneurs 
Norms entrepreneurs are important not only for developing and 
sustaining international norms, but also have notable influence, during critical 
stages where and when norms have not yet been fully adopted or reached a 
consensus stage. It is generally agreed that intellectuals and other members 
of ‘civil society’ are key innovators in domestic, as well as in international 
society, and that human agency is critical, especially in the first stages of 
norm creation (Alderson, 2000; Thakur, 2006). Some research has focused 
increasingly upon individual norm entrepreneurs that serve in international 
organisations, like the UN Secretary-General (Johnstone, 2007) or state 
officials or bureaucrats (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011). Transnational 
advocacy networks, like NGOs, political foundations and churches represent 
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another norm entrepreneur archetype. Private sector actors such as actors 
representing transnational corporations have also been included (Flohr et al., 
2010). For the purpose of this thesis the interaction between the respective 
different actors is summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Understanding Interaction Between Actors 
ACTOR MAIN INFLUENCE 
PUT ON 
ACTOR MAIN INFLUENCE PUT ON 
International actors  Civil society organisations, National 
elites 
National elites  Civil society organisations, Other 
national  
Civil society organisations National elites, Grassroots 
Refugees and IDPs International actors, National Elites, 
Civil society 
 
 
Norm entrepreneurs, be they at the international or national level, use 
varied techniques to facilitate and promote norm diffusion. International actors 
try to influence ‘norm breakers’. This is also a goal for civil society 
organisations pushing for changes at the national level. National elites can 
also make efforts to turn fellow national elites into ‘norm followers’ and as 
such influence policy and legislation. Such entrepreneurs can, for example, be 
actors seeking to influence politicians, politicians reaching out to the 
grassroots, women’s organisations putting pressure on policy-makers or 
educating the public on women’s political rights, to name just a few. Crucially, 
communication and persuasion strategies and tactics are some of the most 
important resources of power. As in every communicative process, the 
sender’s appeal, its moral weight and authenticity, role and approach are of 
immense importance. 
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Turning to the thesis then, it is possible to envisage refugees and 
displaced people acting as potentially important groups of norm 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, if they are the subject of increased international 
pressure (top-down norm diffusion) or embark on activities that seek to 
influence key agendas, then they can easily be regarded as engaging in some 
forms of norm entrepreneurship. 
In the case of forced migration, there are at least four sets of relevant 
actors within the international community: 
1) Representatives of international organisations such as the United 
Nations (including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs in the UN Secretariat, and the UN Security Council) and regional 
multilateral institutions such as the Organisation of African States and the 
European Union (EU). 
2) National decision-makers of key states of the international 
community. 
3) Representatives of national and international non-governmental 
organisations. The numbers of NGOs continues to increase and they have 
become notable for their involvement in humanitarian emergencies (Duffield, 
2012, 2013). 
4) Representatives of forcibly displaced populations (refugees and 
IDPs). Although not as cohesively organised as some of the other actors, they 
nonetheless exert significant influence on the processes described here. 
The relationship between norms and institutions is undeniable: 
according to Goertz (2003), norms are necessary for institutions to exist and 
reside in the realm of social context (Finnemore, 1996). If regimes represent 
collections of institutions, or are the same as institutions (Goertz, 2003), the 
three are intrinsically linked. 
It is important to highlight at this point that organisations offer structure 
and often clarity to international systems. Thus, the power of organisations, 
such as UNHCR is comparatively large. This can be seen in circumstances 
when states first resist a norm or law by undertaking ‘surface action’ and duly 
adopt rhetoric about integration and acceptance in order to retain or enhance 
their respective status internationally, then later concede due to pressure from 
 109 
an international organisation and truly internalising norms (Byers, 2008). 
International institutions set norms followed normally by states that also desire 
to be included in any (often declared) set of ‘civilised’ states (Goertz, 2003). 
The UN is important in many associated respects, so it is also worthwhile at 
this point to further consider its respective involvement in any process of norm 
diffusion. 
Actors, international and domestic, are important aspects of 
constructivists’ theorising and empirical work precisely because they 
contribute to the social construction of structures. Above all, it is an integral 
feature of the work of social constructivists, like Checkel. Unlike neo-realists, 
the focus of social constructivists on actors is not limited to the state, but more 
broadly includes non-state actors. The inclusion of such actors reinforces the 
challenge of social constructivists to the state-centric paradigm that has 
dominated IR (Florini, 2000). Crucially for this thesis, social constructivists’ 
research on international organisations has focused and highlighted efforts of 
individuals and groups/networks to change social understandings, including 
those within International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), such as the 
UN and its agencies in particular; epistemic communities, incorporating 
individuals with specialised knowledge, such as lawyers; academics (Burley 
and Mattli, 1993; Ratner, 2000); and personnel of organisations (Adler, 1998). 
For the purposes of this thesis, existing social constructivist work has 
highlighted the standards promoted by UNHCR ensuring that the standards 
are reinforced by robust legal and moral authority (Zomerhuis, 2015). 
Other scholars have emphasised individuals who are associated with 
organisations that make them ‘effective engines of social construction’ (see 
Chandler, 2010). Chandler (2010) for instance argues that: “The post-liberal 
paradigm tends, in fact, to reject policy goals and is concerned more with 
processes of engagement, held to empower the other, enabling them to 
pursue their goals safely and within a framework of international constraints” 
(Chandler, 2010, p. 193). This has profound implications on the way we 
should think about the role of individuals and for the way we think in this 
thesis about durable solutions since as Chandler (2010) denotes, it is often 
the task of international institutions to ensure that their main task is 
understood as: “the export of good governance rather than the tasks of 
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direction or control” (Chandler, 2010, pp. 193-4). With a more open 
understanding of the task of the UN – informed by social constructivist 
thinking – then there is also room to also enable refugees and IDPs to be 
viewed as (potential) policy entrepreneurs. 
This thesis therefore assumes that the refugee or displaced person, 
like the state and UNHCR, can be an actor shaped by and with positional 
advantages and disadvantages who could also operate at the intersection of 
the domestic and the external (and possessing agential capabilities). In 
contrast with existing research, then, the focus of this study is on the interface 
between UNHCR and the displaced persons, who in the latter case represent 
actors and agents, with the potential to offer views and perspectives on norm 
diffusion and who could via active participation in each phase of the forced 
migration experience, seek to undertake change to the UN durable solutions 
policy. 
3.4.2. Agency of Social Actors 
Like that of structure, a watertight definition of ‘agency’ has proven 
rather elusive (Doty, 1997). Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984) offers a 
sociological discussion of agency concerned with structure, space and time. 
More specifically, Giddens is concerned with how actors create structures 
through constant conduct carried out at different levels. Constructivists, 
following Giddens’s structuration theory, note that social agency depends 
“upon the capability of actors to make a difference in the production of definite 
outcomes, regardless of whether or not they intend (are aware) that these 
outcomes occur” (Cohen, 1987, p. 284). To make a difference, Cohen further 
asserts it is necessary, “to transform some aspect of the process or event; 
agency is therefore equated with transformative and (re)productive capacity” 
(ibid.). 
However, more pertinent in the context of this thesis, Goddard defines 
agency as “the capacity and willingness of actors to take steps in relation to 
their social situation” (2000, p. 3). For this thesis, Goddard highlights the 
accompanying importance of ‘intent’ or ‘willingness’ of actors to try and make 
a difference. This is important since refugees vary in their experiences, and 
differ in their responses to flight, asylum, and return and reintegration. Some 
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do and some do not recognise new opportunities available to them because of 
their trauma and loss of resources. Others seem to cope better. Individual 
decisions, experiences and life courses have been seen as part of the larger 
cultural, socio-political and environmental complex that hold opportunities as 
well as constraints. Yet, importantly it is often clear that refugees want to see 
change and indeed are at the forefront of experiencing it in many forms and 
thus understanding their motivations and willingness towards change. 
Furthermore, the concept of agency is used to inform the actor-oriented 
analysis of the current study. From this perspective, refugees are therefore 
regarded as active subjects with the capacity to process social experiences 
and invent new ways of coping with life even under extreme coercion. 
While forced migration studies position refugees and returnees in 
distinct ways with regard to the home society and the host society in general, 
fleeing, living in exile and returning are actions undertaken by individual 
refugees who are in possession of the facts and who have experiences that 
are not entirely delinked from the current experience of rebuilding their lives 
and that of their community. Vincent and Sorensen (2001, p. 8) claim that 
“contrary to the common assumption about refugees, they are not poor, 
resource-less persons who only think of surviving their present, difficult 
circumstances. Some have many skills, plan and work for a better future”. 
Bulley’s (2014, p. 73) describes how refugees undermine food distribution 
systems in camps by the “double-entering of names on lists, registering in 
more than one zone or village, adding fictional family members, and declining 
to register deaths and departures from the camp”, in order to secure more 
food rations. As refugees learn to navigate this state of physical, 
psychological and legal limbo (Lischer, 2011, p. 280), they can challenge and 
actively shape camps as “in-between spaces” of exception. 
There is a general assumption that refugees are passive entities in 
terms of being ‘recipients’ or takers of refugee status determination 
processes, placing their fate into the hands of state and humanitarian 
authorities. Yet, even under these conditions, refugees exercise agency. 
When refugees aspire to obtain legal status under the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the act of proving that they have a well-
founded fear of persecution is a fundamental way of exercising agency. 
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Applying the notion of agency to the study of the impact of the 
structures of forced migration on the refugee/returnee resource, the study 
examines refugees’ flight decisions and decisions about return and 
reintegration. This enables the study to transcend the pressured argument of 
Kunz (1981) that refugees act on impulse, especially during their flight, and 
Koser’s (1997) argument that refugee agencies are only at play when return is 
self-directed, and not during assisted return. While located in exile, refugees 
sometimes try to renegotiate their relationships with their country of origin by 
organising and systematically putting pressure on their governments to listen 
to their voices. The case of the Guatemalan refugees in Mexico who 
strategically worked to re-establish their relationship with Guatemala, in 
particular the female branch of their organisations, is cited in the literature as 
one of the most prominent cases of refugees expressing their political agency 
(Billings, 2000; Rousseau, Morales, and Foxen 2001). O'Kane (2007) 
describes how Burmese female refugees, removed from the familiar 
authoritative structures they knew from home, created a network of twelve 
women’s political and social welfare organisations in exile to document, report 
and publicly shame the Burmese government for its human rights abuses. 
Social constructivists’ presentation and definition of norms as social 
structures leaves more space for agency – that is, for individual actors to 
influence their environment as well as to be influenced by it. Social 
constructivists note that structures are meaningless without some 
intersubjective set of norms and practices. 
With regard to the reflexive nature of actors in the co-constitutional 
relationship, it implies that the actors (refugees and returnees) reflect on their 
choices and decisions, and are able to learn from experience by acting within 
contexts that involve strategically selecting constraints and opportunities that 
can and do transform social structures they encounter. For example, the 
refugee as an actor is not static, and does not always act as a victim of his or 
her experiences. Like most social actors, the refugee is capable of formulating 
and reformulating strategies in the light of changing experiences, and has 
knowledge about the strategic contexts in which she or he pursues his or her 
goals. As Hansen (2006, p. 37) argues, identities are conceived as social 
phenomena that are constituted “relationally and discursively”. She argues 
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that identity can be and is constructed in more ambiguous and complex 
constructions of difference in practice and that the degree and mode of 
difference should be a question for research carried out in this vein rather 
than an a priori assumption (pp. 38-41). 
Furthermore, applying the theory of structure and agents, the study 
stresses both the opportunities and constraints of each phase of the forced 
migration experience. This approach also presents refugees and IDPs both as 
individuals and as members of a group or groups who participate in the 
broader socio-political conditions of every phase of their experiences, which 
cumulatively affects their resources and choices in various ways. 
The opportunities of refugees or returnees to define problems and take 
part in the decision-making, concerning issues directly affecting their lives, are 
still limited. This is understandable, especially at the beginning of refugee 
operations as it is hard to form decision-making bodies in chaotic situations. 
However, the participation of refugees and returnees in planning and 
decision-making at the later stages may guarantee sustainability and success 
in managing problems in the long term. As such, this thesis argues that taking 
refugee agency seriously in terms of the planning and implementation of 
durable solutions is essential in order to understand the complexities of 
achieving effective outcomes. Political preferences among the existing 
durable solutions should not guide actions and options in refugee cases. A 
general framework on durable solutions for the purpose of this thesis is 
presented in Figure 4. In practice, of course, UNHCR’s work has been 
inescapably political (Loescher, 2001, p. 2), and durable solutions have been 
put to the service of numerous other political, economic and strategic goals, 
some of which are incompatible with their humanitarian rationale (Chimni, 
2004). 
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Figure 4: Framework on durable solutions (Author’s own) 
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Finally, it is important to highlight that the views, attitudes and 
willingness of refugees to undertake agency may be affected by the ‘positive; 
and/or ‘negative’ practices of their respective host societies. Shifting the focus 
a little to a discussion of how host societies impact the refugee’s resources, 
Ryan et al. (2007, 2008) concluded that asylum policies and practice could 
either constrain or facilitate the resources of refugees, and thereby will impact 
upon their motivations to be involved in active forms of agency. In their study 
of forced migrants in Ireland, they highlight that ‘positive’ refugee policies and 
practices, such as free movement of migrants, access to housing, 
employment and education, enable the refugees to increase their resources 
and adapt better. They are therefore more likely to be passive in terms of 
being integrated into the politics and practices as ‘new participants’ in and of 
the host society and may actually be less interested in international 
engagement. However, negative asylum practices, such as the erosion of 
personal control through denial of asylum and its accompanying rights, 
constrain the refugees, leading to further resource loss. Equally, this can 
provoke differing more assertive forms of agency countering their views as 
‘victims’ with a stronger motivation to act as policy entrepreneurs at the 
international level, including a durable solutions policy. 
It is imperative to raise questions about the broader implications of an 
increased focus on the refugee as an agent within in the larger context of 
justifying refugees’ right to receive the right to a durable solution. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
(Social) constructivist approaches, with their strong emphasis on social 
construction, assign a very important role to international norms and 
institutions. In terms of the constructivist literature, much of the existing 
analysis on norm emergence and spread begins at the point where norm 
entrepreneurs are involved and actively disseminate international norms. 
Taking refugee agency more seriously means pushing against common 
treatment and representations of refugees as hapless, silent victims, which 
has become deeply engrained within the international refugee regime. Within 
this victim-discourse, which drives humanitarian responses and a state’s 
willingness to offer shelter, refugees become anonymous objects who are 
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presumably stripped somewhat of their agency. By focusing on the ways in 
which refugees manoeuvre their circumstances, this thesis challenges these 
common assumptions, which continue to shape policies and practices. 
The analytical model presented in this study provides an attractive 
conceptual framework to conduct empirical research because it explicitly 
addresses the emergence of norms and contains within it the mechanism of 
norm entrepreneurship to explain the change of norms over time. 
Constructivism also looks at how identities and interests evolve and why and 
how refugees and refugees issue change over time. According to this 
approach, state perceptions of the refugee problem are influenced by norms 
and ideas that socialise states and impact on states’ interests. Constructivists 
argue similarly that norms embedded in structure exercise a powerful effect 
on state behaviour. Acknowledging that refugees are still human agents when 
they cross international borders to seek refuge, and do not suddenly become 
without agency, silent, passive beings, fundamentally recognises their 
humanity and, by extension, their right to have their human rights respected at 
the most basic level. 
This chapter shows that the three clearly defined and separate phases 
of the norm life cycle model are in practice more complex than postulated by 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). In terms of agency, the norm life cycle model 
presents international organisations and the networks they form along with 
critical states as the drivers of norm diffusion (1998, p. 898). The main 
mechanism they are said to employ to make norm-violating states internalise 
new norms is norm socialisation (ibid). The review of literature, however, 
points to more varied pathways to norm diffusion and challenges the 
hypothesis that international actors are the sole drivers of norm transmission. 
This chapter concludes that the investigation into the creation, diffusion and 
internalisation of refugee norms and durable solutions must focus on norm 
entrepreneurs as the agents of normative change, both UNHCR and 
refugees, whose actions can impact the construction of new norms when they 
emerge first in a domestic context and the institutionalisation of these norms 
in domestic laws, policies and structures. However, as much as it is important 
to challenge simplistic narratives, it is imperative to raise questions about the 
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broader implications of an increased focus on the refugee as an agent within 
the larger context. 
The next part of the thesis will further position the study by examining 
the contextual background of forced migration. This will then help to provide a 
robust framework informed by a constructivist perspective and located within 
the contextual background of forced migration that will help the reader to 
understand the particular focus on three particular dimensions of the durable 
solutions – forced migration, resettlement and repatriation and the later 
empirical findings. 
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CHAPTER 4: Methodology 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The way in which research is conducted may be conceived of in terms 
of the research philosophy subscribed to, the research strategy employed and 
so the research instruments utilised (and perhaps developed) in the pursuit of 
a goal – the research objective(s) – and the quest for the solution to a 
problem – the research question. Chapter One outlined the research 
questions and research objectives. This chapter explores how the 
methodology chosen underpins the empirical exploration of the conceptual 
framework and the linkages between the research questions and the 
methodology. Sample, and sampling strategy of the study are discussed and 
a justification for the data collection methodology is provided. This chapter will 
also describe how the research data are analysed and ethical considerations 
are addressed. 
The research questions of this study are: (1) To what extent are 
UNHCR’s durable solutions being successfully accomplished? (2) What is the 
perspective of key stakeholders? How much influence do refugees, as agents, 
have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both enabled and constrained 
by the structures? (3) What actions are needed to ensure a more effective 
and consistent achievement of durable solutions? How might UNHCR policies 
be adapted or changed to better address prospects for durable solutions? 
The framework proposed here builds on constructivist insights, allowing 
for interplay between global ideas and local practices (Björkdahl and Höglund, 
2013). Constructivism’s insight that norms affect interest, and therefore that 
interest is changing, is particularly suited to dissect the impact of the 
internationally driven attempt to diffuse human rights norms. 
While liberal and realist approaches adopt a materialist ‘logic of 
expected consequences’, which considers interests as given prior to social 
interaction, constructivism adopts an ideational ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
according to which interests can be transformed through social interaction 
(March and Olsen, 1998). 
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4.2. Constructivism and Interviews 
This section focuses on the respective methodological issues and how 
they are resolved in order to facilitate the study of norm diffusion empirically. 
Theoretically, this study is situated within the constructivist paradigm. In 
contrast to a more traditionally positivist approach, this perspective holds that 
there is no one, objective reality or knowledge to be discovered and known. 
Rather, there are multiple and diverse realities that are constructed by the 
individuals living and making sense of them. 
The current research, which is situated within both International 
Relations and Comparative Politics, employs the constructivist idea of agents 
and structures as mutually constituted to discern the nature of the social 
structures that refugees, as agents, encounter; how these structures constrain 
and enable the action of refugees; and how much freedom refugees (agents) 
have in doing what they do, given they are both enabled and constrained by 
the structures. 
The strengths of social constructivism are in its methods of 
investigation. Methodologically, it employs tools that include process tracing, 
genealogy, structured focus comparison, interviews, participant observations, 
and discourse and content analysis, to understand how and why change 
happens and the constitution of political behaviour and effects (Wendt, 1999; 
Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Constructivism does not have a single method 
or research design. It opens up a set of issues, and scholars choose the 
research tools and methods best suited to their particular question 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Social constructivists thus believe that there is 
no neutral position from which objective data and knowledge can be gathered. 
Social constructivists hold assumptions that individuals seek understanding of 
the world in which they live and work. Individuals develop subjective 
meanings of their experiences-meanings directed toward certain objects or 
things (Creswell, 2009). The goal of the research is to rely as much as 
possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied (Creswell, 
2009). The aforementioned subjective meanings are forged through 
interactions with others in the human community and through historical, 
social, and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives (Ibid.). 
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Social inquiry is generally understood as being underpinned by the two 
principles of epistemology and ontology, with approaches to these key 
dimensions, each exerting a fundamental influence on the research process. 
From an ontological perspective, subjective meanings that are conceptualised 
and perceived by research participants are individualised and originate from 
distinct realities. From an epistemological perspective, the appropriated 
meanings constructed by my research participants from the surrounding 
culture and society configure or create the basis of knowledge which is 
subjective in nature. 
Employing the social constructivist framework helps to explain the 
nature of the structures of forced migration, the agency of the refugee 
returnees during their forced migration experience, and the transformational 
experience of the refugee and the structures as a result of this encounter. 
Accordingly, durable solutions for refugees is a dynamic and multifaceted two-
way process where ‘top-down’ development of UNHCR’s policies on durable 
solutions needs to be equally informed by the ‘bottom-up’ identities and 
experiences of displaced persons. Moreover, the study seeks to include in the 
discussion of the missing voices and actions of refugees in the emerging 
literature that integrates forced migration in the contexts of constraint and 
opportunity (Koser, 2009). 
The individual actor’s capacity to process social experiences and 
devise ways of coping with life, even under the most difficult forms of 
constraint, is referred to as the coping strategy, and is the main attribute of the 
concept of the actor’s agency. Even within restricted social spaces, social 
actors are capable of formulating decisions, acting upon them, and innovating 
or experimenting. Action encompasses the meaning, motivation and purpose 
which individuals bring to their activity: their sense of agency, or power within. 
While agency tends to be operationalised as decision-making, in the social 
science literature, it takes a number of other forms. It takes the form of 
bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and 
resistance, as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and 
analysis. The study’s attempt to include refugees and returnees as capable 
actors is not to impose it on the structures; nor does it present them as 
independent of the structures. Rather, it presents them as existing in dialectic 
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relations. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995, p. 5), the ‘philosophy’ that 
inform interviews is the following “Find out what others think and know, and 
avoid dominating your interviewees by imposing your world on theirs.” 
There are different approaches to qualitative interviewing; unstructured 
and semi-structured interviewing. Hays and Singh (2012) noted that in-depth 
interview is referred to as semi-structured interview. This sort of data 
collection method uses an interview protocol that serves as a guide and 
starting point for the interview experience. The research participant has more 
say in the structure and process. Despite the use of an interview protocol, 
every interview question does not have to be asked, the sequence and pace 
of interview questions can change, and additional interview questions can be 
included to create a unique interview catered to fully describing the 
participants’ experience. The semi-structured interview includes more 
participant voice to provide a richer picture of a phenomenon under 
investigation (Hays and Singh, 2012). 
During an unstructured interview the researcher might start the 
conversation with a question and then actively listen to the respondent who 
talks freely while a semi-structured interview follows a checklist of issues and 
questions that the researcher wishes to cover during the session (Darmer, 
1995; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Thus, semi-structured interviews were chosen 
in this thesis. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews provided the means for 
gathering the forced migrants’ life stories and for exploring the deeper 
meanings of key life events and activities, challenges, and underlying 
motivations or inspirations. A combination of general questions and floating 
prompts are sometimes enough to collect almost all of the information needed 
in a semi-structured interview (Leech, 2002). Such interviews seek to access 
not only personal experiences but also the authentic thoughts, feelings, 
perceptions, and meanings of the storyteller or respondent (Atkinson, 1998, 
2002).  
Qualitative research focuses on the insider’s perspective (Holloway 
and Brown, 2012). This perspective pertains to exploring people’s thoughts. 
The overarching goal is to gain insight into people’s experiences, motivations, 
and worldviews (Boeije, 2010). As Atkinson (2002, p.132) asserted: “The 
quest in a life story interview is for the unique voice and experience of the 
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storyteller, which is morally implicative and may also merge at some points 
with the universal human experience.” In fact, Weine’s study (2011) 
suggested that one effective way to understand resiliency within the refugee 
population is to use minimally structured interviews. Shamai (2003) argued 
that the qualitative interview process could have a healing effect on the 
participant due to space being created for the participant to reflect on his or 
her lived experience. 
4.2.1. Sampling 
In qualitative research, selection of the research sample is purposeful 
(Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012). A qualitative researcher has reasons 
(purposes) for selecting specific participants. The strategy that a researcher 
chooses depends on the purpose of the study (Ibid). Initially a purposive 
sampling method involved contacting UNHCR officials whose responsibility is 
to assist in the resettlement of refugees and provide services (legal, social, 
etc.) to refugees. UNHCR officials were contacted in Geneva, London and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Numerous Bosnian organisations in the UK (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Community Advice Centre – London, BHCUK BH 
Community UK, Remembering Srebrenica, Bosnian Community London and 
Bosnian Resource Information & Cultural Centre Kosovar Support) were also 
contacted as these are the locations from which officials interact with refugees 
on a daily basis and would know which refugees would be willing to 
participate in my project.12 An email inviting participants for the interviews was 
circulated to the members of those organisations and some of them made a  
direct contact. 
                                                             
12 Out of those contacted, the following officials were willing to be interviewed for my 
research. 
1. Ewen Macleod, Director of the Policy Development and Evaluation Service. 
2. Jackie Keegan, Head of Unit, Comprehensive Solutions Unit, Division of International 
Protection. 
3. Gavin Lim, Protection Officer. 
4. Larry Bottinick, Senior Legal Officer. 
5. Allehone Abebe, Senior Protection Officer. 
Also, UNHCR London, UNCR Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Community Centre in 
Derby and Remembering Srebrenica UK were helpful with providing information. 
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The remaining respondents13 were located through snowball sampling. 
Snowball sampling is often used in research concerning refugees, as there is 
a lack of formalised data available from which to obtain a sample (Bloch, 
2007b). 
The population for this study was Bosnian displaced people and 
refugees, aged eighteen years and older. 
Inclusion Criteria: 
 Displaced population and resettled refugees – all participants were 
registered refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and left the country 
after the war. 
 Eighteen years of age and older – interviewees were all adults, 
representing an economically active segment of the population. Even if 
it was not a requirement, a balance of gender was achieved. 
 Part of UNHCR programme of durable solutions – each participant fell 
under one of the durable solutions promoted by UNHCR. 
Sample size in purposeful sampling is relative to the research goals and 
tradition, and consequently, it is very difficult to establish the ‘right’ number of 
participants (Hays and Singh, 2012). Kvale (1996, p. 101) provided an answer 
to the common question, ‘How many interview subjects do I need?’ the author 
replied: “Interview as many subjects as necessary to find out what you need 
to know.” Five detailed and deep semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with UNHCR officials and 10 interviews with refugees and displaced people. 
Details of the displaced persons are outlined in Table 4. 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Interviews with UNHCR officials will be referred to as ‘interview’. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of interviewees14 
Name  Gender  Age Status Marital 
Status  
Education  Year of 
Immigration 
Additional information 
1 Male  65 Refugee, UK Widowed Degree  1995 He is widowed with two children – one 
son and one daughter. He and his family 
live in Birmingham. They waited three 
years in Serbia for approval of their 
application for resettlement in the UK. 
2 Male  47 Refugee, UK Divorced High 
School 
1998 He escaped from Bosnia in 1992 with a 
convoy of refugees. He escaped with his 
wife, mother and sister. With the help of the 
Red Cross they came to Germany. They 
spent five years waiting for their application 
for refugee status to be approved and in 
1998 they came to the UK. 
3 Female  65 IDP Married Degree N/A She lost her son in the war. Currently lives 
with her husband and daughter and her 
family. Immediately after the war they lived 
a collective centre. 
                                                             
14 Refuges interviewed will be called ‘respondents’. 
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4 Male  57 Refugee, US Married Degree 2001 He is married and in his late fifties. He 
worked in Bosnia as an English translator. 
Because he could not stay in Germany, he 
applied for refugee status in the US. 
5 Male  46 Refugee, UK Married High 
School 
1999 He was in two concentration camps before 
he managed to arrive to the UK. Currently 
he has his own construction business and 
lives in Birmingham. 
6 Male  51 Returnee Married Diploma 1999 He lived with his wife and children in 
Netherlands for a few year after the war. He 
decided to go back to his town in Bosnia. 
7 Male 63 Refugee, UK Married High 
School 
2000 Initially he wanted to resettle in  
Switzerland but was offered the UK. He and 
his wife opened a shop in London. 
8 Female  40 Returnee  Married Diploma  1999 She currently lives in Bosnia and returned 
from the UK with a diploma in nursing. 
9 Female 56 Refugee, UK Married High 
School 
2001 She has three children – one son and 
two daughters, who went into medicine. 
She and her husband opened a private 
business. 
10 Female 45 Refugee, UK Married Degree 1995 Through other relatives, they contacted her 
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husband’s sister in Germany, and she 
helped them cross the border. They lived in 
Germany for six years. The family adjusted 
well, both adults worked and the children 
attended school. However, due to 
immigration policies in Germany, they could 
not stay there permanently so they applied 
to come to the UK as refugees. She and her 
husband have a private business importing 
ethnic goods to the UK.  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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After creating summaries of each interview, the key themes were 
identified across the research in line with the research questions, focusing on 
key themes of journeys, stories and time. To do this, the interviews were 
organised in relation to these broad themes. From this, the analytical chapters 
of the thesis were divided across the research questions and each chapter 
focused on answering one of the research questions. After deciding on the 
broad analytic themes in line with the research questions, each chapter had 
its own analysis. This process was broadly structured around identifying the 
most relevant interviews and extracts in relation to each theme and analysing 
these in turn. 
 
4.3. Methods 
Methodology refers to systematically structured or codified ways to test 
theories. Methodology is thus critical in facilitating the evaluation of theory and 
the evolution of research. The epistemological assumption of qualitative 
research conceptualises subjective evidence as it is assembled based on 
individual views. This is how knowledge is known and constructed through the 
subjective experience of people (Creswell, 2013). 
This research employs a structured case study of the evolution of 
norms by using interpretive and qualitative methods. In tracing the 
development of a norm, it would be difficult to justify using other methods, as 
norms are inherently interpretive and would be difficult to measure as 
anything other than qualitative data. In addition, the methods that will be 
employed to conduct this study are logically interconnected through the 
constructivist approach. Constructivists have suggested that studies of 
international norms have been missing “process tracing and case research 
needed to explore actual diffusion mechanisms” (Checkel, 1997, p. 473). For 
example, the high number of speeches, statements and press releases made 
by government could be an indicator that they are adapting norms. 
Researchers should use multiple other data sources for triangulation of 
data in order to establish credibility. For data triangulation, legal instruments, 
conventions, national laws and strategies relevant to durable solutions were 
collected and analysed to supplement data from interviews. The study’s 
research methodology is outlined in Figure 5.
 128 
 
Figure 5: Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Qualitative methods were chosen for several reasons. Qualitative 
methods are important tools in eliciting refugees’ personal experiences during 
resettlement because they allow interviewees to give voice to their own 
thoughts and feelings in their own way. A missing component of political 
discussion about refugees is their own voices. A dialogue with refugees in the 
context of this study provides them with an opportunity to share their 
perspectives. According to Holloway and Brown (2012) qualitative research 
Research Questions 
Research Design 
 Qualitative 
 Interpretive 
 Case Study 
 
(i) to investigate the experiences 
and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
displaced persons on durable 
solutions;d 
(ii) to understand the ‘top-down’ 
drivers that have shaped UNHCR’s 
durable solutions policy to date 
(with specific reference to 
resettlement, local integration and 
repatriation) and to introduce a 
clear notion of ‘bottom-up norm 
diffusion’ which provides value-
added;  
(iii) to demonstrate that the thesis 
is informed by a constructivist 
perspective and a spiral model, to 
evaluate the linkages and 
synergies between refugees’ 
perspectives and experiences (as 
agents of change) and UNHCR’s 
politics and policy of durable 
solutions. 
 
 Case analysis 
Data Collection Strategies 
 Semi structured interviews 
(UNHCR officials and 
forced migrants) 
 Documentary evidence 
(policy statements, 
speeches, and documents 
from leading international 
organizations) 
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yields a ‘thick’ description, which covers in-depth and detailed descriptions of 
participants’ behaviours, feelings, opinions, processes, actions, and 
experiences. A good ‘thick’ description has to be theoretical and analytical, 
which means that the researchers not only report the raw findings, but they 
also analyse and interpret them by providing relevant supporting data on the 
issue. 
Qualitative methods are especially appropriate for studies on sensitive 
topics such as the exploration of refugee issues. As Padgett (1998, p.8) 
notes, using “a standardized, closed-ended interview would be inappropriate 
or insensitive” for issue areas where respondents need to articulate their 
experiences in their own style and own words. This is particularly applicable 
when respondents are recounting traumatic experiences, including cases of 
physical and emotional trauma. 
Integration of displaced people has previously been approached from 
the top-down, a disempowering approach for refugees with a sole focus on 
the structural and organisational aspects of one country’s integration system 
(Korac, 2003). Actively listening to refugee perspectives creates a partnership 
that can be a model between the host country and refugees that can in itself 
promote integration and empower a traditionally powerless group. By 
juxtaposing refugee perspectives and policies, the study compares ‘lived 
experience’ with policies on paper, thus making a contribution to refugee 
policies and programmes. 
 
4.3.1 Approaches  
The research approach is either quantitative or qualitative (Copper, 
2006). The five specific types of qualitative research or qualitative inquiry 
approaches are: phenomenology, ethnography, case studies, grounded 
theory, and narrative research (Creswell, 2009; Johnson and Christensen, 
2012). Hays and Singh (2012) defined the qualitative approaches to inquiry.  
Narrative research (explores the life of an individual), phenomenology 
(discovers or describes the meaning or essence of participants’ lived 
experiences), grounded theory (generates a theory that is grounded in data 
regarding participants’ perspectives for a particular phenomenon), 
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Ethnography (describes and interprets a culture of a group or system), case 
study (develops an in-depth description and analysis of a case or multiple 
cases). Creswell (2013) explained that at the most fundamental level, the five 
approaches differ in what they are trying to accomplish – their foci or the 
primary objectives of the studies. The particular approach to research often 
directs a qualitative researcher’s attention toward preferred approaches to 
data collection (Creswell, 2013), discussed in next section. 
 
4.3.2. Data Gathering 
Hays and Singh (2012) stated that individual interviews are the most 
widely used qualitative data collection method and continue to be a preferred 
option for unexplored and underexplored social phenomenon. Seidman 
(2013) explained that interviewing is based on the interest in other people’s 
stories that constitute a way of knowing. Telling stories is essentially a 
meaning-making process and every word that people use in telling stories is a 
microcosm of their consciousness. Hatch (2002) stated that if the work is a 
qualitative interview study, then formal interviewing will be the data collection 
tool. The strength of the interviews is that they allow insight into participants’ 
perspectives. 
Hays and Singh (2012) noted that in-depth interview is referred to as a 
semi-structured interview. This sort of data collection method uses an 
interview protocol that serves as a guide and starting point for the interview 
experience. The research participant has more say in the structure and 
process. Despite the use of the interview protocol, every interview question 
does not have to be asked, the sequence and pace of interview questions can 
change, and additional interview questions can be included to create a unique 
interview catered to fully describing the participant’s experience. The semi-
structured interview includes more participant voice to provide a richer picture 
of a phenomenon under investigation (Hays and Singh, 2012). 
Data gathering is the process of gathering and measuring information 
on variables of interest, in an established systematic fashion that enables one 
to answer stated research questions and evaluate outcomes. In addition to a 
thorough review of the secondary literature, primary data is collected through 
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policy statements, speeches, and documents from leading international 
organisations (mainly UNHCR) involved in work with refugees. In addition, the 
extensive use of semi-structured and semi-formal interviews is an integral 
feature of the research design of this thesis. The choice of semi-structured 
and semi-formal interview techniques, is as Mason (2002, p. 225) argues 
essentially a ‘conversation with a purpose, characterised by a conversational, 
flexible and fluid style’. He further suggests that for the researcher to achieve 
his or her purpose with the interview, the interviewer has to be active in 
encouraging the candidate to speak about relevant issues, topics and 
experiences during the interview itself (Ibid.). Furthermore, the use of semi-
structured questions allows the participants more freedom and creativity in 
their response to the questions (Sowell and Casey, 1982). Finally, because 
the questions are semi-structured, this approach provides reasonably 
standard data across participants, thus facilitating my objective of comparing 
and contrasting the resources of the refugees, and also allowing me flexibility 
to probe answers more deeply and gather more information than is found in 
surveys (Gall et al., 1996). 
Interviews were conducted with a number of forced migrants and 
officials of UNHCR. Two sets of interview guides were developed and 
deployed: one set for forced migrants, and one set for UNHCR officials. The 
interviews with UNHCR officials showed that top-down approaches have 
struggled to create appropriate responses to refugees’ displacement and that 
refugees continue to have little ability to shape the conditions of their own 
return or integration in a host state. Based on the interviews with forced 
migrants there must be a change in strategy that results in working with 
refugees and hearing what they need. 
The findings and arguments presented in this study are grounded in an 
intensive and comprehensive review of existing literature on durable solutions 
including: key documents relating to the durable solutions policy and the 
interviews – conducted with: 
 key officials from UNHCR involved in the development of durable 
solutions policies; and 
 the refugees on their perspectives towards durable solutions. 
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The responses from my interviews provided: 
1. Insight on the range of durable solutions programmes and coordination 
mechanisms; 
2. Best practices, lessons learned, challenges and ways forward informing the 
design of existing or future durable solution initiatives; and 
3. Perspectives of other non-traditional actors 
 
The responses were then matched with desk review literature related to 
durable solutions including: 
 International and regional policy and legal frameworks to durable 
solutions (including legal instruments, conventions, national laws and 
strategies relevant to durable solutions); 
 Research published on regional displacement issues and trends as 
well as national level work; 
 A review of mandates, coordination systems, and programmes. 
4.3.3. Analysis  
There are numerous methods to analyse qualitative data obtained 
through interviews, many of which are associated with a particular theoretical 
background or epistemology (Thomas, 2006). Constructivist research by 
Wendt (1992 a and b) and Onuf (1989), among others, has been severely 
criticised in the past for neglecting to illustrate any empirical applications 
(Björkdahl, 2002): that is, social constructivist research often lacks observable 
evidence. In constructivism, objective truth is not required; induction therefore 
poses no hindrance to constructivist research. Deduction, by contrast, does 
seem to limit what we can perceive, or at least what will be permitted. Floridi 
and D'Agostino claim that “deductive inference is usually regarded as being 
‘tautological’ or ‘analytical’: the information conveyed by the conclusion is 
contained in the information conveyed by the premises” (Floridi and 
D'Agostino, 2009, p. 271). 
Creswell (2007) explained that qualitative inquiry builds from the 
‘bottom-up’, by organising the categories and themes into more abstract units 
of information. This deeper understanding of the meaning can be established 
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by empowering individuals to share their stories from their own perspective. If 
normative change in international relations is driven by agency along the lines 
that, for example, Finnemore traces, we can understand such change only by 
giving careful, detailed historical analyses that allow us to dissect the details 
of action as it unfolded. Inductive research methods allow participants to 
articulate their own concerns unrestricted by the researcher’s assumptions of 
what matters most to them (Miller and Rasco, 2004). 
Suggestions have been made that inductive reasoning – theory 
building from other than data – is undervalued in academic research today. 
While deductive reasoning – ‘top-down’ hypothesis testing – is commonly 
considered to be more scientific, in practice, scientific research involves both 
deductive and inductive processes (Coppedge, 2012). Grounded theory 
involves ‘bottom-up’ analysis, using a combination of both deductive and 
inductive reasoning. 
An interpretive case study addresses exactly this problem, as it allows 
for an in-depth look into particular cases of norm promotion (Schwartz-Shea 
and Yanow, 2012). As Holloway and Brown (2012) suggest qualitative 
research may be exploratory and descriptive. Gibbs suggests that “a major 
concern of qualitative analysis is to describe what is happening, to answer the 
questions ‘What is going on here?’” (Gibbs, 2017, p. 4). The case method is 
useful for empirical studies of complex political phenomena (Bryman, 2001). It 
allows the researcher to study a phenomenon intensively, interpret how 
theoretical elements are related to each other and thereby arrive at a better 
understanding of complex problems and processes such as norm diffusion. A 
study may contain deductive argumentation but rely mostly on inductive 
reasoning to arrive at general conclusions. Looking inductively at the norms 
allows to predict the chance that a norm actually has an effect in the state. 
The transcription of each interview began immediately after the 
interview. The transcription aims were to clearly attribute quotations and to 
analyse the interview data into a manageable format. The transcription 
involved incorporating notes and audio tape recordings.  
Esterberg (2002) pointed out that coding is the process of ensuring the 
collected data make sense. Coding involves categorising data, assigning 
numbers to the relevant categories, and creating themes that capture 
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participants’ key responses related to the research questions. While no codes 
were created during the analysis, potential themes were noted. The process 
of data analysis involved developing an understanding or sense making of the 
collected data. Categorizing data was crucial to creating main headings or 
subheadings for the research. According to Boyatzis (1998) a theme is, at one 
end of the spectrum, a pattern within the data that describes your 
observations and, at the other end, a tool used to interpret an element of the 
phenomenon being studied. This process was not, however, either simple or 
straightforward. Instead it took an almost constant reading and then re-
reading of the interviews as each new theme emerged. 
 
4.4. Case Study and Case Selection 
The research conducted in this study is designed within the framework 
of the comprehensive case study. According to Yin (2009), the components of 
case study research design are as follows: the study’s questions; its 
propositions, if any; its units of analysis; the logic linking the data to the 
proposition; and the criteria for interpreting the findings. 
First, the armed conflict had to occur in the post-Cold War era. These 
conflicts are the most accurate representation of the current and future 
application of UNHCR programmes. Second, third party states became 
involved. 
Despite its distinctive features, the Bosnian case is not unique. There 
are important reasons, however, to pay close attention to this specific case. 
First, Bosnia is “one of the toughest of the ‘tough cases’ among post-civil war 
environments” (Cousens and Cater, 2001, p.133). Since the Dayton Peace 
Agreement left many underlying political problems unresolved, some 
observers fear the possibility that the peacebuilding process might stall and 
hostilities resume. The largest proportion of the Bosnian Diaspora is the result 
of tragic war conflicts that forced hundreds of thousands of Bosnians to leave 
Bosnia. Indeed, approximately 800,000 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
emigrated in just two years – 1993-1994 (Kupiszewski, 2009). This war period 
can be broken down into two waves: the first in 1992, the first year of the war, 
and the second in 1995, following the Srebrenica massacre in July of that 
year. Bosnians who found refuge in Europe in the early 1990s were the first 
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refugee group to experience a temporary protection regime. It can therefore 
be expected that any practical development of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives and 
viewpoints towards UNHCR and even durable solutions would be more easily 
detectable given the fact that this represents a path-finding case study. 
Second, international attention and spending in the country has been 
enormous. The international peacebuilding mission to Bosnia is among the 
biggest ever undertaken. For most of the 1990s, the cost of peacebuilding in 
Bosnia amounted to about US$9 billion annually, US$7 billion of which was 
spent to maintain the NATO-led Stabilisation Force. The overall amount spent 
since 1992 is estimated to be between US$81 and 91 billion (Papic, 2003). 
The funds allocated for the reconstruction programme and economic 
rehabilitation, although less than the resources spent to maintain a military 
presence, are very significant. About US$1,200 per person has been made 
available for the Bosnian reconstruction programme – more than four times 
the Marshall Plan’s US$275 at today’s prices (Deacon and Stubbs, 1998). 
These inflows of remittances are a significant source of income for a large 
proportion of the BiH population. The total amount of money spent is difficult 
to estimate, given the multiplicity of donors and their tendency to be opaque 
about the actual amount of money disbursed. Between 1996 and 2000, 
according to the World Bank Mission to BiH, some KM 5.3 billion (local 
currency) or US$3.5 billion were spent on the reconstruction of basic 
infrastructure, educational and health care institutions and reconstruction of 
housing (World Bank, 1999). Although remittances have a positive impact on 
economic stability and the development of the country, channelling their use 
towards more productive activities, such as entrepreneurship, would have a 
more positive impact on the Bosnian economy, particularly in the long term. 
This implies not only rethinking the rules governing international finance 
(perhaps the most urgent challenge to be addressed) but also those that 
organise international trade. In the context of this thesis then, there would 
seem to be plenty of avenue for refugees to have – at least in theory – come 
into contact with and even be immersed by international norms and measures 
and thus provide fertile ground for the exploration of the interface between 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives and ‘top-down’ norm diffusion and policies in this 
particular case. 
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Third, in response to the legal deficiencies exposed by the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for 
fresh thinking on the issue. In response, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published in 2001 its seminal 
report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. It aims to find some new common 
ground on issues of the protection of human rights. Hence, this particular case 
study was also subject to changing norm diffusion on the part of the 
international community and institutions, providing notable opportunities for 
engagement with refugee networks (see also Chapter 3). 
Fourth, in Chicago on 22 April 1999, in the midst of the Kosovo war, 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair (Blair, 1999) offered the international 
community a set of criteria for deciding when and how to intervene militarily in 
the affairs of another country where the immediate threat was not to the 
outside world, but to a domestic population. These proposals, originally 
formulated as the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, have become 
known simply as the ‘Blair Doctrine’ (also known as the Chicago Doctrine). 
The doctrine was further built upon by the revulsion felt by the international 
community for the failure and indifference towards the war in Bosnia. Hence, 
this case study also shows the potential impact of state policies and initiatives 
on the perspectives of refugees. 
In addition, examples can be readily drawn from a case study of the 
Bosnian civil war (1992-1994), which illustrate that UNHCR’s extended 
activities both changed orientation and indeed, even compromised its basic 
protection responsibilities, and thus there are spaces where controversies, 
gaps and even tensions between UNHCR norm reorientations and refugee 
perspectives should be more easily discernible. While the BiH case study is 
particularly important in explaining how recent developments have 
undermined international refugee protection, the reaction of states to this 
refugee crisis on European soil also reveals the likely direction of future 
policies regarding involuntary migrants. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is particularly useful in examining new developments in refugee protection 
because the international community was actively involved in this crisis at the 
same time that the refugee regime was undergoing worrisome changes. A 
study of the events that occurred in this part of the Balkans helps to establish 
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the extent to which refugee protection has been diverted from traditional 
approaches. 
Sixth, the relevance of these norm diffusions via state and UNHCR 
policy initiatives remains also highly contemporary. Recent war crime 
decisions (such as Libya’s Tohami Mohamed Khaled, 2013, Sudan’s Abdel 
Rahim Mohammed Husse, 2012) show that the impact on UNHCR and 
refugee perceptions has been long lasting. Hence, at least in theory, this case 
study might also be a way of showing the durability of ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of refugees that have continued to influence their thinking given 
the longevity of UNHCR’s changed norm diffusion since then. In this way, we 
may need to consider both the spatial and temporal dimensions of the 
interface between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives. With this in mind, 
it is now worth providing a more detailed explanation of timeframe. 
4.4.1. Timeframe 
Establishing a timeframe for implementation has an obvious 
advantage. At the very beginning of the peace process, for example, the 
withdrawal of armies to the barracks and the gradual demobilisation of the 
former enemies were clearly an achievement. But it is only a partial one. The 
long-term success of a peace process requires the local development of 
capacities to manage differences peacefully. This can be achieved in two 
ways, with important implications for the study of peacebuilding. Differences 
can be managed through the presence of a hegemony imposing its own 
agenda and version of peace. Internal conflicts, however, typically end with a 
stalemate requiring negotiation and compromise among the parties, instead of 
imposed solutions. The long-term viability of a post-settlement policy 
necessitates the local development of institutional and societal tools that are 
able to channel violent behaviour into non-violent compromise. 
Ultimately, a case is made for utilising a theory framework for analysing 
the theory and practice of Bosnia (1992-1995) and respective post-conflict 
transition from 1992 to 2010. 
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4.5. Research Questions and Goals 
The current research employs social constructivism, especially its idea 
of agents and structures as mutually constituted, to discern the nature of the 
social structures that refugees, as agents, encounter; how these structures 
constrain and enable the action of refugees; and how much freedom refugees 
(agents) have in doing what they do given they are both enabled and 
constrained by the structures. The case study design should help to answer 
questions about the relative weighting of social and instrumental motivations 
of international organisations, decision-makers and refugees. The use of 
cases should also assist in the effort to improve the role of the theory. In order 
to further increase the knowledge on how international norms travel, this study 
performs an analysis of Bosnia. 
 
 4.6. Ethical Considerations 
Moustakas (1994) noted that human science researchers are guided 
by the ethical principles of research with human participants. Bloomberg and 
Volpe (2012) stated that researchers are morally bound to conduct their 
research in a manner that minimises potential harm to those involved in the 
study. The authors portrayed the criteria to assess ethical issues: Informed 
consent that is central to research ethics, confidentiality, participant 
autonomy, and researcher-participant relationship. 
Since this research involves the use of human subjects, it was 
necessary to apply for ethics approval. The research proposal, consent form, 
and the interview questions were submitted at Bournemouth University in 
2018. 
As part of that clearance, informed consent was initially required from 
each of the participants, written consent was signed prior to beginning the 
interview process. A cover letter explaining the purpose of the research and 
the expectations required of the participant was sent to each participant. In 
addition, the cover letter included the researcher’s name, phone number, and 
email address for any further clarification the participants needed regarding 
the study. 
With regard to the data collection process, permission was sought from 
each participant to allow the interview session to be audio-taped. Each 
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participant was advised of his/her right to request that the audio-tape recorder 
be turned off at any time during the recording. They were also assured that 
the recorded tapes would be destroyed after they had been stored securely 
for a period of five years. Each interviewee was advised that he/she could 
request a copy of the transcript of the interview. The researcher also offered 
to go back later in order to clarify and validate information. 
Furthermore, the participants were assured that confidentiality would 
be maintained and protected. The participants’ names or identity and 
addresses would not be revealed in the thesis in any way or made known 
publicly. Additionally, the protection of the confidentiality of information 
obtained from the participants, especially with regard to sensitive interview 
situations where personal and private information was disclosed, was also 
assured. 
Based on the aforementioned perspectives pertinent to the researcher-
participant relationship, the research participants were engaged in a dialogue 
for the purpose of constructing knowledge. As the researcher, it is important 
to maintain high levels of both professionalism and sensitivity toward each 
participant throughout the interview process as “humanity is key here. To tell 
stories and conduct research, one would do well to remember that refugees 
deserve our sensitivity when dealing with their hardships” (Nayer, 2013). 
Although ethical considerations in social research are always important, they 
become almost pivotal in the use of personal experience methods. Especially 
when the social group under investigation, refugees, is amongst the most 
vulnerable in our society, and the sensitive issues of which they can tell, may 
include experiences such as rape and torture.  
In a brief amount of time, respondents had to be instilled enough 
comfort and trust to be willing to share their experiences. Reminding them of 
past painful events and far from smooth resettlement experiences made some 
of the respondents visibly vulnerable. The narratives were full of suffering, 
pain, and disillusionment, but also hope, survival, and proactive stances. 
Therefore, it was ensured that the process of interviewing took into account 
what Abebe and Bessell (2014) term an ‘ethic of care’ where personal 
connections, relationships and responsibilities are prioritised, echoing Lawson 
(2007) on the importance of emotions and reciprocity in research. Many 
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interviews concerned issues that were sensitive; this could make interviews 
emotionally intense. Powles (2004, p. 17-20) notes how the sharing of 
personal experiences can be of some benefit to those who tell their stories. 
Sharing one’s personal narrative has the potential to be empowering for the 
storyteller, especially for refugees, “it is a sign that their experiences and 
perspectives do matter within a humanitarian system that tends to appear 
otherwise. It can help refugees be more aware of the social and political roots 
of their suffering, to give them a sense of their own agency, and to claim the 
right to be heard‟ (ibid). Moreover, it could be seen as beneficial to refugees 
to talk about their past experiences, even if the listener is a researcher and 
not a therapist. 
At the beginning of each interview each participant was assured that he 
or she could reschedule or terminate the interview session if the situation 
were to become emotional, uncomfortable or unbearable for the participant. A 
period of debriefing was permitted after the interview session was completed 
to allow each participant to express his/her feelings about the process and 
also to ask questions. All the participants were appreciative of the opportunity 
to share their experiences. 
The participants were sent a letter of appreciation and gratitude for 
participation after the interview. A request for any feedback from the 
participants about the interview process and/or any further information was 
included in the letter of appreciation. 
Beyond these various questions, the ethical concerns of this thesis 
were in many ways framed by a fundamental dilemma, which has been 
articulated by Kenneth Plummer, who asks, “by what right can an academic 
enter the subjective world of other human beings and report back to the wider 
world on them?” (2001, p. 206). This question, which relates back to the 
politics of knowledge production explored earlier on in this chapter, pushes to 
reflexively engage with how and where the stories that had been generated 
within the research context were going to be reported.  
To sum up, ethical considerations are not something that can be 
discussed in one or two paragraphs at the end of the methods chapter. 
Instead, ethics should be an integral part of the research process, starting 
from accessing people, to meeting them, and interviewing them. Through 
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maintaining a balance between academic rigour and sensitivity to the 
personal refugee narratives, ethical concerns formed part of analysing the 
stories, and part of the process of interpretation and writing up. 
 
4.7. Validity  
Bond (2003, p. 179) commented that “(...) validity is foremost on the 
mind of those developing measures and that genuine scientific measurement 
is foremost in the minds of those who seek valid outcomes from assessment”. 
From this above quote, validity can be seen as the core of any form of 
assessment that is trustworthy and accurate. Validity is an evolving complex 
concept because it relates to the inferences regarding assessment results. 
Seeing reality as socially constructed can be thought to be one of the main 
characteristics of interpretivism (Klein & Myers 1999). Subjects’ answers 
during an interview are interpretations of their initial motives, and researchers’ 
conclusions from the collected material are interpretations as well, which are 
made in a certain situational context or from a certain standpoint (Stahl, 
2014). What this means is that the findings of this thesis are ultimately a 
product that is based on the researcher’s subjective understanding of related 
work and relevant constructs. In order to strengthen the validity of this 
research this study used triangulation of several data sources (interviews with 
UNHCR officials, displaced persons as well as using documentary sources).  
 
4.8. Limitations of the Study 
Volpe and Bloomberg (2012) noted that limitations expose the 
conditions that may weaken the study. The researcher needs to control for 
potential limitations by explicitly acknowledging them. Volpe and Bloomberg 
(Ibid.) stated that limitations arise from, among other things, restricted sample 
size, sample selection, reliance on certain techniques for gathering data, 
issues of researcher bias and participant reactivity, and the situation of the 
study within a specific context where the reader will make decisions about its 
usefulness for other settings; transferability. 
Analyses of this thesis primarily relied on interviews and documentary 
analysis as the methodological approach. The verbal, explicit expressions and 
narratives of informants yield rich data, but ethnographic approaches, 
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including observation and researcher participation, may yield deeper and 
more contextualised insights. 
Qualitative researchers bring their worldviews, beliefs and assumptions 
to their research, and it is important to make these assumptions and 
frameworks known so that readers can be aware of how they influence the 
inquiry (Creswell, 2007). My worldview and assumptions are the lens through 
which the participants’ stories are interpreted and presented. Triangulation 
was used to eliminate as much bias as possible. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
In order to investigate the experiences of Bosnian refugees based on 
their own perspectives, as well as evaluate the interplay between ‘top-down’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, this study uses a qualitative approach as its 
main methodology. In total 15 participants were recruited using convenient 
sampling and the snowball method. This chapter began by presenting the 
rationale for using a qualitative approach in general and a specific descriptive 
case study in specific. It discussed thoroughly the mechanisms, dynamics, 
and procedures related to my research sample. It also corroborated the 
rationale of choosing “interviewing” as the data collection method. 
It is important to understand that the various conditions (structures) of 
the refugee experience present both opportunities and constraining effects, 
which exist in a strategic relationship with the choices of the refugees, 
resulting in gains or further depletion of their resources. The current study 
highlights the circumstances under which refugees and returnees develop 
more awareness of their social situation, and grow assertive in negotiating 
social spaces and conditions that can further deplete or increase their 
resources. Recognising refugees as knowledgeable and capable social actors 
requires that their voices be heard, and their actions examined, on issues 
concerning them, and how they in turn affect the structures of forced 
migration. Furthermore, to examine the refugees’ engagement in the process 
of post-conflict peacebuilding, the concept of their resources (material, social, 
personal and cultural) was introduced as a lens through which to identify the 
transformation that refugees undergo as a result of their forced migration 
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experience, and how they deploy it in their integration activities, thus making 
them agents of their situation.
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CHAPTER 5: Leaving and resettlement 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the resettlement of Bosnian refugees in host 
countries from 1992 to 2014. Resettlement has to be understood as moving or 
transitioning a refugee from the host country to the resettlement country 
(UNHCR, 2012). Resettlement is the process by which refugees are given 
permanent legal residency in a host country.15 This means that they cannot 
be forced to return to their country of origin, have the right to apply for 
citizenship after a certain period of time, and are accorded the major benefits 
and entitlements possessed by citizens of the host country. Permanent 
resettlement is used when there are grave threats to a refugee’s life, liberty, 
safety, health, or other fundamental human rights, either in the country of 
temporary asylum or the country of origin (Article 1, 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees). 
Through UNHCR, and after lengthy and extensive background checks 
lasting about two years or more in most cases, less than 1 per cent of 
refugees are selected for resettlement in a host country (US Department of 
State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2013). As Collier and 
Betts (2017) argue the refugee crisis is the result not of numbers, but of 
policy. In other words, the problem is not that a great number of refugees 
creates an unsustainable burden but that refugees are seen as a burden in 
the first place. Very often refugees are presented as having no agency and 
described in elemental terms: burden and influx (Behrman, 2014, p. 249). The 
implications of UNHCR definition of a refugee also generally serve as a rubric 
for perception of the person as engulfed in fear and helplessness. 
This chapter considers the process of resettlement from both the ‘top-
down’ approach via UNHCR policies and the ‘bottom-up’ approach via 
experiences of refugees. 
The objectives of this chapter are to address three research questions 
in relation to resettlement: First, to what extent are UNHCR’s durable 
                                                             
15 For more details on the definition of resettlement see Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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solutions in relation to resettlement being successfully accomplished? Second, 
what were and are the perspectives of key stakeholders and how much 
influence do refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they 
are both enabled and constrained by the structures? Third, what actions are 
needed to ensure a more effective and consistent achievement of 
resettlement as a durable solution? How can UNHCR policies be policies that 
are adapted to enhance prospects for resettlement? 
This chapter firstly discusses ‘top-down’ and push and pull factors 
recognised by studies of refugees and especially those from a constructivist 
perspective. Secondly, the chapter presents findings drawn from primary 
interviews with refugees and considers key ‘bottom-up’ issues and identities 
with resettlement. Finally, the chapter analyses UNHCR’s operational 
guidance on resettlement and discusses and shows the challenges of norm 
diffusion, particularly when there are differences in the assumptions on the 
identities of the refugees from the ‘top-down’ of UNHCR operational guidance 
compared to the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on identities among interviewed 
refugees. 
The term ‘resettlement’ is considered to be a concept or act with 
processes and procedures. The definition of resettlement provided by UNHCR 
(2011a) suggests that the focus of resettlement is to clarify and streamline 
procedures to deliver results that are intended to improve uprooted lives that 
are caught up in the process. There are two related concepts: acculturation 
and integration. Dandy (2009) defined acculturation as “the cultural change 
that results when two (or more) groups come into continuous first-hand 
contact” (p. 226). Acculturation takes on psychological, cultural, and 
environmental changes for the refugee who has been uprooted from his or her 
native land and moved through a transitional change to redefine who he or 
she is in the newly relocated land. These changes may be based on group or 
individual level effects for refugee groups that experience sociological, 
cultural, and custom changes during resettlement transitioning and the 
coinciding elements, such as the necessary clothing, food, jobs, language 
barriers, and more. Refugees often experience behavioural issues and 
physical and psychological challenges. 
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Refugee integration is considered a change or movement from a less 
privileged society to mainstream society. Acculturation is not a requirement of 
integration. Integration does not require refugees to forget their culture or 
language, but it may require adoption of a different set of laws and values and 
learning a new language in their new world (Berry, 2012). Integration 
processes will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
There is a sufficient body of laws – the Charter of the United Nations 
and the various international and regional human rights conventions, including 
the Geneva Conventions on war – that can be deployed to enhance the safety 
of refugees and displaced persons (United Nations, 24 October 1945; 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 12 August 1949). However, despite 
the fact that many relevant norms already exist, there are nevertheless gaps 
in the resettlement protection framework for vulnerable migrants that need to 
be addressed. Nevertheless, non-refoulement has attained the status of 
customary international law, or, as many recent commentators have asserted, 
is now considered a jus cogens norm: that is, a norm of international law from 
which no derogation is allowed (Allain, 2002; Farmer, 2008). 
 
5.2. Durable Solution: Resettlement 
The Bosnian war created approximately one million refugees and one 
million internally displaced persons, triggering what is referred to as the 
“Bosnian Refugee Crisis” (UNHCR, 2000). Within a relatively short span of 
time, one million people left Bosnia and Herzegovina to seek refuge in 
neighbouring countries. The largest number of refugees and IDPs were 
Bosnian Muslim families fleeing Serb cleansing operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 350,000 Bosnian 
refugees fled to Germany, and about 86,500 went to Austria; Sweden took in 
the third largest number of about 70,000 (UNHCR, 2000). 
Soon the ‘West’s’ preferred solution for Bosnian refugee crises was no 
longer the resettlement of refugees in third countries but rather their exclusion 
or their repatriation to their countries of origin. Figure 6 reveals that Germany 
repatriated most Bosnian refugees in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement. 
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Figure 6: Outflows of Bosnians from their country of reception and stock of 
Bosnian refugees in 2005 
Host country 
(1992-95) 
 
Moved to 
different 
country of 
reception 
 
Repatriation to 
Bosnia (1996-
2005) 
 
Number of (former) 
Bosnian refugees 
remaining in 2005 
 
Austria  5,500 10,100 70,900 
Denmark  - 1,600 15,400 
Germany 52,000 246,000 22,000 
The 
Netherlands 
2,000 4,000 16,000 
Sweden  - 1,900 56,000 
The United 
Kingdom* 
- - 7,000 (2004) 
Source: based on Valenta and Ramet (2011). 
* based on Al-Ali, N., Koser, K. (2004). 
 
The refugee crisis was a catalyst for a number of ad hoc policies in 
receiving states that attempted to respond to this massive influx of protection 
seekers. The idea of ‘temporary protection status’ was one of the ad hoc 
policies that European states widely adopted and policy-makers and scholars 
have widely criticised. 
Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
proposed the idea of “temporary protection” (TP) shortly after the war began 
in Bosnia. This policy meant that “a person [could] be granted temporary 
asylum if fleeing situations of generalized violence in contrast to refugee 
status which guarantees the permanent protection of persons fleeing 
conditions of individual persecution as stipulated in the Geneva Convention of 
1951” (Korac, 2009, pp. 59-60). Commissioner Ogata thought that temporary 
protection would encourage European states to ‘share the burden’ of refugee 
protection because, first, TP assured European states that the refugees would 
not stay forever. Second, TP gave states permission to circumvent the costly 
and lengthy asylum determination process that dampened interest in helping 
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with the refugee crisis (Al-Ali et al., 2001, p. 532). Unfortunately, the policy 
was not successful. It did not take into account refugees’ needs, as reported 
by some refugees from Bosnia who felt their temporary stay was a state of 
limbo. 
Temporary protection also did not bring about equal sharing of the 
‘refugee burden’ as it was intended to do. Fourteen European states took in 
refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany, Austria, and Sweden 
together absorbed 89 per cent of the refugees from the former Yugoslavia (Al-
Ali et al., 2001, p. 533). Clearly, the distribution of the refugee burden was not 
equal. Moreover, there were other consequences of the policy. For instance, 
some EU countries “lower[ed] their welfare standards for refugees... [to] make 
their societies ‘less attractive’ destinations” (Korac, 2009, p. 56). In addition, 
since TP released states from their obligation to carry out official asylum 
proceedings for every refugee, temporary protection essentially negated the 
1951 Refugee Convention and deprived refugees of all the rights to which 
they would have been entitled as ‘Convention refugees’. In effect, the rights of 
Bosnian refugees were left to states’ discretion and were contingent upon the 
generosity of those states (Al-Ali et al., 2001). Unfortunately, beyond 
motivation to showcase their humanitarianism, states had little incentive to 
welcome and extend their generosity to Bosnian refugees. To list a couple, 
Sweden was experiencing an economic slump with high unemployment, and 
the German economy had sunk into a recession by 1992, due in large part to 
the extraordinary expense associated with rebuilding East Germany in the 
years after reunification, to the tune of tens of billions of Deutschemarks per 
year (Bibow, 2001). Towards the end of 1991, unemployment, public debt and 
hate crimes against immigrants were rising rapidly. 
The situation has hardly changed. As, noted by one of the primary 
respondents (UNHCR senior official): “The cost of accommodating asylum 
seekers, economic migrants, refugees, particularly in Western industrialised 
countries is really very high (…) [I]t causes a fair amount of resentment in the 
time of economic stagnation in Europe in particular. So it is hard to concretely 
say that we have been become less welcoming, but it is probably true” 
(Interview 1). 
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UNHCR has a prescribed refugee discourse articulating and circulating 
a specific refugee identity. This is the context wherein refugees have become 
a global problem and a shared burden; target populations have been forgotten 
as human beings in the course of becoming refugees. Refugees are talked 
about as an enduring problem, carrying with them a contagious poverty as 
they pour over the borders and invade the communities. In many cases 
UNHCR reports these as perceptions of host states, but in others it is posed 
as a recognised fact: “Acknowledging that refugee situations also impose 
considerable burdens and generate significant problems and challenges...” 
(UNHCR, 2009, p. 3). The Preamble of the 1951 Convention notes that “the 
grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and...a 
satisfactory solution...cannot therefore be achieved without international 
cooperation” (UNHCR, 2010d, p. 13). Similar statements have been included 
in more than 30 conclusions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee over the past 
35 years (UNHCR, 2014b, pp. 4-9) and as many UN General Assembly 
resolutions (Milner, 2016). 
In addition to being a potential financial drain and source of other 
difficulties, refugees, being the consummate survivors, have another trait that 
makes governments wary of opening the door; once here, the refugee may 
not want to leave. When UNHCR develops its policies, they do it only from 
‘top-down’ perspective. The key norm of UNHCR is therefore not capacity 
building but burden and cost sharing as reconfirmed in Germany. 
Another key identity that UNHCR promoted is seen as political protection. 
 
“[Protection] not be granted for a day longer than was absolutely 
necessary, and should come to an end...if, in accordance with the terms of the 
Convention or the Statute.” (UNHCR, 1997b). 
 
Fear is difficult to qualify and even more difficult to quantify, yet it must 
be present and remain present to maintain protection and aid. The ‘top-down’ 
identity advocated by the international community may perpetuate notions of 
the refugee as disempowered, fearful, and passive actors. Equally, from an 
epistemological point of view, it also empowers the ‘top-down’ structure of 
international aid intervention. It strengthens a structure built on the 
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recirculation of particular norms that authorise the international community to 
control and confine refugees for their own protection and the distribution of 
resources. It also enhances an accompanying discourse that denies refugees 
the right to be free from fear in order to enjoy the protection and provisions 
(care) of the international community. Restrictions in developed countries are 
seen as evidence of double standards and send a clear message that 
international obligations towards refugees no longer hold. The ripple effects of 
refugee policies and other border control measures introduced by Australia, 
European Union member states (both bilaterally and collectively) and other 
developed countries risk overturning the existing international refugee 
protection regime. 
An additional reason for limiting immigrant incorporation pertains to 
politicians’ fear of public backlash domestically (DeBono, 2018). The 
immigration debate was a salient issue in Germany, especially in the 1990s 
after the fall of the Berlin wall, and jobs became scarce around this time. The 
country began to experience a rapid increase in xenophobia and xenophobic 
attacks against foreigners just before the Bosnian War began, making the 
German attempts to limit its responsibilities regarding protecting Bosnian 
refugees particularly important to political leaders at that time (UNHCR, 1995). 
Therefore, the states used this protection identity in their policies. 
5.2.1. UNHCR Durable Solutions: Understanding Key States as Drivers 
It is probably worthwhile at this point to briefly consider the way that 
UNHCR durable solution identities were also shared and driven by some key 
states. It is after all important to be reminded that the burden of receiving 
Bosnian refugees was not an event shared by all states. Equally, this also 
implies that certain states acted as key drivers having a more notable 
influence on UNHCR durable solutions identities. From the perspective of this 
thesis, it is therefore reasonable to assume that – at least theoretically – the 
wider context of key states may also have a bearing on the views of refugees. 
Accordingly, soon after the signing of the DPA, Germany placed considerable 
pressure on UNHCR to devise a repatriation plan. This plan foresaw the lifting 
of temporary protection and the return of refugees on the basis of the 
fulfilment of specific benchmarks, including the implementation of the military 
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provisions of the DPA, the proclamation of an amnesty for crimes other than 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, and the establishment 
and effective functioning of mechanisms for human rights protection 
(Bagshaw, 1997). 
In contrast to Germany’s policy in the 1990s, Norway also received a 
large number of refugees from Bosnia, but gradually incorporated the concept 
of ‘temporary protection’ into its refugee policies (Koser and Black, 1999; 
Valenta and Bunar, 2010). The contrast however is that the temporary 
protection regime in Norway has also been combined with extensive, state 
sponsored repatriation programmes (Ibid.). Known as a ‘two-track policy’, it 
combined an active integration policy with the repatriation policy. The 
rationale was that refugees should be prepared for life in Norway if the 
conditions for repatriation failed to materialise. In Norway, refugees from 
Bosnia were granted collective ‘temporary protection’ and access to welfare 
systems, but when the war ended, they should either return to their countries 
or apply for asylum on an individual basis. 
The examples above show that states accepted the particular identities 
diffused by UNHCR. The dominant identities on refugees have, over time, 
been ‘repackaged’ – at least in a rhetorical sense – and then more deeply 
embedded in the institutionalisation of practices and structures. Yet, refugees 
have – importantly for this thesis – very little power to affect their own 
outcome and are constrained by the protocols of the international community 
put in place ‘top-down’ to protect them from further harm. This brief analysis 
therefore suggests that resettlement should be regarded as, and is, a vertical, 
‘top-down’ process with field workers close-up and UN policy-makers quite 
removed from personal interaction with refugees. Yet this leads to important 
observations for this thesis. First, the key insights from the analysis 
undertaken so far confirm that while UNHCR durable solutions were 
influenced and at least partly driven by the wider contexts of certain states, 
then this is also likely to have the potential to have some effect on the 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees. In this way, and as this thesis continues 
to argue, there is a need for understanding the interface with and the role of 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives and see them as crucial. Second, at least in the 
theory, the actions and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees could matter and 
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even shape structures in their immediate surroundings and have the potential 
to trigger shifts in policies and discourses at local, national or international 
levels. This more selective focus and attention on the constraining feature of 
structures, which presumes that refugees are rendered without agency (that is 
often found in parts of the existing literature – see Chapter 2) is therefore ill 
suited to fully grasp the complexity of the developments on the ground. 
5.2.2. From limited admission to denial of access 
Since the intense international involvement in preventing the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had failed, it is important to examine the immediate 
response of regional states to the predictable refugee flows that soon 
attempted to cross borders. This section will analyse the extent of the 
willingness of certain states to admit forced migrants from Croatia and how 
this was replaced – several months later – by a generalised reluctance to offer 
asylum to refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can be argued that states 
build identities, in accordance with social constructivism, within regional and 
cultural communities (Brysk, et al., 2002). Once the armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the reaction of European states toward the 
refugees who fled the violence comprised three essential features: limited 
admission (mostly by affiliated neighbours), quickly followed by general 
implementation of non-entrée policies and finally the introduction of small 
quotas of externally controlled admissions. The initial admission of refugees 
from Croatia illustrates that “domestic politics will dictate preferential treatment 
for specific refugee populations” (Shacknove, 1993, p. 525). 
It should be noted that the territory of present day Croatia was part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that the Croats had maintained political ties 
with their Hungarian and Germanic neighbours for centuries (Frelick, 1992, p. 
25). Based on constructivism then (Chapter 3) this relationship was shaped by 
ideational and cultural factors. Constructivism arguments therefore, provide 
interesting clues for how war initially broke out stressing ethnicity. Ethnicity 
can often have a greater meaning to the participants of war. 
The refugee protection offered by Croatia’s northern neighbours 
contrasts with the distinctly poor response by some of the other more affluent 
European states such as France and the United Kingdom, which together 
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admitted a total of 3,000 refugees. These variations in the initial European 
response highlight “the preference of states to admit national or ethnic 
relatives, or those who are otherwise affiliated to the asylum state, and whose 
admission may therefore be seen to be less of an intrusion into a state’s right 
to communal closure” (Hathaway, 1990, p. 125). 
It may be argued from a social identity perspective that affiliation to 
community helps to explain why some states have been more willing to admit 
former Yugoslavs than refugees from current conflicts on more distant 
continents. Sweden and Switzerland initially decided to give European victims 
from the former Yugoslavia preferential treatment by admitting tens of 
thousands of people fleeing from the armed conflict. Aside from the 
aforementioned states, however, it should be noted that the response from 
European states to this new refugee crisis on European soil has generally 
been feeble. 
Yet, as the war spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, non-entrée 
policies were being firmly implemented (Amnesty International, 1993, p. 2). 
Even the states that initially perceived the admission of involuntary migrants 
from Croatia to be reconcilable to their own national interests actively sought 
to stop the outflow. The reasons for this change in attitude are many: states 
indicated that their absorptive capacities were close to being exhausted, the 
spread of the war to BiH suggested that there would potentially be many more 
refugees and the background (cultural, religious and social) of these new 
refugees was also different from the earlier victims of displacement and might 
have played a role to the extent that affiliation was perceived in a very narrow 
sense. 
The logic of burden-shifting eventually had former Yugoslav Republics 
concerned that they would be left to assume protection of the refugees fleeing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, Slovenia actively sought to limit its 
responsibilities (US Committee for Refugees) after having offered asylum to 
approximately 51,000 refugees (UNHCR, 1992). Most importantly, Croatia 
decided that it could no longer count on other European countries to provide 
assistance for the significant number of refugees it was receiving. European 
burden-shifting was taken to its logical outcome when this primary state of first 
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asylum for refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina began considering the 
adoption of the most direct forms of non-entrée 
Croatia’s treatment of the large number of Muslims it had already 
admitted deteriorated once fighting between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina intensified. Pressure on these Muslims to leave Croatia was 
clear and reports indicate that some were victims of non-refoulement 
violations (US Committee for Refugees, 1994). 
Eventually, Croatia was convinced by UNHCR to partially open its 
border and give transit visas to Muslim refugees if they were part of a third 
country temporary protection or resettlement programme arranged by 
UNHCR. Nevertheless, these resettlement quotas indicate that European 
states are primarily interested in controlling their borders and choosing which 
foreigners can access their protected communities.  
Sweden, on the other hand, did not immediately close its borders to the 
Bosnian refugees. Swedish immigration officials worked to find a way to 
speed up the asylum determination process to accommodate the Bosnian 
refugees, but the refugee reception system in place at that time, as in the rest 
of Europe, was far too inadequate to handle the large number of applicants it 
received between 1992 and 1993. The decision by Swedish authorities to 
grant Bosnian refugees permanent residence permits entitled them to rights 
and status almost equivalent to those afforded to full Swedish citizens. The 
stability and predictability that the residence permits created in the lives of 
these refugees had important implications for their mental health. 
Furthermore, the residence permit was a key ingredient in integrating the 
refugees into the social and economic fabric of Sweden. Finally, permanent 
residence gave them the rights, resources, and access to services that made 
it possible for them to lead a relatively normal life in Sweden. Bosnian 
refugees in Germany did not enjoy such privileges, which made it much more 
difficult for them to lead a normal life. 
In Germany, temporary protection status equated to an almost 
complete lack of rights and access to social and community services. It had 
the effect of alienating Bosnian refugees from German society and excluding 
them from the formal economy. The refugees received a ‘Duldung’ – a 
‘toleration permit.’ Duldung was a short-term solution. In 1992 and 1993 it 
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took in approximately 70,000 Bosnian refugees (UNHCR, 1995). Duldungs 
were given to asylum seekers whose applications were found to be 
‘unfounded’ or ‘manifestly unfounded’ but for whom it was unsafe to return to 
their country of origin. Bosnian refugees in Germany therefore held no 
legitimate right to reside in Germany and were forced to re-apply for a new 
duldung every three to six months, each time fearful of the possibility that it 
would not be renewed. 
Compared to most other European countries, the UK was not a major 
destination country for refugees. By 1999 around 2,000 Bosnians were in 
Britain under the status of ‘temporary protection from the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia’. They came as part of an agreement with UNHCR, and were 
given their status on arrival in the UK, although they could apply for asylum if 
they wished (Liebaut and Hughes, 1997). The minimal number of refugees 
admitted by the UK was dependent to a large extent on the policies 
surrounding refugees. In Britain, the government claimed that it was 
responding effectively to the ‘Yugoslav problem’ (Hansard, 1992), although it 
was reluctant to accept proposals from Germany for sharing the burden of 
asylum applications (Marshall, 1996). 
The international refugee regime is characterised by norms, the most 
important being burden-sharing. However, it is almost the weakest of the 
norms due to the absence of related institutional structures. In the 1990s 
when the Yugoslavian refugees were in need, Germany did not react as 
heroically as they are reacting to the current refugee crisis. This was a 
process of learning and internalising. Wendt stated: “As cultural practices get 
routinized in the form of habits they get pushed into the shared cognitive 
background, becoming taken for granted rather than objects of calculation” 
(Wendt, 1999, pp. 310-311). Germany’s social identity was constructed over 
many years and reflects the collective sense of duty to help the ‘Other’. 
 
5.3. Push and Pull Factors for Refugees 
Perhaps the desire for resettlement is not surprising, given the 
multitude of factors that characterise Bosnian forced migration at this 
particular juncture in time and place. Although UNHCR’s durable solutions are 
often conceived of as either distinct entities or as separate parts of a cyclical 
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process of forced migration, analysis of refugee resettlement demonstrates 
that in the practical exigencies of life in exile, durable solutions and indeed 
categories of migration, such as forced or voluntary, may become blurred 
(Van Hear, 2002). For participants in this study, as confirmed by the 
interviews with refugees, refugee resettlement is simultaneously an escape 
from an insecure life in exile and an opportunity to ensure needed health care 
or achieve other aspects of a stable life. 
In UNHCR publications, resettlement is cast as an option for only the 
most vulnerable refugees, as determined by UNHCR and resettlement 
countries, to be offered only to a few who meet specific criteria (UNHCR, 
2003, UNHCR 2011). UNHCR resettlement criteria, which emphasise 
vulnerability and protection needs as eligibility for third country resettlement, 
provide an example of what Fassin (2001, p.3) refers to as the “biopolitics of 
otherness”. In a global context where resettlement is increasingly limited, 
borders are increasingly closed and the legitimacy of asylum as a category is 
increasingly challenged, resettlement on humanitarian grounds replaces 
political asylum with asylum based on medical, psychological and 
humanitarian criteria. Yet in order to be considered for resettlement, refugees 
must meet specific criteria of vulnerability and convince UNHCR and country 
officials that they are both credible and truly in need of protection. 
In arguing for resettlement, refugees identify themselves as vulnerable 
on their own terms, both identifying with and challenging UNHCR criteria. 
Urgency and severity, as well as available resources in resettlement 
countries, must come into play when officials decide whether or not to 
recommend a refugee for resettlement. 
Twenty-four nation-states16 participated in refugee resettlement 
programmes, although a number of these accepted an extremely limited 
number of refugees under specific circumstances (UNHCR, 2010b). In 2009, 
the United States accepted 80,000 refugees for resettlement, the largest 
number of any resettlement country (US Department of State, Bureau of 
                                                             
16 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States of America. 
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Population, Refugees and Migration, 2010). However, UNHCR estimated that 
only 10 per cent of refugees who required resettlement actually received it. 
By considering refugee voice as a departure point for the creation of 
policies, the possibility of reforming the existing ‘top-down’ policy frameworks 
with ‘bottom-up’ perspectives could be achieved. Refugees’ perceptions of 
policies and programmes combined with their understandings of rights and 
own priorities could have a direct influence on the outcome of policies and 
ultimately on the livelihoods of refugees. Bakewell (2003, p. 17) argues that 
this is not the case for the principles and practices put forward to refugees 
within UNHCR’s community development approach: “An organisation that has 
not developed a participatory, empowering management structure cannot run 
a participatory program.” For this shift to take place, the language of 
‘dependency’ and ‘vulnerability’ needs to be removed from the operational 
programming of UNHCR and all other agencies (ibid). Instead, policies and 
programming should be based on the principles enshrined in the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees which treats the refugee as an individual 
whose rights must be protected and respected. 
 
5.4. Findings in Relation to Resettlement 
The integrated perspective of both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives17 that this thesis has so far presented suggests that in most 
cases it is the ‘top-down’ choices made by government and international 
agencies that remain (potentially) influential and induce the decisive outcomes 
for displaced persons at micro-level. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how key agents are involved in the socialisation process of norm diffusion. 
Norm entrepreneurs change and create norms through many different tools. 
First, however, they must signal their dissatisfaction with the existing norm 
and demonstrate their commitment towards changing it. Then they often 
frame the issue in a way that will be easily accepted by their targeted 
                                                             
17 See chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for a discussion on two perspectives. 
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audience, create coalitions to legitimise and spread the norm, and find ways 
to make defiance of the norm more costly. 
When evaluating the institutional framework for resettlement, the 
refugees’ own roles in this network of assessment and initiatives needs to be 
considered further. It is important to also consider their ‘bottom-up’ choices 
and perspectives, such as, is there any flexibility in the system and what 
degree of influence can a refugee exert? Can a resettled refugee choose 
which country he or she wants to go to? 
This section, therefore, presents the selected findings drawn from the 
primary interviews. All participants interviewed in this study reported that they 
needed to make decisions for themselves and their families to flee from the 
occupied areas in order to survive. It was in essence very much a ‘bottom-up’ 
decision made by the refugees undertaking very specific practical appraisal of 
local conditions and the continuing well-being of themselves and their family. 
This was an extremely difficult time for many. The act of fleeing from war 
included many different struggles such as finding safe places to sleep in the 
forests, being clever about hiding places, and recognising the enemy. One 
interviewee noted: 
 
“I am also a victim of the war, have been in two concentration camps. 
Have seen my whole city burned down to the ground. Have been 
tortured.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Indeed, push factors were often cited such as the fear of actual harm 
from military actors on the ground. One participant reported feeling helpless 
because the Serbian army was going to capture them if they stayed in their 
own homes: 
 
They [Serbian army soldiers] were going to take us. We didn’t know 
that they had surrounded us, and that they were attempting to capture 
us. 
(Respondent 9) 
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“That night was the worst. My son left with my husband. There were 
bombings, and shootings. We didn’t sleep all night. Thank God, they 
returned the next morning because they could not cross an area that 
was occupied.” 
(Respondent 10) 
 
Hence, these interviews suggest that decisions to migrate were made 
largely on the basis of ‘bottom-up’ assessments of ‘the push factors’ of 
deteriorating local conditions rather than because of the ‘top-down’ pull of host 
or likely recipient countries. Nevertheless, according to the interviews (100 per 
cent, the key issue of concern for refugees remained effective protection and 
security. UNHCR maintained that it provided legal protection for refugees and 
that any receiving state should take up the responsibility of physically 
protecting refugees, as they are entitled to this by virtue of their refugee 
status. Yet, according to the interviews, the findings suggest something 
slightly different; namely that refugees, on the other hand, noted that – if they 
were aware of UNHCR at all – then the perceived role of UNHCR was to 
provide them with additional protection and assistance (alongside that of the 
recipient state). 
For many, some of their greatest struggles occurred during the journey. 
According to the interviews, most respondents (70 per cent) claimed that on 
leaving their home, most of them did not have a very clear picture of their 
destination – confirming that ‘bottom-up’ local conditions were driving their 
departures rather than sophisticated appreciations of ‘top-down’ policies by 
UNHCR or indeed respective countries. Their overriding goal was 
achievement of safety. Most participants noted feeling helpless during this 
time because they did not receive any assistance: 
 
“We were hungry, thirsty, without warmth. You know when you have 
everything, and then overnight you don’t have anything.” 
(Respondent 7) 
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After escaping from her village, one participant found herself moving 
from town to town, and house to house within Bosnia in search of food and 
shelter. 
 
“You didn’t know where you were going, what’s gonna happen, where 
you’re gonna live.” 
(Respondent 10) 
 
Through other relatives, they contacted her husband’s sister in Germany, and 
she helped them cross the border. They lived in Germany for six years. The 
family adjusted well, both adults worked and the children attended school. 
However, due to immigration policies in Germany, they could not stay there 
permanently so they applied to come to the UK as refugees. 
Several of the interviews (60 per cent) also highlighted that even 
though refugees can be provided with numerous services to meet their needs, 
they can remain and did remain economically isolated and therefore, as 
suggested in refugee testimonials, have ‘hardly any rights’. Yet, the interviews 
also indicate that respondents have a wider definition of what they perceived 
as safety or protection. According to the interviews refugees (80 per cent), 
viewed their protection not only in terms of being free from random arrests 
and deportation but as linked to the provision of basic human rights, such as 
access to education, work, housing, and health services. Without the 
possibility of accessing their right to livelihood, then – according to the 
interviews, many refugees did not see easily the value of the protection 
promoted by UNHCR. 
Nevertheless, the documents survey also suggests that UNHCR 
representations of refugees often emphasise push factors that shape leaving 
and give the impression that refugee fleeing is an act lacking deliberate and 
thoughtful decision-making (Johnson, 2011). Yet, the majority of interviewees 
(100 per cent) for this study also gave the resounding impression that – in 
reality, to flee is a very difficult decision. Above all, it is often limited or 
constrained by (the fear of) coercion – yet it is also important to highlight that 
it is often at times deeply contemplated prior to actual flight, with a very strong 
‘bottom-up’ focus on the ongoing local conditions. Choosing to leave or 
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choosing to remain is not always a one-time event either. The decision to take 
leave is not always based purely on self-preservation. There are many 
influential considerations, such as, particular concern involving the bonds of 
human relations, family ties, and particular human attributes (gender, age, 
health, etc.). Respondent 10, for instance, highlighted that the process of 
leaving should actually be seen as a series of cumulative steps; the 
interviewee reported that there were actually months of living on the road and 
hiding from military forces, before consummating their ultimate decision to 
leave their homeland. The pre-flight phase is comprised of deliberation and 
choices – often based on ‘bottom-up’ assessments of the situation at the time, 
however constrained those choices may be. 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the resettlement policies, the 
respondents were questioned on their particular experiences with the different 
aspects of those policies. Respondents had and displayed a range of 
knowledge about UNHCR resettlement policies. Altogether 40 per cent of 
respondents did not know anything about them and/or had never been offered 
these services. Therefore, it is clear that the ‘bottom-up’ conception stage 
may not be recognised fully by ‘top-down’ perspectives and norm diffusion. 
 
“I was not offered housing or employment assistance.” 
(Respondent 1) 
 
“I did not get any support whatsoever. Some people get support, but I 
did not because I was considered capable and could do everything for 
myself.” (Respondent 2) 
 
“I am not familiar with their [UNHCR] work. I can't say anything about 
them, because I haven't seen their work…Haven't got any help. 
Everywhere I come, I get the answer: "For returnees from out the 
Netherlands there is no help needed.” (Respondent 6) 
 
The responses above further confirm that it is therefore important to 
query any assumptions that refugees are always chasing services from 
recipient countries and that remains an overwhelmingly part of any equation 
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as to why they seek to flee. Indeed, it is also clear from the interviews that the 
road from relocation to resettlement and finally rehabilitation is a long one. 
Invariably, resettlement schemes perpetuate economic difficulties not only for 
their ‘top-down’ style of decision-making, but also due to the incapacity of 
local economies to sustain both newly resettled displaced communities as 
well as the host populations around new resettlement schemes. Had the 
protection of rights been the focus of the resettlement effort, it would have 
necessitated engaging refugees and local administrators in all discussions of 
their own goals and objectives. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that refugees are not interested in 
securing better services as part of this wider notion of safety. One respondent 
(1), for instance, highlighted that that they decided to move to Serbia with the 
intention of starting a new life there. While in Serbia, they lived in abandoned 
houses and moved frequently, but could not settle anywhere. He stated that 
the local people did not welcome refugees, so they decided to leave the 
country. They waited three years for approval of their application for 
resettlement in the UK. For many refugees there is often a protracted period 
of transitional and limbo like situations between the time they leave their 
country of origin and their eventual arrival in the country of resettlement. 
Indeed, acquiring better services was seen by some interviewees (60 
per cent) as a way of demonstrating stability given that for them the process 
of resettlement was also one fraught with difficulties and one that could 
actually heighten the sense of insecurity among refugees. One respondent, 
for example, stressed how refugees seek to escape from an insecure life but 
the process of resettlement is also insecure and often presents a greater 
challenge. 
 
“I was part of a prisoner-of-war exchange. I was without documents, 
without money. I was psychologically destroyed. I registered under 
UNHCR’s protection. I asked for Switzerland but they told me the 
Swiss quota of 150 prisoners-of-war and their families were filled. They 
offered me the UK.” 
(Respondent 7) 
 
 163 
The sense of uncertainty and instability was perpetuated by the 
indeterminate length of the resettlement process. Although resettlement is in 
theory a critical component of international responsibility sharing, in reality its 
practice is extremely limited in relation to overall needs – raising critical 
questions about the ability of resettlement to represent a meaningful form of 
responsibility sharing today. 
Another respondent (2) said that he escaped from Bosnia in 1992 with 
a convoy of refugees. He escaped with his wife, mother and sister. With the 
help of the Red Cross they came to Germany. They spent five years waiting 
for their application for refugee status to be approved and in 1998 they came 
to the UK. This finding shows that the waiting time to resettle is very long; 
however, it is frequently not recognised as such by UNHCR and the host 
country. 
On the subject of permanent resettlement, the interviews also showed 
how the insecurity attached to the process of resettlement also led to refugees 
seeing any migration as a multi-stage and often dynamic process. One 
respondent, for example, – who migrated to the US – reported that Germany 
was, for him, regarded as a transit state and he had decided to relocate 
further as events unfolded and choices became available. Because he could 
not stay in Germany, he applied for refugee status in the US (Respondent 4): 
 
“We were not offered any rights to asylum in Germany. We had to 
either go somewhere else or go back to Bosnia.” 
 
In contrast, this shows a difference of perspectives emanating from the 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of the refugees, when compared to the ‘top-down’ 
policy orientations of UNHCR. In the interviews, and among those aware of 
UNHCR policies, UNHCR resettlement policy then came under fire with 
regard to selection criteria. Some respondents highlighted how a one-stop 
problem with resettlement and the top-down processing of refugees as a 
clearly identifiable group is problematic in terms of their essentially ‘bottom-up’ 
and multi-stage perspectives of refugees on migration. Hence, the ‘top-down’ 
notion and identity of resettlement differs according to and from the 
perspectives of the refugees looking ‘bottom-up’. 
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Furthermore, the participants were questioned about the challenges of 
resettlement. Here, respondents highlighted the negative effect of that waiting 
time on their well-being: 
 
“As we waited through the resettlement process, we felt anxious and 
afraid that they would reject us.” 
(Respondent 10) 
 
Every year, UNHCR gathers information about current resettlement 
needs from its regional and local offices. On the basis of the information 
received, it compiles its annual ‘Projected Global Resettlement Needs’18 
document. This document is also the main reference document for the 
‘Indication Conference’ held each year. At this Conference, the resettlement 
countries provide preliminary estimations on the size of their quota allocations 
and the geographic areas from which they wish to accept resettled refugees. 
Resettlement countries that use the dossier-based method of selecting 
resettled refugees simply select the cases they will accept from the collection 
of dossiers forwarded to them by UNHCR. 
Resettlement is supposed to be a method of protecting refugees from 
insecurity. However, the pursuit of resettlement can itself become a source of 
anxiety. The bureaucratic procedures to apply for resettlement often 
exacerbate the anxiety experienced by refugees. 
Moreover, this is compounded since the respondents in this study also 
highlighted how they often say that attaining resettlement was and should be 
accompanied by increasing and rising expectations. The majority of the 
respondents (80 per cent) in this study believed that attaining resettlement 
would in itself end waiting, which should and would improve their well-being 
and return their pre-war identity. Most refugees viewed their situation as a 
temporary state of waiting that was rewarded with resettlement. When the war 
ended, one respondent (9) said that she and her husband were reunited with 
their family and relocated to Serbia. The family lived in terrible conditions 
                                                             
18 2019 Projected Global Resettlement Needs sets out in its detailed regional and country 
chapters information on the close to 1.4 million refugees identified as needing access to this 
key durable solution in the coming year. The total is 17per cent higher than the 2018 levels 
(UNHCR, 2018). 
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without water, electricity, or any income. They submitted an application for 
resettlement in the UK and this was approved in 2001. Nevertheless, the 
salient theme that emerged from this interview was disappointment and unmet 
expectations during war relocation. She stated that their troubles ‘were much 
greater in resettlement than during the war’ (Respondent 9). 
Interestingly, – according to the interviews – some of the negative 
experiences that the Bosnian refugees encountered during resettlement only 
strengthened the resilience skills they had acquired in the previous phases of 
their journey and helped them later when providing for their families.  
Furthermore, several of the interviews also highlighted how, alongside 
the enhancement of resilience skills, then the adaptation and resettlement of 
refugees into their respective new societies ‘takes hard work’. According to 
over half of the interviews, then central to successful adaptation was the 
concrete acquisition of employment by respective refugees since this 
effectively reaffirmed the quality of their new resilience skills and the 
robustness of their identities.  
Yet, several of the respondents also argued that the acquisition of 
employment, and through this successful adaptation, was something that had 
to be actively sought and required major effort by the refugees from the 
‘bottom-up’. In this way, the acquisition of employment may be seen as a 
central component if refugees are to play any kind of future role of as ‘change 
agents’ since it is through active employment, that respective refugees are 
able to clearly show that they have been active in changing their own 
circumstances in practice and on the ground. According to one respondent 
(9), it was only through the active pursuit and acquisition of employment, that 
participants (refugees) were able to show that they could become better 
equipped to resolve their conflicts in the new environment: 
 
“Don’t stay at home alone – try to find work. Working is essential. 
Staying at home means isolation and depressing thoughts” 
(Respondent 9). 
 
In this way, the findings suggest a strong qualitative link between refugee’s 
identities for self-reliance and as successful adapters, and the concrete 
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acquisition of employment. Conversely, is employment was not achievable 
and/or secured by respective refugees, then this was seen also by the 
refugees themselves in rather negative terms from the ‘bottom-up’ – bordering 
on failure (Respondent 9). 
It is noted elsewhere that refugees are often also likely to develop a 
capacity for sustainability and self-reliance (Gabiam, 2016). Yet, the findings 
from the interviews for this study also suggest that the lack of empathy with 
‘top-down’ notions of resettlement actually lead to the growth of another 
‘bottom-up’ identity among the interviewed refugees, namely an identification 
with sustainability, resilience and self-reliance and the production of a 
particular skill set among refugees where they can handle things on their own. 
In this way, refugees develop a strong identification with self-reliance and 
autonomy which can and often does make then less receptive over time to 
further norm diffusion by UNHCR which identifies with top-down criteria of a 
refugee and resettlement. 
Shakespeare-Finch and Wickham’s (2009) study suggests that looking 
ahead to the future strengthens refugee people’s resilience. Despite the fears 
expressed by the participants in this study in relation to their uncertain futures 
as refugees, many of the interviewees also noted and showed strong hopes 
and dreams for peace and freedom, and of ultimately living a better life, with 
increased personal and professional development. 
Indeed, several participants talked about their strength and ingenuity, 
which they had not realised they possessed. As a result, several participants 
reported that they felt much stronger and had a sense that they could handle 
anything that came their way. Overall, the findings from the interviews suggest 
that participants often demonstrated and were convinced that they had 
acquired stronger resilience towards stress and ultimately became more 
confident and active agents in determining their future from the ‘bottom-up’. 
Yet, it is important to recognise that any growth in self-reliance was not 
usually accompanied by a perception among the refugees that this was a 
direct result of better ‘top-down’ policies of UNHCR. 
To summarise, the interviews with refugees confirm: (i) the refugees 
have a more flexible ‘bottom-up’ notion of what constitutes resettlement with a 
strong emphasis on taking account of local conditions; (ii) they identify with 
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resettlement as a much more fluid and haphazard and multi-phase process 
that put them – at least to some degree – at odds with the ‘top-down’ policy 
that UNHCR was seeking to promote and; (iii) the refugees have a strong 
identification with self-reliance, individual resilience and autonomy that might 
actually make them less susceptible to the atop-down notion of resettlement. 
They are at least to some degree active agents with notable degrees of self-
reliance and individual resilience. 
 
5.5. Resettlement in context and the role of UNHCR 
With these prior observations in mind, it therefore worthwhile exploring 
a little more deeply how UNHCR usually presented it ‘top-down’ thinking in 
relation to questions of resettlement. On this basis, the analysis in this thesis 
will now turn to a more detailed examination of key documents presented by 
UNHCR that potentially encapsulate the main ‘top-down’ thinking of UNHCR. 
A good place to start then is with an examination of UNHCR Resettlement 
Handbook(s) that were – at least partially – designed to provide guidance on 
resettlement thinking approaches towards the refugees. 
In particular, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011) "offers 
resettlement management and policy guidance to UNHCR staff, and is a key 
reference tool on global resettlement policy and practice for resettlement 
countries, NGOs and other partners." It presented three main functions of 
resettlement. The first is the importance of providing protection and meeting 
the needs of those being resettled. This emphasises the fact that resettlement 
is viewed as a humanitarian effort in order to ensure that human beings can 
have their basic human rights fulfilled. However, the notion of resettlement not 
only considers the needs of the resettled, it is also supposed to be adaptive to 
demands from the ‘bottom-up’ view of the refugees. The main definition of 
resettlement is based on providing protection, so here the handbooks treat 
refugees as rather passive and needing to be helped and not as self-reliant 
actors. 
The second function is the emphasis on resettlement as a durable 
solution for larger groups of people who have been forced to move, along with 
the other two durable solutions. The function of resettlement in this context is 
a strategy for solving larger refugee displacement situations. Moreover, the 
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programme is not accessible to everyone, and – as the interviews for this 
study demonstrate – may sometimes come across as incompatible with 
‘bottom-up’ transmission of norms from refugees themselves. This suggests 
that there is a problem with symmetrical norm diffusion. 
The third function is the importance of recognising the sharing of 
responsibility within the international community, with emphasis on the 
importance of states demonstrating solidarity with the asylum countries that 
receive many refugees, an effort sometimes referred to as ‘burden-sharing’ 
(UNHCR, 2011c, p. 3). This notion is that the resettlement from the ‘top-down’ 
is also defined in terms of burden-sharing – again – where the focus is also on 
transmitting the demands of the supplier (states) over the demands of the 
receiver (the refugees). Emphasis is mainly on compartmentalising help and 
resources and thus ‘top-down’ driven’ definitions of resources and services 
seem at odds with the focus on the individual. In order to address the needs 
of refugees in an appropriate fashion, government officials, counsellors, and 
agency personnel that work with refugees need to learn about refugees’ 
experiences from the point of view of the refugee. 
The Handbook also emphasises that UNHCR bases selection on the 
“refugee’s objective need for resettlement and not on their subjective desire 
for it.” (p. 216). That resettlement is not a right is often repeated to help 
convey this message, perhaps so as to reassure states of their sovereignty 
and to temper the expectations of refugees themselves. Refugees themselves 
have very little choice in the resettlement system, as also confirmed by the 
interviews. Refugees usually cannot proactively apply for resettlement. Even 
refugees selected for resettlement cannot choose to which country they will 
be resettled. Ultimately, the only agency that refugees possess in the 
resettlement regime is the choice not to resettle if they have been offered 
resettlement. This is an example of ‘top-down’ pressure and lack of choice 
and ‘bottom-up’ autonomy of refugees. As a result, the resettlement regime 
currently empowers UNHCR and states and leaves refugees without much 
agency in the decision, despite UNHCR’s promotion of self-reliance as a core 
goal of durable solutions (UNHCR, 2014a). 
Two preconditions for being eligible for resettlement are outlined in the 
Handbook. One, the applicant has to be considered a refugee according to 
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the UN’s refugee convention; and two, resettlement is considered the most 
appropriate durable solution for the individual (UNHCR 2011c). However, it is 
the resettlement countries that make the final decision regarding from where 
to resettle and whom to grant permanent residence. These decisions are 
made on the basis of several factors such as the state’s own laws, and 
migration policy, as well as the state’s political relations with other states. In 
other words, the process of resettlement is entirely dependent upon nation-
states’ willingness to resettle. 
This section illustrates that the process of seeking resettlement 
illuminates tensions and incompatible norm diffusion for the nature and ability 
of UNHCR’S Learning Programme. The figures for resettlement programmes 
remain low.19 UNHCR has difficulties agreeing resettlement capacity and 
priorities in future. One of the key problems with why any agreement 
remained ad hoc is that the norm diffusion to the refugees was not that 
successful and that the needs of the refugees – as conceptualised as three 
identifications in terms of resettlement were not fully understood by UNHCR 
(see also Table 5). 
 
5.6 Incompatible Norm Diffusion on Resettlement: Where the Differing 
Identities Meet and Do No Meet? 
Implications of this understanding (or lack of understanding) are 
manifest in the normative expectations that influence institutional and donor 
actions and are illustrated below in Table 5): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 An estimated 1.19 million persons were projected to be in need of resettlement in 2017. 
Against this need, UNHCR had planned to submit close to 170,000 refugees for resettlement 
in 2017. Due to an overall reduction in the resettlement opportunities offered globally, only 
75,200 submissions were made in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). 
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Table 5: ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Norm Diffusion? Comparing Alignments 
and Misalignments of Perspectives on Resettlement 
 
 UNHCR  Refugees  Misalignment  
Identity  ‘Top-down’ 
Political 
protection and 
solutions 
perspective 
‘Bottom-up’ 
Fear, security and 
linking with relatives 
and friends abroad 
Protection becomes 
meaningful in the 
context of being able to 
access rights. This 
means ensuring that 
refugees move in a safe 
and dignified manner 
and that they are 
empowered, well-
informed and properly 
prepared for third 
country resettlement 
and integration into 
welcoming 
communities. 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
Burden-
sharing 
 
‘Bottom-up’ 
Resilience and self-
reliance 
 
Seeing refugees as an 
investment, and not as 
a burden, unlocks huge 
potential benefits for the 
countries that host them 
as well as for the 
refugees themselves. 
Refugees are actively 
seeking solutions to 
their problems by 
inventing creative self-
reliance strategies. 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
Passive 
definition of 
resettlement  
‘Bottom-up’ 
Complex and ‘active’ 
notion of resettlement 
as fluid, haphazard 
and multi-phase 
process 
Constant movement 
and being displaced 
multiple times. Ensuring 
the safe and dignified 
movement of refugees 
is central to any 
resettlement operation. 
 Top-down 
approaches  
Bottom-up 
approaches  
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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Table 5 shows that in the context of forced migration, resettlement can 
be an effective mechanism for burden-sharing and international cooperation, 
providing options to assist first countries of asylum consistent with the 
principle of international solidarity. States often regard asylum burdens as a 
‘zero sum phenomenon’, in which a reduction of one country's burden will 
result in increasing burdens for the others. This means that policy-makers will 
try to use restrictive migration policy instruments to make sure that their 
country will not be seen as a ‘soft touch’, that is, an overly attractive 
destination country. 
Taking into account the need for responsibility sharing in the protection 
of refugees and a strategic use of resettlement, UNHCR and its governmental 
and non-governmental partners have tried to undertake multilateral 
resettlement operations. UNHCR’s dependence on donor, host, and 
resettlement countries is vital because the organisation is unable to function 
without monetary contributions and authorisation to work within a state’s 
borders. This often places the organisation in a delicate position, further 
complicated by relationships with other actors in the international system 
including UN agencies, and international, national, and local NGOs. 
As described in UNHCR’s Resettlement Learning Programme, 
“whether individual refugees will ultimately be resettled depends on the 
admission criteria of the resettlement State as well as the willingness of the 
country of asylum to allow them to leave” (UNHCR, 2010b, p. 21). 
Resettlement is seen as sharing the burden of responsibility for providing help 
to refugees. 
In UNHCR’s Projected Global Resettlement Needs overview for 2011, 
of every 100 refugees identified as being in need of resettlement, only 10 
were resettled each year. More specifically, UNHCR has estimated global 
resettlement needs at 800,000 people, whereas resettlement states provide 
less than 8,000 places per annum (UNHCR, 2010a, p. 2). Additionally, while 
UNHCR estimated that 203,000 individuals were in need of resettlement in 
2010, the number of resettlement places made available by states did not 
increase from the 80,000 offered in 2009 (Ibid.). Unfortunately, the statistics 
are unsettling, even in 2015 it was estimated that 1,150,300 refugees globally 
were now in need of resettlement (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). This marks a 50 per 
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cent increase in resettlement needs compared with the total projected 
resettlement needs estimated for 2012. 
UNHCR continued its discussion with states to increase their 
resettlement capacity in order to meet the protection needs of greater 
numbers of forced migrants. UNHCR eventually introduced in 2005 an 
initiative called the Strengthening Protection Capacity Project (SPCP). This 
project was introduced with the aim of “facilitat[ing] national responses to 
protection problems through a process of protection assessment, dialogue 
and joint planning in States hosting refugees” (UNHCR, 2010b, p. 23). 
As Barnett claims, the biggest obstacle is state sovereignty (2002, pp. 
257-258). It is states that decide what their resettlement policies will be. The 
growing gap between the number of resettlement submissions made by 
UNHCR and the number of resettlement places offered by participating states 
demonstrates the practical difficulties. Very often public attitudes also shape 
policies and political debate, resulting in a cycle of mutual influence (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016). In the Progress Report on Resettlement 
from 2010, UNHCR suggests that: 
 
Measuring the success of resettlement as a protection tool and durable 
solution should be based not only on how many refugees have access 
to this solution and how many countries offer resettlement places but 
also on the way refugees are selected, received and supported, or in 
other words, the value of all of its components (UNHCR, 2010a, p. 6). 
 
The 2010 Progress Report on Resettlement states that: 
  
UNHCR’s resettlement priorities do not always match those of states. 
Greater effort is required by the international community, including 
resettlement countries, to operationalize the relevant paragraphs of 
Executive Committee Conclusions in the area of resettlement (UNHCR, 
2010c, p. 5). 
 
UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2011 report also made this 
point (2011, p. 8), but again failed to expand on it. This reluctance to address 
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the issues facing resettlement is indicative of the fact that UNHCR is 
ultimately a construct of and for the interests of these states. 
 
In the most recent UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2018 report 
it states: 
 
Opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration of refugees 
in the current global landscape are increasingly limited, making 
resettlement an even more important tool for protection and for finding 
solutions for some of the world’s most vulnerable refugees (2018). 
 
UNHCR are recognising that while the issue of resettlement is 
regarded as important, this may not be balanced by any top-down recognition 
relating to the ability of refugees to undertake norm entrepreneurship (see 
Chapter 6) being somewhat limited. 
Group Resettlement and Protracted Situations 
The documents survey also showed that UNHCR also offer(ed) 
guidance on situation-specific multilateral resettlement operations. The 
objective was largely to consider the forms of strategic resettlement 
operation(s) that could benefit a much larger number of refugees, including 
creating a better protection environment and opening up the possibility of local 
integration. For example, in March 2007, UNHCR declared that Iraqis fleeing 
their country were entitled to prima facie20 refugee status and called for their 
resettlement. In addition, it established 11 priority resettlement profiles to help 
assess the vulnerability of Iraqi refugees. Refugees belonging to one of these 
11 categories were prioritised for resettlement in line with the seven globally 
defined resettlement criteria. 
                                                             
20 Prima facie status is granted in cases where refugees are coming from a condition, such as 
the conflict in Iraq, in which the situation is so poor that it is more likely than not that 
persecution occurred and also when refugee flows are massive enough that they exceed the 
capacity ofUNHCR to process RSD individually. Typically, refugees must go through RSD 
individually and prove that they personally meet the legal definition of a refugee, as defined 
by either the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Prima facie allows for the 
designation of refugee status, usually temporarily, to groups of forced migrants. 
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So far, this document analysis of UNHCR key reports shows how ‘top-
down’ perspectives have largely relied upon temporary solutions in practice. 
In July 2011, for example, UNHCR stated that 12 countries had pledged 900 
places, although almost one-third of those offered in addition to annual 
resettlement programmes represented an ad hoc contribution. In July 2012, 
according to UNHCR, 12 countries pledged 1,700 dedicated resettlement 
places (excluding the United States of America, which offered an open-ended 
number of places). Nevertheless, this kind of ad hoc of provision, on the one 
hand, tended to ensure that this kind of provision had some limitations. 
Indeed, this ‘top-down’ assessment was confirmed in the interviews for this 
thesis. One UNHCR representative during the interview, for example, 
highlighted that: “huge amount of resources go into temporary solutions that in 
fact could be much better spent supporting the host governments in looking 
after the whole community, including refugees and IDPs. So it is not so much 
that UNHCR needs more money as that we need community that sees 
displacement as a development issue that goes beyond the immediate rush of 
humanitarian disaster” (Interview 2). This also has some implications for how 
the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refuges can be interpreted since in many 
instances, the ad hoc nature of the ‘top-down’ provision might also explain 
why the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees often confirmed a perception of 
a lack of strong permanent commitment to them on the part of UNHCR and/or 
host governments and/or far from complex understanding of what UNHCR 
was actually doing or indeed wanted them as refugees to do. 
 
5.7. Linkage to conceptual models 
The findings from the interviews presented above can clearly be 
interpreted using a social constructivist perspective and through the prism of 
aligning ‘norm diffusion’. At the core of the findings is the fact that refugees – 
did usually feel like disempowered objects of resettlement policy where the 
focus of UNHCR – if it was perceived at all – was to treat the refugees more 
as victims and/or commodities to be processed effectively. This in turn means 
that part of the misalignment represented a challenge to the social 
construction of the identities of refugees themselves. Durable solutions policy 
may have been designed through principles of, for example, ‘burden-sharing’ 
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to undertake effective ways to help refugees, but what durable solutions were 
actually perceived as – at least by those aware of it – were as a challenge to 
the particular identity of refugees as individuals who have something to say 
for themselves and have discernible identities built particularly around self-
reliance and innovative skills. Hence, while the findings confirm that refugee 
protection was about the very core of UNHCR’s mandate, the data also 
suggest that refugees felt that UNHCR failed to provide them with protection. 
And this may explain why the findings also reveal very little loyalty among the 
refugees to the durable solutions policies of UNHCR in practice. Hence, at 
least in terms of resettlement, the overall picture is one of only partial success 
for durable solutions. 
Again the primary interviews reveal that the refugees often perceive 
that they could contribute to actively promoting norms that reflect and are 
compatible with existing refugee identities. However, this is problematic when 
it comes to refugee protection. From the top-down and UNHCR and states, 
the research findings reveal that refugees are not seen as norm promoters. 
Although they may be active in socially constructing their new identities, 
refugees – as stakeholders or as individuals – are not really heard in the host 
countries since – contrary to constructivist account – the governing narrative 
is often dominated by the mind-set that host states must prevail in being able 
to change refugee policies at the domestic level. Resettlement then is closely 
linked with the sovereignty of the host countries, and it is often perceived that 
rather than seeing refugees as potential assets, the focus of the prevailing 
norm is very much based on premises that refugee resettlement bears high 
direct costs and thus refugee resettlement is often portrayed as a policy 
challenge that often invokes controversy among and with existing citizens. 
From a social constructivist perspective, one dominant finding from the 
interviews was that identities of refugees were heavily influenced by the 
migration journey – one that usually began by fleeing one’s home and 
country, incurred often prolonged periods of uncertainty and travelling, and 
involved arrival in the (often less than welcoming) host environment. Identifies 
were thus being socially re-constructed as the impact of the migration journey 
came to bear on the ‘bottom-up’ perceptions of the refugees. Their identities 
were therefore changing from the ‘bottom-up’ in a way that perhaps was not 
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being recognised effectively from the ‘top-down’ of UNHCR resettlement 
policy. 
Nevertheless, the findings also reveal that at least in terms of 
resettlement the ability of the refugees to upstream their changing 
perspectives through upward norm diffusion was highly constrained. The 
possibility for refugees to direct processes for change remained highly limited 
with the continuing implementation of outside directed assistance 
programming. It can be argued that the ubiquitous top-down relief model and 
the resultant passivity reflected the assumption that refugees cannot (or 
should not) strive to realise their capacity to act as citizens while displaced 
from their country of origin. Hence, the findings show that there is a major 
misalignment between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ over the nature of 
recognition of the changing identities of the refugees themselves, Thus, 
aligning recognition that the emergence and changes to the refugee settings 
are part of evolving refugee identities remains a vital component in ensuring 
the durability of resettlement policy and the realisation of social change 
through participatory development. 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
The findings on resettlement presented in this chapter reveal several 
significant aspects and observations on whether resettlement was actually 
being successfully accomplished (see Research Question 1, Chapter 1). First, 
the initial documents survey analysis confirmed that resettlement was offered 
often on a case-by-case basis to refugees (deemed especially vulnerable, in 
need of protection and/or who meet specific programme criteria). Second, the 
documents survey also reveals that refugee resettlement policy and practice 
was often contradictory in practice in that UNHCR policy-makers found it 
challenging to combine and reconcile humanitarian goals with what has been 
argued is an increasingly state-centred approach on the part of respective 
states who were in practice acting as major drivers and shapers of settlement 
policy from the ‘top-down’. Third, this documents survey is reinforced by the 
findings of the interviews that demonstrate that the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees towards solving problems of forced migration are not necessarily 
aligned with those put forward by UNHCR or other decision-makers from the 
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‘top-down’. In essence, there remains a substantial misalignment of norm 
diffusion (see Chapter 3) in general terms. 
Turning more closely, to the significance of the findings of this chapter 
for the three research questions of this thesis, a number of important 
reflections can be made at this point in relation to resettlement aspects. Let us 
now turn to the three research questions of this thesis respectively at this 
point. 
In Research Question 1: 
1) To what extent are UNHCR’s durable solutions in relation to resettlement 
being successfully accomplished? 
First, the initial document analysis confirms that UNHCR remains – at 
least officially – one of the most dominant influences shaping norm diffusion 
on resettlement policy, with strong potential – even using a largely ‘top-down’ 
policy approach to promote the socialisation of local civil society actors 
regarding refugee protection. Thus, UNHCR can be seen as a largely ‘top-
down’ oriented gate-keeper, not just of issues but also of tactics and 
strategies for advocacy. Thus, the focus of this thesis on UNCHR durable 
solutions policies is vindicated. 
Second, the initial document analysis and respective interviews also 
confirm that UNHCR did largely utilise and implement ‘top-down’ policies on 
resettlement via stakeholders and partners, but only with limited levels of 
success. 
Third, and in spite of the important role assumed by UNHCR in helping 
to shape the ‘top-down’ norm diffusion via its focus on key principles, like 
‘burden-sharing’, the findings from the interviews also show, that – at the 
same time most refugees failed to associate UNHCR with having such an 
important role in shaping such norms, with most refugees that were 
interviewed for this study also highlighting that they largely perceived UNHCR 
and/or host government as only providing limited help and/or guidance. In this 
way, a misalignment between ‘top-down’ policy orientation and the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of refugees can be detected ensuring that UNHCR durable 
solutions policy on resettlement remained only partially successful. Given the 
lack of perception at the bottom among refugees, it is possible to argue that 
the existence of such misalignments demonstrates the very limitations of 
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durable solutions success in practice since key groups perceive there to be 
limited impact. 
Fourth, the data findings show that the agency of refugees is often 
highlighted – not least by the refugees themselves. The data results relating 
to the interviewed Bosnian refugees indicate that there is often a stronger 
awareness of the need for, and even a commitment to, undertaking stronger 
agency action on the part of the refugees – although ultimately this tended to 
reinforce the self-awareness and self-reliance on the respective interviewed 
refugees in practice. Taking this a little further, the qualitative data highlight a 
strong misalignment between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives in three 
particular area/categories (see Table 5). This misalignment has several 
important reflections for this thesis. 
In the first place, protection becomes meaningful particularly in the 
context of being able to access rights. The findings from the interviews 
suggest that refugee have strong self-awareness of their own resilience and 
thus perceive – at least from the ‘bottom-up’ – that they need to be treated 
less as victims and more as actors with rights. This consequently means 
ensuring that refugees move in a safe and dignified manner and that they 
place great emphasis on the fact that any successful resettlement also 
requires that they are empowered, well-informed and properly prepared for 
third country resettlement and integration into welcoming communities. 
Second, the findings show that both UNHCR and the refugees 
themselves see numerous benefits in developing policies that see refugees as 
an investment (opportunity), and not as a burden. In particular, the findings 
demonstrate – especially from the primary interviews – that the refugees – in 
‘bottom-up’ terms – perceive that they have numerous assets that provide 
‘value-added’ and hence offer, huge potential benefits for the countries that 
host them (as well as for the refugees themselves). The interview findings 
also reveal numerous instances where refugees actively sought and continue 
to seek solutions to their problems by inventing creative self-reliance 
strategies. 
Third, that there is a major misalignment around the phasing of 
movement by refugees and that of UNHCR inspired policy – in many 
instances, the interviews reveal that neither UNHCR policy nor the state 
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strategies really capture the fundamental dynamic that dominates the ‘bottom-
up’ perspectives of refugees. Refugees see the process of resettlement not as 
a finite process but as one that is dominated by constant movement, some 
multi-phasing and with refugees (choosing and) being displaced multiple 
times. Hence, the analysis in this chapter shows that any removal of 
misalignments between ‘top-down’ policy and the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees requires that ‘durable solutions’ must incorporate the practice of 
ensuring the safe and dignified movement of refugees as the central feature 
governing any resettlement operation. 
 
2) What is the perspective of key stakeholders and how much influence do 
refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both 
enabled and constrained by the structures? 
The findings from resettlement confirm that refugees’ conceptions 
about resettlement are informed by complex, multifaceted factors that indicate 
shifting understandings of their journey under a given situation, rather than a 
linear idea of settlement as stipulated by UNHCR. In particular, the findings 
from the primary interviews show a remarkably high consensus among the 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees that they see themselves as being key 
potential stakeholders in durable solutions but also ones that are largely 
stripped of agency to influence many of the decisions that take place during 
the pre-resettlement. According to them this omission represents a serious 
problem since there is a lack of UNHCR awareness of ‘bottom-up’ motives 
and drivers dictating their ultimate resettlement destination. The findings show 
a strong tendency for refugees to leave for resettlement with the assumption 
that life, where they are sent, will at least be better than where they are 
coming from. 
 
3) What actions are needed to ensure a more effective and consistent 
achievement of resettlement as a durable solution? How can UNHCR policies 
be policies be adapted to enhance prospects for resettlement? 
Increased commitment by the international community to offer more 
resettlement opportunities for refugees will benefit refugees. This empirical 
chapter indicates that the effective implementation of resettlement to a third 
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country presents a number of challenges. On several aspects, there is broad 
concurrence between the investigations with senior UNHCR policy-makers 
and the refugees. First of all, that successful resettlement depends on the 
capacity of resettled refugees to integrate in the host country. Secondly, the 
interviews with both UNHCR and the refugees also suggest there is a general 
perception that resettled refugees must be able to adapt themselves to the 
life, culture and socio-economic structures of the host country. Thirdly, there 
was a concurrence of views that durable solutions to resettlement questions 
should always be the objective for international action. 
However, the findings in this chapter also show that practical limits of 
law and organisation are often apparent at the grassroots level, where 
UNHCR, states and refugees interact in a sometimes tense relationship of 
competing interests. On the one hand, the documents survey and interviews 
with UNHCR officials show the limitations to which the senior policy-makers 
are willing to prioritise the views of refugees when faced with state pressures 
and considerations. Where these meet, state interests usually prevail. 
Equally, the interviews with the refugees show the limitations to which 
UNHCR resettlement polices are perceived to have relevance at the grass 
roots level. It is no great success, even in the short term, to have refugees 
confined and dependent in closed camps, in a jurisdictional limbo far removed 
from true community. The primary interviews with the respective refugees 
demonstrated how strongly their actual identities were shaped by often 
personal histories which involved devastating, often damaging trauma, loss of 
family and friends, high levels of stress, which also influence bottom-up 
perceptions towards resettlement in a new country. The dynamic nature of the 
staging of the migration journey and indeed the resettlement process is 
revealed in this chapter as a major area of misalignment between the ‘top-
down’ and bottom-up’. 
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CHAPTER 6: Local integration and Asylum 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As they fled the conflict in Bosnia, refugees from this region sought 
asylum in Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Over 
one million of these displaced persons sought asylum in neighbouring 
countries or beyond Europe. Initially placed in refugee camps in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Western Europe, Bosnians began to apply for permanent 
refugee status abroad. This chapter will examine local integration and asylum 
policies. With the growing number of resettled refugees, researchers and 
policy-makers struggled to understand what forces shape and govern the 
integration process. 
First, starting in 2001, UNHCR made a fundamental shift in its 
approach to the management of these situations with a move away from long-
term ‘care and maintenance’ programmes to an integration approach that 
focuses on self-reliance and local solutions that include naturalisation and 
integration. The ‘care and maintenance’ approach refers to the fact that even 
though, as Purkey (2014) noted, the primary responsibility for refugee 
assistance falls upon host states, UNHCR had to adopt an ‘increasingly 
pragmatic and assistance-oriented role’ because “refugee-hosting states lack 
the political will to offer long-term protection and assistance” (Purkey, 2014, p. 
694). 
Second, local integration – set out in international refugee conventions 
– in contrast, refers to the granting of full and permanent asylum, 
membership, and residency status by a host government. This integration 
takes place “through a process of legal, economic, social, and cultural 
incorporation of refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship’ (Kibreab, 
1989, p. 469; Acobsen, 2001, p. 1). 
Third, unfortunately, though, this approach may be better in theory than 
in execution because as Jacobsen (2001) wrote, the likelihood of a host 
government offering refugees permanent asylum and integration remains 
small. In other words, in the context of local integration there are tensions 
between ‘top-down’ norms underpinning UNHCR activity. 
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This chapter considers the three driving research questions in relation 
to local integration and asylum: First, to what extent are UNHCR’s durable 
solutions in relation to local integration and asylum successfully 
accomplished? Second, what were and are the perspectives of key 
stakeholders and how much influence do refugees, as agents, have in the 
diffusion of norms, given they are both enabled and constrained by the 
structures? Third, what actions are needed to ensure a more effective and 
consistent achievement of local integration and asylum as a durable solution? 
How can UNHCR policies be adapted to enhance prospects for local 
integration and asylum. 
Empirical findings in relation to perspectives on local integration and 
asylum are presented. Overall, the findings suggest that there remains a 
pressing need to understand the ‘lived experiences’ of asylum seekers and 
refugees comprehensively and holistically. This chapter also exposes the 
disconnects between ‘top-down’ UNHCR and state conceptions of asylum 
seekers and ‘bottom-up’ self-conceptions of asylum seekers. 
This chapter also considers the various ways in which conditions of 
asylum have served to either empower or constrain the refugees as they 
strive to manage their situation, and the need to transform asylum practices. 
 
6.2. Durable Solution: Local Integration and Asylum – Five Reflections 
First, an ‘asylum seeker’ is someone who has made a claim under the 
Convention and is awaiting a decision on their case. That person remains an 
asylum seeker for so long as their application is pending (Migration Watch 
UK, 2006). Although UNHCR (UNHCR, 2009) validates refugees under the 
conditions of ‘fear of or actual victimization of persecution’, refugees and 
increasingly asylum seekers experience difficulty in accessing and securing 
safety and rights. The emergent concern with regard to devising policies 
aimed at limiting incoming asylum seekers on the basis of appropriate 
qualifications or other characteristics undermines the rights of asylum seekers 
by forcing them into a liminal zone in which their rights and safety are 
compromised. The consequences of these policies exacerbated refugees and 
asylum seekers' vulnerability by placing them into a liminal zone in which they 
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lack decision-making power, agency, and autonomy.21 The liminality 
associated with ‘top-down’ policies determined by international and nation 
state agendas is illustrated by the failure to consider and support the refugee 
and asylum seeker's process in securing protection from their subjective, 
vulnerable standpoint. 
Second, asylum and integration are usually perceived by refugee 
service providers as an opportunity for refugees, reflecting that seeking 
asylum is not understood as a right under international law. Instead, officials 
must determine which refugees are priorities for resettlement on the basis of 
which are most vulnerable and in need of protection. Integration was 
conceived as a balance of rights and obligations and policies took a holistic 
approach targeting all dimensions of integration (including economic, social, 
and political rights; cultural and religious diversity; and citizenship and 
participation). 
Third, for those refugees eligible for resettlement and asylum, the 
process remains and continues to be fraught with uncertainty and instability, 
lasting months or years. For many more who cannot integrate into the host 
society, may not be eligible for resettlement and cannot return to the country 
of origin, the hope to relocate elsewhere remains consuming.22 
Fourth, asylum offers protection for refugees who are debating their 
next steps and when to begin healing after sometimes brutal and highly 
traumatic events that often cause fatalities among their family and friends. In 
order to demonstrate that a fundamental shift in the practice of asylum has 
occurred, it is first necessary to understand the historical development of 
asylum policy in Europe. This will not only provide a benchmark with which to 
compare recent developments, but will also describe how the determinants of 
policy responses have contributed to changing policy directions. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention was a critical event in the 
institutionalisation of the post-World War II regime, as it created an 
international framework which defined an individual in need of international 
protection. In addition to the Geneva Convention definition, the international 
                                                             
21 Discussion of agency and resilience is set in Chapter 2. 
22 This resonates in my findings from the interviews in Chapter 5, 5.5. Findings in Relation to 
Resettlement. 
 184 
refugee regime rests on two additional pillars: the right to non-refoulement 
(Art. 33), which stipulates that a refugee must not be sent back to a country 
where his life or freedom would be threatened, and the principle of 
international solidarity or ‘burden-sharing.23 
Fifth, progress since 1999 has been uneven, both in terms of the level 
of integration and the degree to which the strategy can be considered to have 
been comprehensive. In terms of the move towards integration, developments 
have been hampered by the highly sensitive nature of many of the issues 
under discussion and the requirement for unanimity in decision-making (Van 
Selm, 2004; Geddes, 2003). The factors contributing to the reluctance of 
states to grant asylum are twofold: the economic implications of support for 
asylum seekers and the political and social unrest resulting from the presence 
of asylum seekers. 
6.2.1. Widening Definitions on Asylum 
Looking at the development of asylum in both the post-war period and 
the three phases of European integration, it is possible to arrive at a number 
of observations concerning the changing nature of refugee protection. Firstly, 
the establishment of the refugee regime and its position in the post-war period 
reflected a human rights paradigm. This is not to suggest that asylum in the 
post-war period was immune from state interests. It has been clearly 
demonstrated that such considerations have influenced asylum policy since 
the inception of the international refugee regime. Yet, in the context of 
growing securitisation of migration policy and concerns over mixed flows of 
voluntary and involuntary migrants, with growing numbers of asylum seekers 
and the mixed flows of migrants, European refugee policies have shifted from 
being primarily rooted in humanitarian considerations to ones reflecting more 
global migration concerns. 
This has resulted in what Andrew Geddes terms a “conceptual 
widening” over the past decades in the field of migration. In terms of the 
asylum debate, this has been evident in the linkages created between asylum 
and other policy fields, such as illegal migration, return policy and cooperation 
                                                             
23 The concept of ‘asylum-burden’ refers to costs incurred by states that may be incurred in 
the process following an application for asylum (Vink and Meijerink, 2003, p. 297). 
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with source and transit countries (Van Selm, 2004). There has been a 
departure from the previous separation of immigration (or migration) concerns 
from refugee and asylum policy).24 
Secondly, the construction of the European regime changed the 
traditional structure of refugee policy, which was previously characterised by a 
“clearly separated dual structure of policy-making at the international and the 
national levels...” This has led to the creation of “a regional system of 
redistribution for asylum seekers that redefines the relationship between the 
national and the international in new terms” (Lavenex, 1998, p. 127). 
 
6.2.2. The asylum crisis 
One indicator that can be used to suggest that the asylum system was 
in crisis is the rapid growth of asylum applications in EU member states since 
the 1980s. Governments’ record that in 1983 Western Europe had about 
70,000 applications for asylum; in 1992, the peak year, there were 702,000, 
falling to 245,000 in 1996 and rising to 335,619 in 1998 (Salts, 2001). 
Compared to global figures, the number of applicants seeking asylum in 
developed countries increased from about 50,000 per annum in the early 
1970s to half a million in 2001. The EU has taken on the brunt of these 
increases, as nearly 68 per cent of all applications over the 20-year period 
have been made in European member states, with North America accounting 
for most of the remainder. In 2015 alone, the European Union received 1.3 
million first-time asylum applicants (UNHCR, 2016c). 
With a significant rise in applications, most national asylum systems 
experienced difficulty keeping pace, resulting in significant backlogs of 
applications. These backlogs seriously delayed the resolution of individual 
claims and have the effect of further decreasing public confidence in the 
asylum system. Public dissatisfaction has been further compounded by the 
high costs associated with refugee determination and the reception of asylum 
seekers. 
There is also a widespread view that many people who are not 
refugees are seeking to gain access to new countries through the asylum 
                                                             
24 Highlighted in which is evident in the discussion of the UK’s integration and asylum policy 
in section 6.4. 
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channel. Asylum seekers might also be represented as a security threat, 
whether to the borders of the state or to the population from within the state. 
In the latter case asylum seekers might be construed as a threat to social 
cohesion or a threat to economic well-being among other factors. These 
portrayals of asylum seekers are frequently seen at the state level (Lischer, 
2008; Betts, 2009). Consequently, protecting the population from the threat 
asylum seekers place on their well-being becomes a policy priority. 
With nearly 80 per cent of persons applying for asylum in the EU in 
2000 being denied refugee status (UNHCR, 2002), this view is not necessarily 
surprising. With no alternatives for legal migration, individuals may migrate 
because of family ties or to gain employment. However, this phenomenon is 
not easily remedied. The “migration-asylum nexus” speaks to the difficulty in 
distinguishing between forced and voluntary migration. It also captures the 
reality that the causes of forced migration are bound in the complex 
relationship between push, pull, and intermediate factors (Koser, 1997). As 
Van Selm notes, “Since 9/11, documents released by European Union 
institutions, the UN and states have all indicated that the moment is politically 
ripe for more serious, consequential and rigorous use of these exclusion 
clauses – as well as for appropriate and rigorous use of those clauses relating 
to inclusion.” (2003, p. 240) 
Moreover, the exponential increase in migrant trafficking and 
smuggling networks gained escalating attention in Europe. In 2015 and 2016, 
more than 2.3 million illegal crossings were detected. In 2017, the total 
number of illegal border crossings into the EU dropped to 204,700, its lowest 
level in four years (European Parliament, 2017). Considering that often the 
only viable alternative for asylum seekers to leave the country of origin is 
through the use of trafficking networks, it is not surprising that they are often 
considered criminals after having reached their destination countries. 
The 'top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ dynamic offers particular insight into 
categories of migration. For example, Haddad (2008) describes the analytical 
difference between a refugee and a migrant: refugees are forced to migrate 
whereas migrants choose to migrate. However, asylum seekers fall 
somewhere in between. They carry the burden of having to prove that their 
migration was forced. This burden exists in the context of state discourses 
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constructing asylum seekers as potential criminals, cheats, and generally 
undesirable persons. 
 
6.2.3. The failure of previous control measures 
Despite nearly three decades of restrictive measures to prevent or 
deter the arrival of asylum seekers, there is now a considerable consensus 
that traditional restrictive policies have often been ineffective in reducing 
asylum pressures. As was previously mentioned, EU member states still 
experience unpredictable and large numbers of refugee applications, despite 
the implementation of controls such as visa requirements, carrier sanctions 
and interdiction. There is also a growing admission that restrictive measures 
may lead to a growth in human trafficking and smuggling as well as illegal 
migration. 
The distribution of asylum seekers during this period across member 
states was also highly uneven despite past harmonisation efforts intended to 
achieve greater burden-sharing. For example, in 2003, five countries (Austria, 
France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom) received 79 per cent of 
all claims submitted (UNHCR, 2004). The relative importance of Europe as a 
destination region for asylum seekers has declined in recent years. By 2009, 
Europe’s percentage of claims had fallen to 45 per cent (UNHCR, 2011). 
However, the number of asylum applications received in 2014 in European 
Union member states had risen by 25 per cent compared to the same period 
in 2013 (UNHCR, 2015). Black and Koser (1999) similarly demonstrate that 
during the conflict in Bosnia, where temporary protection was implemented 
with the intention of increasing burden-sharing, more than half a million 
refugees came to the EU, of whom 60 per cent settled in Germany, with a 
further 30 per cent in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Finally, the issue of integration and the failure of policies to effectively 
incorporate foreigners into host societies rose on the political agenda in light 
of social tensions, exclusion, and increasing public hostility to the presence of 
immigrants and refugees, reflected in the upsurge of nationalistic, racist and 
xenophobic political forces. Although the debate on integration extends 
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beyond the asylum debate, it nevertheless has implications for the 
resettlement of refugees as well as general views towards migrants. 
 
6.3. Findings in Relation to Asylum and Local Integration 
This section presents the findings from the interviews with refugees.25 
Refugees who choose integration prefer not to depend on outside help, 
including aid from UNHCR, but instead maintain their own livelihoods. A key 
finding in relation to questioning on local integration activities was that 60 per 
cent of the respondents expressed a desire for their resettled country to be 
their home. One of the main reasons consistently cited in the interviews for 
this ‘bottom-up’ preference was that the British system of granting asylum 
(after a certain amount of time enabling people to stay) permanently gave 
people, who came to this country, an opportunity to plan their lives and 
integrate into their new community which is seen as successful pathways to 
integration (Atkinson, 2018; Hayes and Endale, 2018). 
The primary interviews also revealed other more common reasons 
(cited by refugees interviewed) for wanting to live in the UK. These included, 
for example: (i) the importance of existing and prevailing family connections, 
with 40 per cent of the interviewees noting that immediate family had already 
resettled in the UK; (ii) the existence of shared affinities and identities with the 
UK, with 40 per cent of the interviewees commenting directly that they 
remained comfortable and accustomed to living in the UK. Interestingly, only a 
smaller proportion of the interview sample cited the importance of economic 
factors as a driver for local integration, with only (iii) 20 per cent of the 
interviewees highlighting the importance of securing better living conditions; 
and (iv) barely 20 per cent of the interviewees arguing that they saw little or 
no reason to return to their home countries, as their livelihoods had been lost 
in their home country. Hence, in the context of this thesis, these findings 
confirm that the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of migrants towards local integration 
and asylum are not always based on clear cut political or economic motives 
                                                             
25 See Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) on the sample. 
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that are often assumed as being key drivers of local integration policy ‘top-
down’. 
According to the interviews (100 per cent), they, as forced migrants, 
were often been exposed to traumatic situations in their country of origin 
including an abuse of power by totalitarian regimes or armed militant groups 
(see also Van de Veer, 1998), physical and psychological torture, sexual 
violence, bombings, living in poverty and malnourishment (see also Neuner et 
al., 2004). In addition to traumatic experiences in their country of origin, the 
interviews also revealed that the forced migrants then faced the further 
challenge of coping with the stressors in their new environments (see also 
Ellis et al., 2007). Altogether 60 per cent of the participants described a 
general feeling of uncertainty around the process, primarily about whether 
they would get a positive decision, which would allow them to remain in the 
UK under refugee status. Recurrent and persistent anxiety about the future in 
the initial stage of applying for asylum was mentioned by many participants as 
both a cause and an expression of their psychological situation when trying to 
integrate with society in a new country: “Emotional, psychological situation 
was not good because we were thinking all the time, what we can do, what we 
are doing for the future?” (Respondent 2). A total 50 per cent of the 
participants described ‘feeling low’ and/or being, emotional and distressed 
when they arrived in the UK. However, this unknown pushed them for 
productive action and resilience in order to move forward and continue to 
survive and hopefully eventually thrive. 
In order to cope with the expected influx of people, the Home Office 
approached the Refugee Council and the British Red Cross to organise 
reception and resettlement facilities. Together these organisations formed – 
'The Bosnia Project’. Refugees accepted on the programme were given 
temporary protection and were initially housed in reception centres before 
being given more permanent accommodation (Compass, 1997). Ager and 
Strang (2004, p.11) studied refugee integration in the UK. One of their 
respondents said: “I think a lot of people are not actually aware of what they 
are entitled to...in terms of education, housing needs, social services or that 
kind of thing...job opportunities, training...things like that” One 
participant/interviewee in this study, who also applied for asylum confirmed 
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this view, describing the asylum system in ways which could be understood 
as being ‘de-personalising’ (Respondent 10). Participants, such as 
Respondent 10, suggested that any initial contact with the Home Office 
immediately made them feel like the system did not really care about them. 
 
“You have to submit yourself and then wait....It’s a very depersonalised 
system...there should be change...they should put in place a...system 
that considers people...as human beings...” (Respondent 10). 
 
In particular, all of the interviewees (100 per cent) confirmed that they 
had come to the host country after surviving various forms of persecution and 
trauma. Many of the refugees were forced to leave home because of war in 
their homelands. Participants described a need for safety, and generally had 
to escape their country of origin because their life was in danger (see also 
Chapter 5). This was to be expected given the definition of asylum seekers. 
For example, one Bosnian interviewee stated: 
 
“In my country, there was lot of fighting: there was a war there. There 
was no security in Bosnia. Now this is my home.” (Respondent 1). 
 
A clear finding from the interviews is that many issues surrounding 
local integration revolved around the particular issue and treatment of 
accommodation and housing (60 per cent). This is a significant finding since, 
from a social constructivist perspective (see Chapter 2), securing of housing – 
i.e. a place to live – is often regarded as being a key part of identity formation. 
Housing is a physical expression of a sense of ‘belonging’ to a host country 
and thus forms an important factor in shaping not just identities but also the 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of the refugees. 
Indeed, scholars have already identified that housing can be a 
significant stressor in resettlement, even jeopardising integration. Often there 
are problems of affordability, availability in general or availability of 
appropriately sized housing, and safety (Miller et al., 2002). Yet housing was 
also an issue where – from the ‘bottom-up’ perspective of the interviewee – 
the realities and success of local integration were most apparent. One 
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interviewee (a Bosnian refugee), for instance, outlined her frustrations of living 
in inadequate housing: 
 
“I had problems with very high rent, that’s why I changed my flat, and I 
took a very bad flat because it was less expensive and I was supposed 
to pay almost all my income for an apartment, for the rent.” 
(Respondent 9) 
 
In this way, housing was often revealed in the interviews as being closely 
associated with the overall ‘well-being’ of migrants and as a criterion on which 
their ‘bottom-up’ perceptions of successful ‘self-reliance’ was also somewhat 
judged (see Chapter 5). 
The findings from the interviews also confirmed that social and 
community support was also identified and found to be significant in terms of 
how refugees viewed the process of integration. Refugees who migrated to 
the United Kingdom came to this country with traumatic experiences, endured 
at times harsh cultural adjustments to a new world, and had to find either a 
balance between or integration with their heritage and the newly adopted 
culture (Knezević and Olson, 2014). Challenges in host countries can be 
remediated via relevant programmes and support mechanisms. The Bosnia 
Project agencies actively supported the establishment of community 
associations. Community formation for Bosnian refugees performed many 
useful functions. They can help to rebuild and foster a sense of belonging. As 
Respondent 2 highlighted, social networks contribute to the development of 
stories or history, the development of identity and overall well-being: 
 
“The good thing is we have...the Bosnian Community centre and we 
meet there a couple of times a week, have you seen the Bosnian 
dancing and on Saturdays there is a school in Bosnian language and a 
religious school, so people bring their children and they sit there and 
talk for a couple of hours.” 
(Respondent 2) 
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Having informal support from relatives and friends, and help from the 
local community with housing and employment and help in addressing various 
resettlement issues and relieving social isolation, is critical to achieving 
integration (Taken from interview with Respondent 2). This is important since 
once again the linkage to refugees seeing themselves – at least from the 
‘bottom-up’ – as much more ‘self-reliant’ is emphasised in the findings on local 
integration. Above all, the interviewees regularly referred to the importance of 
also sustaining and accessing local, migrant-based and community-focused 
support networks driven by the migrants themselves. Hence, this suggests 
some misalignment with ‘top-down’ local integration policy that regularly sees 
the migrants as often much less capable and independent in terms of 
producing their own support networks. 
Furthermore, the findings also confirm that refugees sustained many 
customs in order to preserve their culture and to gain a sense of comfort in a 
foreign environment. For example, the Bosnian refugees built their social 
relationships, which gave them motivation to congregate at their local centres 
to meet with others who share their faith and culture. Community meetings 
were convened to discuss current events and issues, promoting culture by 
way of food festivals, dances and musical shows, pooling resources to do 
household chores, and various hobbies are other activities that help refugees 
to get acquainted with each other and with their neighbours (see Respondent 
4). There are many community organisations for Bosnians in the UK: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Community Advice Centre – London, BHCUK BH 
Community UK, Remembering Srebrenica, Bosnian Community London and 
Bosnian Resource Information & Cultural Centre Kosovar Support, among 
others. The ability of individuals and groups to successfully navigate their 
environments to resources that support them psychologically and physically 
increases resilience (Ungar et al., 2013). 
Up to 50 per cent of the participants also described experiencing a 
sense of loss on arrival in the UK. This was characterised by suggestions that 
they had left everything, including their former life and jobs. In particular, on 
the question of restoring and adapting family life in response to the effects of 
war and living in a different country, respondents identified key ‘bottom-up’ 
issues of qualifications, and working traditions as something that was a key 
 193 
factor in terms of understanding local integration from a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective. Replies from respondents, for example, included: 
 
“It was awful because all of us had qualifications. All. Some lower, 
some higher qualifications and many of them who finished university 
had to start from the beginning.” 
(Respondent 1) 
 
The same respondent added that not knowing the English language has been 
found to be a big problem: 
 
“And first of all, the language, it is a big barrier. It is a big barrier for all 
newcomers.”  
(Respondent 1) 
 
Refugees’ confidence was therefore perceived to be compromised and in 
particular influenced their ability to access mainstream services; and led them 
to become more isolated. Indeed, according to Respondent 9, linguistical 
issues also tended to reinforce the own self-reliance from the ‘bottom-up’. In 
this way, the refugees could be judged to be linking the concrete achievement 
of better language skills with successful adaptation and the achievement of 
local integration.  
 
“Bosnians who live here, they have adapted to English kind of life. 
They, people you know they just mind their own business, they work, 
they come home, cook dinner, go to bed.” 
(Respondent 9) 
 
In terms of local integration, the crucial ingredient in the successful 
settlement of refugees – identified by interviewees – was that they needed to 
be and/or should become self-reliant and self-sufficient. This confirms 
observations of key scholars that local integration would require refugees to 
seize opportunities offered by the economic system in the West, Bosnian 
refugees quickly gained a reputation for their industriousness. Examples of 
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Bosnian industriousness that lead to economic integration within the British 
economic system occurs among immigrants who became ethnic 
entrepreneurs. These individuals serve as bridges between their ethnic 
community and the British economic system by opening small businesses that 
offer their co-ethnics access to familiar goods and services. According to 
Portes (1995), community networks represent an important source of social 
capital. For example, some refugees who find barriers to jobs in the 
marketplace have turned to self-employment with the support of ethnic 
networks and ethnic resettlement services. This was also confirmed in the 
interviews since several respondents highlighted that setting up their own 
business and being involved in self-employment was one way of 
demonstrating their autonomy. 
Respondent 10 and her husband represent one example of the 
Bosnian entrepreneurial spirit. With poor English language skills and a 
university degree from Yugoslavia that was not recognised in the UK, they felt 
that their options for employment were limited. Her husband attempted 
carpentry and construction, but eventually they decided to import ethnic goods 
to the UK. She proudly proclaimed: 
 
“You must risk everything. We took loans. You have only two options: 
You go down, you go up.” 
(Respondent 10) 
 
On the other hand, economic integration barriers can also block 
participation in the host country’s social, cultural, and political spheres as well. 
Employment contributes to one’s development of a new identity in the host 
country by influencing one’s general state of well-being, giving one’s 
existence structure and meaning (Lavik, Hauff, Skrondal, and Solberg, 1996), 
and providing an environment for coming into contact with host country 
citizens. Unemployment or underemployment can focus one’s life on 
subsistence issues and reduces refugees’ opportunities for learning/improving 
host country language skills, forging links the host society and relationships 
with its members, learning about and connecting to the host country culture, 
and becoming involved in political issues which affect their lives. Thus, 
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achieving integration has fundamental implications for refugees’ own goals for 
resettlement: successfully reassembling their lives, integrating into the host 
society, and achieving a sense of normalcy. 
According to the interviews, when persevering in the face of hardship, 
Bosnians possess a high level of industriousness and display strong 
resilience following migration. Several of the interviewees also highlighted the 
link between local integration and the innovative skills of the refugees and 
how this provided a link to local communities. From the social constructivist 
perspective then (see Chapter 2), the findings highlight a self-image and 
awareness among the refugees that there could be compatible norms and 
affinities between the refugees and local communities built around a common 
self-perception that values an innovative work ethic. Another respondent 
described the desire to display the accoutrements of success: 
 
"People from Bosnia are highly competitive. I need a bigger car. I need 
to go find work. They are highly competitive. They were competitive in 
Bosnia as well." 
(Respondent 2) 
 
The drive to achieve a socio-economic standard equivalent to that 
known in Bosnia motivates many to work hard for material success. Although 
forced migration may leave refugees with ambivalent feelings about the 
departure from home and relationship to a new culture, some Bosnians 
enthusiastically embrace their new lives abroad. While this discourse places 
the burden of socio-economic self-reliance totally onto refugees, it disguises a 
total unawareness of the real refugee needs. 
However, generally speaking, Britain failed to incorporate the ‘bottom-
up’ opinions of the recipients of refugee programmes. Refugees could 
potentially benefit the country in which they live, but what they mostly need is 
to be properly incorporated into society. This cannot happen if refugees are 
seen as a burden on society and provide little value-added to local 
communities. It is only when they are truly empowered that they can 
contribute to society. 
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6.4. Responses to the Resettlement of Asylum Seekers 
Yet, the previous analysis of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives also revealed a 
lack of awareness of ‘top-down’ policy changes in relation to local integration. 
It is thus worthwhile at this point to consider any notable ‘top-down’ policy 
changes that nevertheless have implications for refugees in terms of local 
integration questions. These reflections are largely derived from the 
respective documents survey accompanied by findings drawn from the 
interviews with UNHCR officials.  
Under pressure to deal effectively with displacement in the former 
Yugoslavia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees initially proposed, three 
months after the spread of hostilities to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that states 
admit refugees under a temporary protection programme, which was to be 
framed outside the regular European refugee status determination procedures 
(Ogata, 1992). UNHCR encouraged this approach and consequently 
accepted reduced protection for refugees in order to persuade states to avoid 
the comprehensive implementation of non-entrée policies. 
In terms of ‘top-down’ policy-making, then several factors can be 
considered with regard to the external refugee option for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. These factors were identified in respective documents survey 
and in findings from interviews. First, in the economic and political context, 
granting of secure conditions of exile to refugees was not seen as 
reconcilable with the self-interest of Western states. Consequently, the 
general policy commitment to immigration restriction was generally not 
relaxed for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s involuntary migrants. This is 
demonstrated by the implementation of non-entréee policies (discussed in 
Chapter Five) in order to close the borders of potential asylum states. The 
introduction of temporary protection and the reduced rights regime associated 
with this European version of a common worldwide practice also reflected the 
exclusionary aims of states which sought to avoid the integration of those 
refugees who somehow manage to access their territories. 
Second, international refugee protection also underwent dramatic 
change before the conflict in the former Yugoslavia erupted. Of particular 
importance is the development of openly exclusionary norms that were 
intended to deny entry to unwanted asylum seekers. At the same time, 
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UNHCR undertook a significant shift in its activities, as it was increasingly 
asked to work within refugee generating countries. While these new activities 
brought UNHCR dangerously close to working outside its basic protection 
mandate, it is the timing of this shift in focus which is important in the context 
of this thesis, in terms of shaping understandings of general trends in refugee 
protection. UNHCR purposefully (and, for Western states, conveniently) 
shifted its attention to protection activities in countries that produce refugee 
flows rather than in countries of asylum. 
Around 1.1 million Bosnian refugees had arrived in European countries 
by mid-July 1992 (see Tables 6 and 7). 
 
 
Table 6: Resettled Refugees and Asylum Applications received in the EU 
(1989-2000). 
 
Year  Asylum Claims in EU 
 Received  Status 
Recognised  
Rejection of 
asylum  
1995 263,660 45,800  199,180 
1996 226,120 44,100 234,510 
1997 242,750 38,610 192,140  
1998 295,280 29,050 209,120 
1999 367,400 32,730 191,250  
Source: UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR 1999 
Statistical Overview, GENEVA, JULY 2000, 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bc834.pdf 
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Table 7: Resettled Refugees and Asylum Applications received in the US 
(1989-2000). 
 
Year  Asylum Claims in the US 
 Received  Status Granted  Rejection of 
asylum  
1995 149,070 12,450  14,090 
1996 107,130 13,530 2,500 
1997 52,200 10,130 2,460 
1998 35,900  9,940 3,190 
1999 31,740 3,220 1,760 
Source: UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR 1999 
Statistical Overview, GENEVA, JULY 2000, 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bc834.pdf 
 
As seen from the statistical overview (Tables 6 and 7), many countries 
within the European Union enacted more restrictive measures in asylum in the 
1990s. Cooperation in the field of asylum is an instance of political integration 
in a highly sensitive field where states are keen on protecting their 
sovereignty. This might partly explain the general ‘bottom-up’ ambivalence of 
refugees (recorded in the primary interviews) towards UNHCR (see also 
Chapter 5). 
 
6.5. Asylum and Integration 
Nevertheless, the findings from the documents survey and interviews 
also indicate that the ‘top-down’ policy changes did ensure that achieving 
integration required that refugees address various challenges during 
resettlement. Refugees can take several avenues once resettled 
(assimilation, acculturation, etc.), but integration is thought to be the best 
result (O’Neill and Spybey, 2003). According to Favell (2001, p. 378), 
“Integration, not immigration control or naturalisation, may indeed be the most 
important immigration issue, particularly in view of problematic research in this 
area”. Attempting to establish a comprehensive theory of integration has 
proven complicated, if not impossible (Ager and Strang, 2004). The term 
 199 
“integration” is said to be “chaotic and vague” and “a word used by many but 
understood differently by most” (Robinson 1998, p. 118). Sigona (2005, p. 
119) calls integration an “elusive concept”. Finally, Freeman (2004) argues 
that trying to document the different typologies of immigrant incorporation in 
Western nations is pointless, and instead suggests a definition of integration 
that “rejects permanent exclusion but neither demands assimilation nor 
embraces formal multiculturalism” (p. 945). Freeman’s idea of integration 
closely parallels the concept of selective acculturation because it eliminates 
the requirement for complete assimilation or acculturation in order to become 
a citizen in a European country. 
UNHCR describes integration as “mutual, dynamic, multifaceted and 
ongoing” (Refugee Resettlement: An International Handbook to Guide 
Reception and Integration 2002, p.6). The perspectives of the refugee and the 
host society both factor into successful integration: 
 
From a refugee perspective, integration requires a preparedness to 
adapt to the lifestyle of the host society without having to lose one’s 
own cultural identity. From the point of view of the host society, it 
requires willingness from communities to be welcoming and responsive 
to refugees and for public institutions to meet the needs of a diverse 
population (Refugee Resettlement: An International Handbook to 
Guide Reception and Integration, 2002, p.7). 
 
The complex process of integration occurs on various levels: political, 
social, cultural and economic. As noted by UNHCR official: 
 
“For example, Romania and Bulgaria, receive the large numbers of 
asylum seekers but they are unable to cope because their mechanisms 
for local integration are weak (…) It is very to implement and prioritise 
asylum and local integration agenda. (…) We are constrained by the 
political environment that we are in (Interview 2). 
 
Complexity is reflected in how the term integration is defined and in the 
numerous definitions used by researchers. In an attempt to remedy the 
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ambiguity of the definition, several scholars have endeavoured to create 
general integration models (Ager and Strang, 2008; Healey, 2006,) and 
models concerned with specific aspects of integration (e.g. quality of life in 
Ager and Strang, 2008). The individual nature of refugees, however, makes it 
difficult to apply integration models as universal frameworks. 
The documents survey reveal that several studies have attempted to 
add to a comprehensive theory of forced migration by focusing on the 
decision-making processes of asylum seekers to determine how they choose 
their destination country. Most of these studies concluded that not all asylum 
seekers have much choice in their destination country and do not determine 
the destination before emigrating, although a recurrent theme shows that 
some admitted to influencing factors, such as being in a European country 
and/or the presence of friends or family (Gilbert and Koser, 2006). Robinson 
and Segrott (2002), for a British Home Office research project, developed a 
model of an asylum seeker’s decision-making process. This model includes 
four stages: 1) the decision to leave; 2) figuring out how one will leave 
(whether or not one will use an agent); 3) weighing the options of where to go 
and 4) making the final destination choice. A scientific model of decision-
making may be helpful in the abstract; however, it must be recognised that 
forced migrants are individuals with unique factors influencing their decision to 
move and do not always conform to the paths delineated in scientific models. 
In the context of this thesis, however, these staged models have so far had 
limited utility precisely because they are often unclear on the relationship 
between ‘top-down’ policy and the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees in 
practice. 
Whereas achieving integration means active involvement in the host 
country society in multiple ways, the primary objective of host countries for 
refugees during resettlement is singular: economic self-sufficiency. Refugees 
are not provided with effective tools, however, to achieve short- or long-term 
self-sufficiency. Restrictive government policies regarding foreign 
qualifications, inadequate support and funding for labour market retraining, 
and ineffective, often underfunded, language instruction during the 
resettlement period contribute to refugees being funnelled into the low-wage 
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service sector of the labour market or the public welfare system as confirmed 
by my interviews. 
As shown throughout the literature on refugee identity, the label of 
‘refugee’ tends to have a negative impact on one’s identity (Harrell-Bond, 
1999). In Timotijevic and Breakwell’s (2000, p. 366) study of Bosnian refugees 
in Britain, respondents experienced some of the same feelings about their 
refugee label: 
 
“I am a refugee, and that sounds terrible, really bad...When you say to 
the people here that you are a refugee, everyone turns their head away from 
you.”; “...when I go to the Home Office...I feel ‘Oh, look at yourself, how low 
you are now, you used to be a normal person...’”. 
 
Highly skilled professionals in Colic-Peisker and Walker’s (2003) study 
of Bosnian refugees in Australia felt uneasy about their refugee classification, 
since it left them socially disadvantaged. 
Even if being labelled as a refugee did not affect the refugee’s identity, 
having the label, however, often led to respondents feeling like outsiders 
which can prevent full integration. Timotijevic and Breakwell (2000) found a 
similar situation in their research on refugees from the former Yugoslavia. 
One Bosnian refugee contemplates whether to tell people she is a refugee or 
not because of what their ensuing reaction could be: 
 
When I meet the English people and when they ask me where I am 
from, I think – OK, what that guy will think of me when they hear that I 
am a refugee, from Bosnia and all these things, that I am a refugee...I 
never had any kind of complexes in my life, but this has become a 
social complex, and you can’t go straight to these people and ask – oh, 
can I sit here, etc., as you would do in your country. They would 
probably not like me because I am from Bosnia (Timotijevic and 
Breakwell, 2000, p. 367). 
 
Identity reformulation depends on factors that unify or differentiate an 
individual from others, with the individual actively choosing the ways to 
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identify themselves (Mutanen, 2010). However, the findings for the primary 
interviews in this study do offer a number of important reflections in some 
cases for example, the choice is not made by the individual but by the society 
or state in which he or she lives (see Respondent 3). From a social 
constructivist perspective then, it is important to highlight that identity is 
constructed from a plurality of elements, and thus individuals have to choose 
which aspect of their identity to emphasise in different situations (Sen, 2006). 
For example, respondent 2 stressed the importance of individuals 
emphasising their innovative skills and this could be interpreted as a particular 
individual strategy/choice used by individual refugees to build synergies with 
local communities in the UK. 
There were numerous instances where the implications of this 
understanding (or lack of understanding) were confirmed by the findings from 
the interviews (see Table 8): 
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Table 8: ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Norm Diffusion? Comparing Alignments 
and Misalignments of Perspectives on Local Integration and Asylum 
 UNHCR  Refugees  Misalignment  
Identity  ‘Top-down’ 
Safe third 
country ruling 
‘Bottom-up’ 
Uncertainty about 
asylum claim 
process; fear of 
negative decision 
Uncertainty with regard to the 
outcome of the asylum 
process, specifically whether 
an individual is approved or 
denied status, is a prevalent 
and continuous aspect of 
stress for asylum seekers. 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
To attain 
asylum is to 
gain 
protection for 
‘genuine’ 
asylum 
seekers 
‘Bottom-up’ 
Feeling 
marginalised, 
insecure and 
vulnerable 
The constant exposure to risk 
required asylum seekers to 
continuously overcome 
obstacles. Bogus asylum 
seeker is a rhetorical 
category that is not 
established in international 
frameworks and yet is 
referred to in state discourse 
and in policy documents. 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
Asylum to 
offer full 
access to 
resources 
‘Bottom-up’ 
Lack of resources 
and barriers  
The lack of resources 
contributes to barriers toward 
eligibility for asylum. Labelling 
of asylum seekers reinforces 
the justifications for the 
current restrictive definition. 
 Top-down 
approaches  
Bottom-up 
approaches  
 
Source: Authors’ own 
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As seen in Table 8 above, the documents survey and primary 
interviews confirm that UNHCR incorporated an overarching ‘top-down’ 
approach to refugees’ rights (that entailed the protection of refugees). Yet, 
Table 9 also records how refugees often also regarded the reception phase of 
refugee newcomers as being largely detached from the potential longer-term 
outcome: integration of refugees. Equally, the interviews show how political 
parameters did restrict ‘top-down’ engagement with the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of refugees on local integration (see also Chapter 5) fuelling 
misalignments, The interviews stress how a broader discourse of integration 
would allow the tackling of different phases of resettlement process, show 
greater ‘top-down’ sensitivity towards refugee ‘bottom-up’ self-reliance and 
fulfil those human rights that they expect to enjoy as beneficiaries of 
protection. Refugees’ ‘bottom-up’ ideas of protection therefore entailed a 
wider assumption of human rights where situations that allowed them to flee, 
to seek asylum, not to be forcibly returned, to obtain the status of refugees but 
also to strive to bring forward a discourse of human rights within the host 
society could be incorporated more realistically into dialogue between senior 
policy-makers and the refugees. 
This leads to a number of important wider reflections in relation to local 
integration that inform this particular study. First, the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives 
gained though primary and secondary research suggest that the system for 
claiming asylum remains highly complicated and difficult for many people to 
go through – in particular for survivors of trauma, torture and violence. While 
this in itself is not UNHCR’s fault, it does hinder their ability to operate 
effectively. Three of the respondents argued that UNHCR could do more to 
utilise resources to convince governments of the responsibility they have to 
the refugees, and increase local integration and asylum opportunities. 
Second, when applying for asylum, according to UNHCR, the asylum 
seeker should enjoy minimal protection in the member state, protection that 
comes from its international obligations. Yet, the findings from the interviews 
suggest that there are pragmatic limitations to this. In addition, and for 
example then, according to the Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) report of 
2015, the UK’s integration policy introduced by the (then) coalition 
Government made access to citizenship more restricted, as well as on anti-
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discrimination, family reunion, migrant workers’ rights and the education of 
migrant children matters. Together, these factors lead to asylum seekers 
experiencing exclusion, inequalities of access to services and marginalisation. 
Third, there are often extremely stringent rules which only allow asylum 
seekers to work in specific circumstances and in practice, prevent them from 
working. This concern was cited in several of the interviews as a major 
‘bottom-up’ concern that restricted the ability of refugees to engage in better 
local integration. Various respondents in the interviews noted that asylum 
seekers were dependent on the state and cannot make a positive financial 
contribution. In addition, interviewees highlighted that high levels of exclusion, 
unemployment and underemployment among refugees can result in them 
feeling even more socially marginalised (40 per cent). 
 
6.6. Linkage to conceptual models 
Using a social constructivist perspective the findings suggest that it is 
important to recognise that refugees seek to selectively choose compatible 
identities and affinities from the ‘bottom-up’ that can avoid stigma, and build 
synergies with local communities as part of demonstrating their value-added 
and self-reliance and resilience. In this way they are engaged in practical 
norm selection to enhance their agency and even have the potential when 
such dialogue with UNHCR was to improve to upload norm diffusion upwards 
from the ‘bottom-up.’ 
The interviews confirm that refugees are exercising their political 
agency in response to the highly complex circumstances with little to no 
support or legitimacy. The interviewees in this study were additionally 
concerned with the growing ‘stigmatisation’ of asylum seekers and refugees. 
This notion of asylum seekers as the ‘Other’ and as a threat to the economy 
has been discussed in the above section. 
The liminality associated with ‘top-down’ policies determined by 
international and nation state agendas is illustrated by the failure to consider 
and support the refugee/asylum seeker's process in securing protection from 
their subjective, vulnerable standpoint. The constraints to the articulation of a 
refugee identity which contains empowerment and agency are several. 
International norms and institutions, which could support the national 
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discourse to include human rights in refugee protection measures and 
promote multiculturalism. 
A central theme which emerges in both literature and the interviews 
concerns the limited degree of autonomy asylum seekers have access to in 
reporting victimisation and seeking validation through asylum with the aim to 
seek a safe context in a host society. In this sense, asylum seekers are 
confined to a liminal zone that is a result of the conditions and uncertainty in 
the forced migration process, they lack agency and autonomy to decide their 
immigration process, and maximise their sense of security and self-worth. 
 ‘Top-down’ approaches border on social engineering. Therefore, 
labelling refugees is an ideological practice which not only dilutes the 
complexity of single refugee realities but constructs their social reality. 
Constructive dialogue between UNHCR, the state and refugees on asylum 
and integration would allow the different phases of the resettlement process to 
be tackled and lead to refugee self-reliance and fulfilment of those human 
rights that they expect to enjoy as beneficiaries of protection. Their capacity 
and self-reliance to acquire housing and social skills would be strengthened 
by bringing together all top-down and local actors cooperating closely with 
refugees, who have evaluated the offer and accepted it prior to the relocation. 
In a theoretical sense, action has been historically conceptualised as a 
linear process in which an actor exerts appropriate means in order to attain a 
specific end. This formulation tends to normalise the linearity of action, which 
consequently overlooks other types of actions in which a clear end was not 
preconceived, multiple ends were considered simultaneously, or even if the 
main focus of an end was to be later modified into a mean to achieve a future 
end. 
Regardless of efforts to secure their ends, asylum seekers experience 
uncertainty in the process that makes them unsure as to whether they will 
achieve status or not. The process is broken into stages, which serve 
simultaneously as hurdles to be overcome in order to progress to the next 
stage. 
 
 
 207 
6.7. Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter offer a number of important observations 
informing this study in relation to local integration. First, while UNHCR’s ‘top-
down’ policy framework assumed that the asylum seeker has access to 
resources and knowledge to exert agency, there were notable limitations on 
this in practice. Second, overall, the results suggest that, the agency of the 
asylum seeker is not valued and/or validated sufficiently by the larger system 
and often ignored. With this in mind then, it is important to focus observations 
on findings on local integration and asylum in relation to the three research 
questions of this study. 
 
1) To what extent are UNHCR’s durable solutions in relation to local 
integration and asylum are successfully accomplished? 
The findings from the interviews suggest the following misalignment 
between ‘top-down’ policy and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees. First, the 
findings show that while the ‘top-down’ policy-makers increasingly recognise 
the need to engage with refugees, the reality is that it is constrained by 
prioritising ‘top-down’ politics and there is some confusion on how to handle 
any greater focus on understanding refugees as individuals with ‘bottom-up’ 
preferences and identity formation of their own. 
Second, the findings suggest that there are particular issues relating to 
local integration that help to define the ‘bottom-up’ identities of refugees and 
are regarded by them as criteria shaping local integration – these include for 
example, housing, employment rights, community support and qualifications. 
Primary research confirms that asylum seekers face a plenitude of 
insecurities and lack of resources that contribute to their vulnerability. The 
overwhelming issue, from the ‘bottom-up’ perspective, is that international 
policy and its enforcers neglect to acknowledge the coerced conditions that 
refugees and asylum seekers’ experience, and the difficulties they encounter 
as they exercise agency from a coerced, traumatised, and liminal space. The 
interviews confirm that there is uncertainty with regard to the outcome of the 
asylum process, specifically whether an individual is approved or denied 
status, and this a prevalent and continuous aspect of stress for asylum 
seekers. 
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The constant exposure to risk requires asylum seekers to continuously 
overcome obstacles. Bogus asylum seeker is a rhetorical category that is not 
established in international frameworks and yet is referred to in state 
discourse and in policy documents which were surveyed in this study. This is 
a serious example of misalignment. First, while the putative goal of policy-
making has been to square asylum for genuine refugees with the prevention 
of ‘bogus’ or unfounded asylum applications, restrictive policies have often 
operated with insufficient regard for the protection of those with valid refugee 
claims. The notion of the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker is a familiar refrain of the 
tabloids and many politicians, casting most refugees as fraudulent ‘economic 
migrants’. Labelling of asylum seekers reinforces the justifications for the 
current restrictive definition. 
Local integration combines three dimensions: legal, economic, and 
sociocultural. Host countries must be willing to grant legal rights (similar to the 
rights of nationals) to refugees seeking asylum, assist in measures for 
refugees to attain a standard of living comparable to the citizens belonging to 
the host country and enable refugees to live and contribute to the host 
community without fear of persecutions. As seen in the data from the 
interviews, this durable solution is strongly dependent on both the willingness 
and the availability of resources of the country of first asylum to host refugees. 
 
 
2) What is the perspective of key stakeholders? How much influence do 
refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both 
enabled and constrained by the structures? 
The primary interviews reveal that refugees oppose their 
misrepresentation as burdens, as less human, as entitled to less rights, as 
victims and reclaim dignity. They try to demonstrate that they are resourceful 
people who ‘do not want help for help’ but that want to be enabled to become 
self-reliant. The ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency is undoubtedly 
one of the cornerstones of the successful integration of recognised refugees 
in their host country. Beyond purely financial benefits, employment plays a 
key role in furthering the social integration process of refugees by improving 
their language skills, encouraging the formation of friendships and 
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professional contacts with the host population, and generally helping them 
gain acceptance by their local communities. 
The findings show that key issue of concern for asylum seekers and 
refugees is effective protection and security. Refugees view their protection 
not only in terms of being free from random arrests and deportation but as 
being linked to the provision of basic human rights, such as access to 
education, work, housing, and health services. Protection also becomes 
meaningful in the context of being able to access rights, especially through 
citizenship. As people without the protection of their own country, refugees 
strive to find security and stability in their lives. 
The interviews confirm that refugees experience a sense of self-
reliance on their ability to obtain the necessary knowledge and resources 
needed to apply for asylum because they did not have access to social or 
legal assistance. The lack of resources contributes to barriers toward eligibility 
for asylum. Considering that the asylum system is organised in stages based 
on developing an application and defending the case in an interview, asylum 
seekers must actively seek resources, including knowledge and strategies in 
order to present a sound case with supporting evidence. 
There should be a genuine attempt to identify individual challenges 
rather than treat refugees as a monolithic category with the same needs 
which would contribute to self-sufficiency by highlighting refugees’ individual 
strengths and bolstering areas where they need assistance. 
 
3) What actions are needed to ensure a more effective and consistent 
achievement of local integration and asylum as a durable solution? How can 
UNHCR policies be adapted to enhance prospects for return of local 
integration and asylum. 
As, noted by one of the interviewees (UNHCR senior official): 
 
“We need] to think of durable solutions, as we say in our paperwork 
and our documents, but and we don’t necessarily apply in practice, that 
we have to recognise three durable solutions, and we have to realise 
the quality of those solutions and make sure they are implemented on 
the ground” (Interview 2). 
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A re-conceptualisation of agency is proposed in Chapter 2 in order to 
acknowledge the conditions in which marginalised actors do not have the 
autonomy or means to modify structural barriers. As a way to displace the 
means-end component of action in order to emphasise structural conditions, 
the conceptualisation of agency includes situations in which individuals 
become conscious of structural barriers and respond to them. For example, 
asylum seekers are required to successfully advance through the application 
and interview process in order to attain their end of asylee status. 
As illustrated with the case study, despite situations in which means 
are available to overcome barriers, effectiveness is not guaranteed. Asylum 
seekers as they navigate through the asylum system must negotiate 
uncertainty and the likelihood that their resources may be limited or that they 
will not succeed at various stages of the process. In this context, asylum 
seekers continuously respond to dilemmas in which they must implement 
strategies to further secure their ability to attain asylee status, however, fear 
and uncertainty make this process toward protection difficult to achieve. 
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CHAPTER 7: Returning and Structures of Repatriation 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Forced migration is one lens that allows us to think about the ways in 
which transnational processes and global asymmetries affect people’s lives. 
The solutions to forced displacement that are proposed and implemented are 
an example of the complexities of discourse and practice in refugee 
situations. For example, voluntary repatriation was by far the most widely 
advocated durable solution to forced migrations despite the fact that for some 
refugees, return can never be an option. 
Repatriation refers to refugees returning to their place of citizenship or 
origin after conflict or war. Repatriation can be voluntary or involuntary, where 
the government or international agencies step in and mandate direction for 
the refugees’ future, whereas refoulement is the expulsion or return of the 
refugees to a place where there is a threat to their freedoms. With 
refoulement, however, asylum must be present to preserve a secure and safe 
dwelling (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights, 2012). States may, however, try to justify the measures adopted, 
stressing the inapplicability of the rule to the specific occasions (asylum 
seekers who arrive by sea). 
The objectives of this chapter are to address the three research 
questions in relation to return of refugees: First, to what extent are UNHCR’s 
durable solutions in relation to return being successfully accomplished? 
Second, what is the perspective of key stakeholders and how much influence 
do refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both 
enabled and constrained by the structures? Third, what actions are needed to 
ensure a more effective and consistent achievement of return as a durable 
solution? How can UNHCR policies be adapted to enhance prospects for 
return of refugees? 
This chapter posits that it is necessary to recognise refugee returnees 
as active participants in that experience. According to the interview with 
UNHCR Protection Officer: 
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“We have to recognise the agency of the persons of concern. If they 
don’t want to return, we cannot force them to. And if the conditions, in their 
minds, are not conducive in all aspects – this doesn’t mean just housing – 
they are not going to stay in the places of return” (Interview 3).  
 
This interview as well as some recent UNHCR documents suggest that 
UNHCR recognises the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives: “Responses are most 
effective when they actively and meaningfully engage those they are intended 
to protect and assist” (UNHCR, Compact for Refugees, 2018, p.7). 
 
7.2. Normative preferences 
By the 1990s, the normative preference for ethnic homogenisation had 
begun to change, along with the international perception that such practice 
was unlawful, inhumane, and ultimately counter-productive to the bringing 
about of stability and democracy. The international community strongly 
condemned ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Cambodia, among others. 
Accordingly, international intervention in post-settlement societies 
focused much attention on returning refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes. Refugee policy was dominated by the idea that repatriation is the best 
and ‘most durable’ solution to refugee crises (Harrell-Bond, 1989). As the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted (UNHCR, 1997a, pp. 
159-164), return contributes to peacebuilding in four ways. First, return clearly 
signals that conflict has ended and a state is capable of protecting its citizens. 
Second, it legitimises the post-conflict political order by providing validation to 
subsequent elections and democratic processes. Third, return deprives 
political elites of the possibility to manipulate refugees politically and militarily 
to upset the newly established peace. Finally, the return of skilled workers 
could contribute to the economic recovery of war-torn economies and 
societies. 
While return to one’s country of origin is the cornerstone of 
international refugee policy, return home was never affirmed as a right before 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. The international community’s insistence that 
Bosnians return home, instead of simply returning to their country of origin, 
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was unprecedented (Rosand, 1998). For the first time in the history of 
migration, ‘home of origin’ was interpreted to mean the physical structure in 
which one lived before the war. Because often the ‘home of origin’ was under 
the control of an ethnic group other than the one to which the refugee 
belonged, return was inherently a difficult process involving individuals who 
have been improperly defined as ‘minorities’. International agencies affirmed 
the ‘right to return’ as a solution to the forces that promoted ethnic cleansing. 
A total of 400,000 persons are estimated to have returned in 1996 and 1997, 
though the number of returns in 1997 was 40 per cent lower than those in 
1996. In both years, 80 per cent of the returns were to the Federation rather 
than to the RS. In early 1998, 75 per cent of those forced to flee Bosnia 
remained abroad, and 85 per cent of those internally displaced were still 
unable to return to their place of origin (Office of War Crimes Prosecutor, 
1998). The actual number of individuals who went back after the war to areas 
controlled by an ethnic group other than their own might even be bigger. Many 
returnees in fact did not register or signal their presence. 
The overall success of international community policy led High 
Representative Ashdown to argue in late 2002 that the international 
community “invented a new human right here: the right to return after a war” 
(International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 39). This assertion represented a fairly 
new argument in international law and convention, which traditionally focused 
either on the right not to return, i.e. to stay in the country to which one fled 
during war, or on the right to return to the country but not necessarily to the 
region of one’s origin. Hence, the international community invented a different 
type of international norm and diffused it easily to migrants. 
This success demonstrates two important points, one concerning 
Bosnian social reality, and the other concerning the international community. 
First, large-scale return is a disclaimer of the notion that the different Bosnian 
groups will never be able to live together again. It also falsified the claim that 
“[m]any Serbs, Muslims, and Croats expressed the desire to stay elsewhere 
rather than return to their homes after the war” (Chandler, 1999, p. 105). 
Instead, when given a choice, Bosnians of all ethnic groups took the 
opportunity to return, instead of relocating. Overall, this development shows 
that the sceptics’ unwillingness to allow for the possibility that Bosnia can 
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survive as a multinational state needs to be carefully scrutinised. Second, the 
international community has endorsed a substantive notion of ‘peace’ and 
‘peacebuilding’ which includes notions of human rights protection. Instead of 
surrendering to the forces promoting segregation and the consolidation of 
ethnic cleansing, the international community invested substantial resources 
and credibility in reversing the war’s outcome and restoring at least some 
degree of national diversity. 
 
7.3. Dayton Peace Agreement 
The fate of Bosnian refugees and displaced persons was made a 
central part of the agreement that terminated the war. Annex 7 of the DPA is 
entirely devoted to the process of return. As chapter 1, article 1 reads: 
 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to 
their home of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored 
to them.  
 
A number of other articles within the Annex emphasise the right of 
refugees and displaced people to return under conditions of safety and dignity 
to their home of origin. The parties to the peace agreement had to ensure the 
presence of the necessary conditions for this to happen. Consistently with the 
aim to restore peace and stability by reversing the effects of ethnic cleansing, 
no part of the peace agreement foresaw explicitly the possibility of relocation. 
At the time of the signing of the DPA, Bosnia’s per capita GDP was 
less than US$500 (about 20 per cent of its pre-war level), while 
unemployment had reached 80 per cent (European Commission & World 
Bank, 1999, p. vi). Developed world nations invested to stabilise the region 
and prevent renewed fighting or instability. Evidence from several post-conflict 
situations confirms that the lack of return and the resettlement of refugees in 
third countries are most closely associated with the preservation of peace. 
According to Howard Adelman (2002, p. 290), “in many civil wars there may 
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be an inverse correlation between refugee repatriation and the successful 
implementation of a peace agreement, defined as the cessation of violence.” 
The definition of peace as “absence of violence” is an important caveat 
in Adelman’s analysis. While the resettlement of Bosnian refugees could have 
helped to maintain the “cessation of violence” and alleviate the economic and 
housing problems of post-war Bosnia, it also would have meant 
acknowledging the outcome of ethnic cleansing.26 Thus it would have run 
contrary to the stated ‘top-down’ goals that the international community set for 
itself at Dayton. For this reason, the DPA included a ‘right to return,’ despite 
the predictable difficulties in implementing and enforcing such right. 
 
7.4. Forced Repatriation 
While UNHCR’s official ‘top-down’ view remained that return provides 
concrete political, economic, and social benefits for the country undergoing 
the post-war transition, European states often have different reasons to seek 
return. Germany has always been concerned about the welfare costs of 
maintaining a sizeable refugee population. Accordingly, soon after the signing 
of the DPA, Germany placed considerable pressure on UNCHR to devise a 
repatriation plan. Such plan foresaw the lifting of temporary protection and the 
return of refugees on the basis of the fulfilment of specific benchmarks, 
including the implementation of the military provisions of the DPA, the 
proclamation of an amnesty for crimes other than serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, and the establishment and effective 
functioning of mechanisms for human rights protection (Bagshaw, 1997). It is 
notable that the plan largely created ‘top-down’ benchmarks and criteria 
determining the lifting of temporary protection and the return of refugees. 
There is little evidence then of norm diffusion from the views of ‘bottom-up’ 
refugees helping to shape these ‘top-down’ benchmarks. While ‘top-down’ 
reforms were underway, options could have been explored to support 
community involvement in these processes, through consultation of local 
people and grassroots advocacy, as well as direct international intervention 
                                                             
26 For example, Žižek (2008) distinguishes subjective violence from its objective counterpoint. 
Subjective violence is the perceptibly obvious violence seen on the news or on the streets, 
whereas objective violence is the unseen form of violence that takes the form of either the 
symbolic or the systemic. 
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aimed at raising government awareness of the specific protection concerns 
held by repatriates. 
These ‘top-down’ benchmarks were broadly consistent with provisions 
in the DPA concerning refugees and IDPs. However, no one had the illusion 
that refugees could return to those areas where previously they had been 
expelled because they belonged to the ‘wrong’ ethnic group. The ‘top-down’ 
decision of the German government to begin mandatory repatriation of 
Bosnian refugees as of 1 October 1996, including the repatriation of those 
“who presently cannot return to their areas of origin,” thus contravened the 
principle of safe return to the pre-war home declared in the DPA and 
increased the problem of internal displacement. Between 1996 and 1998, 
about 150,000 refugees returned under pressure from Germany, possibly 
violating the principle of non-refoulement, and demonstrating little concern for 
the ‘bottom-up’ views of refugees themselves. The process continued 
between 1998 and 2000 with the repatriation of the few remaining Bosnians 
(about 3,400) still in Germany. The return to internal displacement was 
protested by many human rights organisations that believed that at least the 
third benchmark – the presence of “mechanisms for human rights protection” 
– had not been fulfilled. Swiss foreign minister and then OSCE chairperson 
Flavio Cotti took the same point further and openly linked repatriation to 
complicity with ethnic cleansing: “Forcible repatriating people to an area that 
is not where they come from in a region where they make up the ethnic 
majority means actively supporting ethnic cleansing and contradicting Dayton, 
UNHCR and the community of nations.”27 
It is unclear whether the German decision to repatriate Bosnian 
refugees was illegal.28 On the one hand, the 1951 Refugee Convention does 
not require that refugees be granted permanent admission to a new political 
community. If such admission were granted, it would undermine immigration 
controls and, as a consequence, would reinforce the reluctance of host states 
                                                             
27 Reuters, “Swiss stick to plan to repatriate Bosnian refugees,” 9 June 1997. In early 1998, 
even the Council of Europe called on member states to “refrain from forced repatriation of 
refugees originating from minority areas in order to avoid further destabilization of the ethnic 
composition of the country”; Recommendation 1357 of the Council of Europe, adopted 29 
January 1998 (cited in ICG, 1999c, p. 7) 
28 For competing interpretations, see Andersen (1996); Bagshaw (1997); Hathaway (1997). 
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to accept refugees during future crises. Moreover, the protection granted to 
Bosnian refugees during the war was explicitly ‘temporary’. On the other 
hand, the Convention maintains that refugees should be granted protection 
against refoulement, whereby an individual cannot be forced to return to a 
potentially dangerous situation in their country of origin. In this way, it can be 
argued that the ‘bottom-up’ views of refugees should at least be taken into 
consideration (see later).  
First, as UNHCR argues, instead of contributing to economic 
development, repatriation aggravated the difficult post-war economic situation. 
The post-war repatriation from Germany cut one of the most important 
sources of income for many Bosnian families (Black, 2001). Moreover, it 
placed an enormous strain on the scarce housing stock, a challenge that 
international agencies were not ready to face. UNHCR estimated that 50,000-
60,000 houses were needed if the return of 200,000 refugees was expected. 
However, according to then High Representative Carl Bildt (1998), the World 
Bank had not given priority to this area of intervention, probably because its 
major members were not so inclined. As Bildt recalled with frustration and 
disappointment, the US congressional committee decided that taxpayers’ 
money could not be used to build houses in “remote European countries” 
(Bildt, 1998, p. 315). 
Second, in addition to the economic and housing situation, the 
repatriation of Bosnians further contributed to the ethnic homogenisation of 
the country. Local politicians both resisted minority return and attempted to 
consolidate their political power by attracting additional individuals from their 
own ethnic group to the municipality they controlled. A few of those returnees 
who ventured to areas under the control of another ethnic group did so at 
great personal danger. In the first few months following the signing of the 
DPA, the homes of returnees in the Republika Srpska had been mined to 
expressly prevent their return (ICG, 1996). In the Federation too, the return of 
minorities has not always been welcome. In a much-publicised case, Croats 
destroyed Bosnian Serb homes near Drvar on 2-3 May 1997 when 25 houses 
were burnt (ICG, 1997b). 
Whether the returnees were Bosniak, Serb, or Croat, international 
authorities did little to facilitate the return home. The High Representative 
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believed that minority return could have been politically de-stabilising, and 
therefore was not ready to make it a central part of peacebuilding. NATO 
troops insisted that they had no mandate to assist returnees to go home and 
ensure their safety (ICG, 1998b; Black, 2001). Because of the lack of housing, 
many of those repatriated were accommodated in so-called Collective 
Centres: temporary accommodation that soon turned into long-term 
shelters.29 
In sum, the forced repatriation of Bosnian refugees had a considerably 
negative impact on the reintegration of Bosnia into a multi-ethnic polity. By 
repatriating refugees when it was not yet possible for them to safely and freely 
return to their home of origin, host states contributed to the problem they were 
attempting to resolve: that is, the reversal of ethnic cleansing and the 
promotion of a multi-ethnic society. As UNHCR argued, the prospects for 
reintegration of the country along multi-ethnic and multinational lines were 
severely undermined. 
Moreover, the increase in internally displaced persons created a 
socially and politically explosive situation. The lack of a durable solution to the 
problem of displaced persons was a problem that affected the deepening of 
peace processes worldwide. When there is no solution to the plight of 
refugees, there is a possibility that they can develop into ‘refugee warriors’ 
resorting to violence against their former enemies and the government that 
keeps them in exile (Adelman, 1998; Lischer, 2003). The classic example is 
that of the Palestinian refugees who were expelled to neighbouring countries 
following the creation of Israel and the 1948 war. Over time, these long-term 
refugees, with no hope for return until radical political changes take place, 
became increasingly prone to violence. 
The presence of displaced persons with no durable solution increased 
the possibility that they could develop into a new army at the disposal of 
Bosniak leaders dissatisfied with the territorial settlement established at 
Dayton. Many thousands of those repatriated settled in Sanski Most, where its 
mayor and former Bosnian Army General Alagic strongly supported the 
                                                             
29 UNHCR, Collective Centres Reports, Sarajevo, August 2001. 
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settlement of returnees in order to consolidate its own political power as well 
as the military victory that allowed retaking the town from the Bosnian Serbs 
at the end of the war. By mid-1997, about 40,000 refugees moved to Sanski 
Most, raising the total population to the pre-war level of 61,000. Living in bad 
conditions, these displaced persons constituted a menacing presence just 
across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, only a few miles away from their town 
of origin – Prijedor (Heimerl, 2005). 
Another international attempt at return was a series of so-called ‘Pilot 
Projects,’ aimed at four Federation towns which had effectively exchanged 
residents during the war as their ethnic compositions shifted. The goal was to 
ensure that residents of two Muslim-controlled and two Croat-controlled towns 
could return to their pre-war homes, thus freeing up a home in another town 
for its pre-war resident. By the end of 1997, some returns had occurred in 
three of the four towns, but the leaders and residents of the fourth, Bosnian 
Croat-controlled Stolac, resisted all Bosniak attempts to return (US Committee 
for Refugees, 1998). 
The magnitude of the problem led international agencies to pursue a 
two-fold strategy. First, reversing the earlier approach, they placed the issue 
of minority return at the centre of the peace process. By mid-1999, minority 
return had become the “cornerstone of official policy” (Black, 2001, p. 182) 
and thus a key agreed international norm complemented ‘top-down’ approach 
through policies. International economic assistance became increasingly tied 
to local politicians’ cooperation (Rosand, 1998; Phuong, 2000). Second, they 
began considering alternatives to returning home: that is, the possibility of 
relocating those who had lost their houses. UNHCR distinguished between 
different types of relocations and approved of one. ‘Voluntary relocation’ 
occurs with the consent of both the individual who is relocating to a new 
property and the original owner of that property. 
The problem with this approach relates to the lack of employment and 
thus sustainable livelihoods (See Chapter 6).30 The problem of sustainability 
                                                             
30 The empirical results presented in the previous chapter highlight how important 
perceptions of the autonomy and sustainability of displaced persons are to refugees. Thus, 
my interview set adds greater credibility to this particular observation. 
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of return raises difficult questions about the quality of life of those who took 
the difficult decision to go back to live next door to former enemies. 
So this analysis further highlights a number of issues. First, the 
difficulty of implementation of reparation policy in the Bosnian case. Second, 
that the case of repatriation even at the ‘top-down’ level is not straightforward. 
Third, that this could potentially be a very complex issue to development at 
the ‘bottom-up’ level. As one UNHCR official noted:  
 
“We have significant proportion of returns (…) UNHCR in 2004 
celebrated one million returned but if we look on the ground in terms of how 
many of those people we had seen returned are actually still in the areas of 
return, it is a very low percentage. So the issue of sustainable returns remains 
complex” (Interview 3). 
 
7.5. Durable Solution: Returning 
Many authors have claimed that internationally led efforts in post-
conflict states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina were absolutely necessary in 
order to lay the groundwork for peace and a pathway towards reconstruction 
and progress. 
 
The core objective of a transitional administration is to facilitate the 
reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and create sustainable 
political and economic institutions that in some cases are needed to 
accommodate and support a politically fragile multi-ethnic society, as is 
the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ohanyan, 2002, p. 397). 
 
Indeed, it is important to note that repatriation requires ‘top-down’ 
support for numerous reasons. First, international support for return requires 
attention to a broad range of activities; sustainable return depends on the 
provision of security, economic opportunity, and a functioning legal sector that 
includes, crucially, a functioning system of property law. All such 
peacebuilding interventions require well-developed implementation structures 
and responsive outreach capacities, which most international public 
institutions lack. This has especially been the case in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, where many of the societal institutions have been modelled 
around a modern neoliberal, free market system, but have not been 
successful, or have failed either due to the implementation on the ground, 
corruption or political deadlock. Similarly, Western invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan caused the conditions that prevented their economies, social 
standards, and governance from improving. 
Second, the economic transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
especially difficult. The problem in Bosnia was that there was not only a 
transition from a command economy to a neoliberal economic model but the 
transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy also had to take 
place. The West tried to instil open market, laissez faire values consistent with 
the modern global trend of neoliberalism, but this was successful, in good part 
because of the political reality on the ground. Nikolaos Tzifakis (2012, p. 131), 
author of Bosnia’s Slow Europeanization, writes: “The Dayton Accords 
succeeded in ending the war, but proved inadequate in building peace.” 
Third, the war destroyed vast swathes of roads, schools, universities, 
hospitals and clinics, along with other important infrastructure in the country. 
Even though the international community has done a good job of rebuilding 
infrastructure and the physical aspects of the state following the war, the 
economic recovery as well as the availability of emergency services and 
health care have decreased (Simunovic, 2007). A UNHC official (Interview 3) 
interviewed for the present study said: 
 
 “if we had involved beneficiaries at the very early stage then we could 
have had much more realistic programmes in place (…) some of them are so 
vulnerable that it is almost impossible to assist them. It’s been twenty years 
and individuals who are still in alternative accommodation or collective 
centres, for example, are the most vulnerable of the vulnerable. Finding a 
durable solution for them is extremely hard because they face mental health 
issues: these are elderly persons, so what kind of solution can we provide? 
They can’t work anymore.”  
 
This view confirms the challenging environment for returnees and 
therefore, the ‘bottom-up’ views of returnees should be taken into account. 
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Fourth, a particular aspect that could hinder refugees’ return is the 
state of education. After the war, the country was roughly divided along ethnic 
lines in terms of percentages of the population, with the Bosniak majority 
numbering 48 per cent, followed by the Serbs at 37 per cent and the Croats at 
14 per cent. Division was notable – not just in terms of the percentages of the 
population – but also within the actual system along political lines, both on the 
local level and on the national, entity level. Perhaps most shockingly, the 
education system was also divided along the same ethnic lines, with no 
central curriculum and common core across the country. “Separation between 
ethnicities has also extended into the education system. Schooling is 
characterised by monoethnic classrooms, segregated schools, opposing 
pedagogies, and an absence of a common curriculum” (Hill, 2011, p. 156). 
From the ‘top-down’ perspective, UNHCR undertook several initiatives 
to induce local authorities to accept minority returnees. It instituted the ‘Open 
Cities’ initiative, where cities fulfilling certain criteria would receive additional 
financial assistance from the international community. This initiative reversed 
the earlier policy by using positive instead of negative incentives as a form of 
aid conditionality.31  
The first ‘Open City’, Konjic in southern Bosnia, was recognised in July 
1997, and eleven other localities had joined it by spring 1998. As a whole, 
however, these initiatives and hopes failed to deliver the expected results. 
During Dodik’s tenure, there were only 3,700 minority returns to the RS. 
However, the programme began to show flaws fairly soon after its inception. 
Konjic, which received one quarter of all funds committed to the Open Cities 
programme, accounted for only 12 per cent of all minority returns in the 
programme. The high-profile declarations of Sarajevo and Banja Luka were 
also largely not implemented. Only 4,400 minorities came back to Sarajevo in 
1998, and a negligible number returned to Banja Luka (Slatina, 1999; World 
Bank, 2002). 
An appraisal of the programme conducted one year after its inception 
indicated that UNHCR had little control over how the money given to a locality 
was spent, and did not escape the narrow focus of international aid in general 
                                                             
31 In general, however, donors were very inconsistent in terms of the political conditionality 
they applied to aid. 
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on the reconstruction of physical damage instead of larger economic and 
social issues: “UNHCR invested 1.2 million DM to finish construction work on 
an apartment building to be used as "buffer" accommodation, only later to 
discover that the municipality had already sold the rights to 14 of the 85 
apartments before the war.” (ICG, 1998, p. 19). In Konjic, for example, an 
unemployment rate above 50 per cent is a major deterrent for potential 
returnees, but the Open Cities programme made no plans to allocate funds to 
job creation projects from the considerable sums spent on housing 
reconstruction (ICG, 1998). 
There were success stories too. UNHCR was also actively involved in 
the closure of collective centres and in providing alternative accommodation 
for their residents. Between 1999 and the end of 2005, UNHCR and its 
partners managed to close 93 collective centres (a decrease from 108 to 15), 
reducing their population to 1,200, and constructed or repaired houses (also 
in cooperation with SDC) for a total of 1,880 beneficiaries, most of whom were 
from the collective centres. 
In the few cases where return occurred, it was made possible by two 
indispensable ‘ingredients’: the active presence of NATO troops, and the 
initiative of organised displaced groups. The most significant of these cases 
was that of the return to Prijedor, a municipality that was never recognised as 
an ‘Open City’ because of the local politicians’ obstruction to minority return. 
Yet, today, international peacebuilders almost unanimously pinpoint this 
region to highlight the achievements of peacebuilding. The 1997 arrest of 
indicted war criminals and the removal of police officers involved in wartime 
atrocities had a profound impact. Potential returnees felt enough security to 
begin to take seriously the possibility of returning. They began the type of 
return that came to be known as ‘spontaneous’: that is, return that was made 
possible because of the determination of the displaced people, rather than the 
planning and direction of international organisations. “The lesson is clear: the 
removal of suspects indicted for war crimes, who are symbols of impunity and 
are among the most obstructionist, has a ripple effect that can fundamentally 
alter the disposition of an area towards DPA implementation” (ICG, 1998b, p. 
39). 
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This has important implications for the role of the military in 
peacebuilding. At Dayton, the military refused to take over responsibility for 
enforcing the peace agreement, while accepting the authority to do so. The 
example of Prijedor demonstrates that a more active military is important to 
ensure the implementation of the agreement and does not necessarily lead to 
a dangerous environment for international peacebuilders. Instead, NATO 
troops continued to arrest on a case-by-case basis that has led to the 
apprehension of so far only a very limited number of indicted war criminals. 
Instead of learning the lesson of Prijedor – that the removal of 
suspected war criminals alters the disposition of an area toward the 
implementation of the DPA and the chances of return – international agencies 
responded in the following ways. 
First, oddly, they blamed the returnees for going back home which 
illustrates the case of negative impact of norm diffusion. The sporadic 
violence that resulted from return was thus blamed on the returnees and on 
those who encouraged them to return ‘too rapidly’, instead of on the 
perpetrators. According to a former UNHCR official working in the Prijedor 
area, Bosniak IDPs and their leaders “pressed ahead with an agenda of return 
without consideration of the safety of potential returnees” (Ito, 2001, pp. 35). 
Second, the point below illustrates the case of the amendment to norm 
diffusion. International agencies changed in part the principle guiding return 
with the creation of the ‘Regional Return Task Force’ (RRTF). The RRTF’s 
strategy was based on the assumption that potential returnees should 
determine the locations that would become return sites, as opposed to the 
earlier internationally driven efforts, which did not rely on input from the 
potential returnees themselves. Reversing the traditional ‘top-down’ 
peacebuilding approach, the RRTF’s main innovation was the decision that 
international activities should follow the flow of displaced persons, instead of 
requiring displaced persons to follow the flow of international activities.  
Third, while this was an important change in the international approach 
in the short term, however, it had little impact. At the end of 1999, after four 
years without conflict, approximately 830,000 persons were still considered 
internally displaced (Cousens and Cater, 2001). It is important to note that the 
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above point illustrates the lack of ‘top-down’ norm effectiveness as it did not 
enabled ‘bottom-up’ displaced people in practice. 
 
7.6. Findings in Relation to Returning 
This section presents the findings from the interviews with refugees in 
relation to returning. They should also be placed in the context of findings 
drawn from key documents concerning minority returns. By 2008, more than 
one million former refugees and IDPs were reported to have returned to their 
pre-war homes. These returns included a significant 467,297 in minority 
returns (UNHCR statistical summary, as at 31 December, 2008). The political 
motives behind the promotion of return in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not to 
take away from a key reason why return is a sought after ‘durable solution’: it 
is often the refugee’s or displaced person’s profound wish to return home. The 
problem with this context, however, is that ‘home’ (discussed by several 
interviewees) as remembered by refugees and displaced persons no longer 
exists. Return is not a genuine durable solution if the conditions to make it 
sustainable are absent: 
 
“Governments are not prepared to look at things through those kind of 
wide-eyes (…) governments are refusing to allow those returnees to 
access lands, etc. Because we have a humanitarian mandate towards 
those people, we continue to provide them with support. It kind of 
creates disincentive for governments to play an active role. They 
[governments] see that we [UNHCR] will support displaced people 
anyway.” (Interview 2). 
 
And as confirmed by the interview with the refugee: 
 
“We didn’t receive any help. The international community gives money 
to UNHCR. UNHCR gives money to another international organisation. 
That organisation gives money to NGO. In the end, nothing comes to 
the beneficiaries” (Respondent 5). 
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Such behaviour prevented the cascading and internalisation of the 
norm into legislation, institutional practices and the wider domestic social and 
political order. 
When it comes to return, then, the findings from the interviews confirm 
a central focus of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees that again focuses on 
issues of housing and sustainable livelihoods (See Chapter 6). In most 
countries recovering from internal conflict, the most pressing property issues 
tend to be those relating to daily use of housing and land. Conflict leads not 
only to the destruction of housing and other buildings but also to the 
destruction of property records and consensual means of reaching decisions 
in cases of dispute. The key to allowing the return process to gain momentum 
was securing individual property rights. Yet, the interviews also suggested 
that ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on property rights were linked to identity. 
Refugees’ perspectives were not simply defined by the return of property and 
property rights since in practice this was not that easy. ‘Bottom-up’ 
perspective of refugees is not just about returning to their country but to the 
“land of their homes” – so property rights is seen as confirming their “return 
home”. As Respondent 5 commented: 
  
“Yes, I've retrieved my land, but the rest was burned down. The 
process was very difficult; many problems were there and it took very 
long. Eventually I retrieved it.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Indeed, the complexity of the situation was not helped by the fact that 
during the war, all three communities tried to solidify their exclusionist 
territorial gains by promulgating property laws aimed at accommodating the 
large numbers of DPs belonging to their respective ethnic groups 
(Respondent 5). At the end of the war, the property regime made minority 
return practically impossible (Waters, 1999). The DPA attempted to create the 
conditions necessary for reversing this state of affairs by upholding property 
rights. Annex 7 foresaw the need to address the immensely complicated issue 
of establishing legal ownership of property, making provision for the 
establishment of a Committee on Real Property Claims (CRPC). 
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The new agency consisted of international and local legal experts who 
would receive applications from pre-war property owners who had lost their 
property during the war and make decisions on the final status of the land or 
home in question. Enforcement of the committee’s decisions, however, was 
left to state and local authorities, which effectively meant that Dayton did not 
provide any means for the execution of decisions. Additionally, from the start, 
the CPRC lacked the necessary funds and personnel to meet the numbers of 
applications it received (Cousens and Cater, 2001). The Dayton Accords also 
called for the creation of a Property Fund to compensate pre-war property 
owners in cases where property could not be reclaimed after the war. The 
fund, whose operation was assigned to the Commission for Displaced 
Persons and Refugees, was to be financed from donations from the parties to 
the Accord and by the sale of real property. The fund was never created, 
however, as international interest was insufficient to balance the opposition of 
local authorities to any measure which would facilitate return (ICG, 2002). 
Indeed, while none of the respondents in the interviews were able to 
cite specifics, 60 per cent of respondents remained concerned over the 
complexity of new property laws and international support for property 
repossession. After all, property repossession had been part of the 
international community’s policy since 1998, when the promulgation of new 
property laws, first in the Federation and subsequently in the RS, restored 
some legal certainty and cleared many obstacles for returnees to reclaim their 
property. In 1999, the High Representative intervened to harmonise these 
laws, imposing a package of property-related laws to create the long-delayed 
legal framework to ease return and to reinforce “the duty of the authorities at 
all levels... to actively implement their [citizens’] rights to their homes and 
property” (OHR, 27 October 1999). By 1999, a reasonably clear procedure 
was in place to make it more difficult for local housing offices to ignore 
requests for repossession and the need to evict occupants who would not 
leave voluntarily. The decision of the High Representative to remove 22 local 
officials in late 1999 was explicitly justified by their obstruction to return. The 
creation of the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) decisively 
contributed to the process. The PLIP abandoned conditionalities and positive 
discrimination in favour of the principle that the same pressures, demands 
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and expectations must be applied to all of the officials and municipalities of 
BiH (UNHCR, 2000). Despite some resistance and delays, PLIP statistics 
indicate that the process of enforcing the property laws is irreversible. 
Several interviews highlighted how implementation would be 
complicated by cases of ‘double’ or ‘multiple’ occupancy. Multiple occupants 
were defined by their ability to otherwise meet their housing needs (by virtue 
of income, access to housing elsewhere, etc). The enforcement of the new 
property laws focused on these cases. The international community 
encouraged local housing authorities to focus all of their resources on acting 
on allegations of multiple occupancy. 
The cost of this strategy became clear in the cases of temporary 
occupants who could not meet their own housing needs and were therefore 
entitled to look to the authorities for alternative accommodation. In practice, 
this meant that temporary occupants with a right to alternative 
accommodation were effectively given an open-ended right to live in other 
people’s claimed property. Compounding this problem was the housing 
authorities’ discretion over the order of processing all cases, inviting both 
bribery and pressure not to act against politically protected cases. On 4 
December 2001, amendments were imposed on the property laws making 
chronological processing an explicit legal obligation binding on housing 
authorities. This principle was tested in Prijedor before it became law in 
December 2001. In this municipality, as the evictions began, there was no 
negative public reaction. Four families evicted without alternative 
accommodation moved in with friends and families. Monthly evictions rose 
from 32 in August to 121 in November. A high number of temporary 
occupants voluntarily handed over the properties they had occupied, instead 
of waiting to be evicted. 
The success of this policy demonstrates three important points about 
displacement and peacebuilding. First, the key actors in making return 
happen are the displaced persons themselves and their longing to go ‘home’. 
The interviews with both refugees and those who decided to go back to their 
own country confirmed this sentiment: 
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“We all longed to go home. People came back despite everything 
because it’s still their home. I saw people travelling once a month from 
Germany or Austria and they were rebuilding their houses” 
(Respondent 5). 
 
Second, return became successful when it was no longer explicitly 
linked to minority issues but to the respect of the rule of law. This is illustrated 
by the focus of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on property rights. The standardised 
and law-based approach gradually decreased the influence of partisan politics 
and allowed the displaced population to go back to the places from which it 
had been expelled. Third, despite the international rhetoric about ownership 
and capacity building, some decisions simply have to be imposed. This 
problem creates a true dilemma for peace builders. On the one hand, the lack 
of resolve in trying to remove obstructions might be interpreted as acceptance 
of warlords, criminals, and corrupted political entrepreneurs. It might delay the 
implementation of the more difficult aspects of the DPA and threaten the 
viability of the Bosnian state. On the other hand, too much involvement is 
contrary to the principle of ownership of the peace process and hinders, rather 
than fosters, the building of sustainable local capacities. 
The logic of the ‘security dilemma’ suggests that a situation of inter-
mixed populations, in a context of recurrent ethnic animosity, is potentially 
explosive. This was confirmed in a particular interview with a returnee when 
discussing the conditions at home: 
 
“Hard. There's discrimination all around me. Rights are at the lowest for 
us. Before the war the security, wellness and welfare were much, much 
higher than today in Bosnia.” (Respondent 6) 
 
For all of the interviewees (100 per cent) the prevailing ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective detected related to the view that returning was not fair or even 
just. Rather, all of the interviewees agreed that it tended to reinforce 
discrimination and ethnic animosity in Bosnian society. Therefore, from the 
returnees’ perspective, return was not seen as a durable solution – differing 
substantially – from UNHCR’s ‘top-down’ policy where returning was a 
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durable solution. As Chaim Kaufmann (1999, pp. 222-3) most famously 
argued, 
 
[t]he intensity of this security dilemma is in part a function of 
demography: the more intermixed the patterns of settlement of the 
hostile populations, the greater the opportunity for offense by either 
side, and it becomes more difficult to design effective measures for 
community defence except by going on the offensive pre-emptively to 
‘cleanse’ mixed areas of member s of the enemy group and create 
ethnically reliable, defensible enclaves. 
 
The policy choices deriving from this analysis are obvious: “the 
international community should endorse separation for at least some 
communal conflicts.” For Kaufmann, Bosnia is one of them. 
Andrew Slack and Roy Doyon (2001) studied demographic changes in 
Bosnia at the level of the local municipality prior to the outbreak of war. 
Focusing on the relative balance between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, they 
showed how the demographic position of the Bosnian Serbs has ‘declined 
dramatically’ in over 90 per cent of the municipality throughout the country 
during the 1970s and 1980s. These population trends are correlated to ethnic 
competition between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, and even to the 
geographic pattern of the propensity for violence. For most of their recent 
history, the different Bosnian ethnic communities were not distributed 
uniformly on the Bosnian territory. In most cases, the level of “mixing” was 
such that no one community was in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis the other 
ones. 
Another precondition to successful repatriation is reconciliation. Hayner 
suggests that reconciliation is the strength of truth commissions, as they 
promote a negotiated transition towards peace by redressing “past silenced or 
highly conflictive events” (2011, p. 182). Findings from interviews show that 
reconciliation was regarded as a key feature of successful returning among 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of migrants. This respondent underscored that 
reconciliation was an important consideration and meant – from a ‘bottom-up’ 
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perspective – daily living in peace and harmony with everyone else in her 
country: 
 
“Reconciliation means forgetting and looking into…what is it that I want 
to achieve, what do I want my country to achieve. I want my country to 
achieve peace and build peace with neighbouring countries. I want 
everyone to enjoy peace and for that I should think of things of peace 
instead of revenge.” (Respondent 3) 
 
“Stories can help to prevent them to be forgotten and help as a lesson 
for not happening again.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Indeed, several respondents highlighted that refugees viewed that they had a 
particular and valuable contribution to make given their lived experiences. 
Respondent 5, for example, noted that: 
 
“I am happy, because I have had some bad experiences and you are 
letting me give voice to them. I hope my contribution may be helpful 
and useful ... If you want to do something positive, it brings difficulties 
as well and you have to accept those; this is very useful to realise.” 
(Respondent 5) 
 
This could be taken as representing recognition by at least some 
refugees that they see themselves as having the potential to become 
advocates and/or agents for change; in this way providing evidence of them 
perceiving possibilities that their contributions could be as potential norm 
entrepreneurs in relation to reconciliation.   
Yet in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reconciliation was a painstaking process, 
because ethnic groups were not encouraged to reach out and rebuild 
relationships. Ironically, here is an example of a failed ‘top-down’ norm that 
would have been accepted from the ‘bottom-up’. The reconciliation process, 
however, also needs to take into consideration initiatives to compensate and 
provide reparations for victims of violence and to bring perpetrators to justice. 
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Refugees wish to retain their ethnic cultures and close the growing 
cultural gap between the young and the old refugee generations. They wish to 
showcase their cultural heritage to their neighbours by promoting intercultural 
activities. Most refugees enjoy discussions about cultures and intercultural 
excursions. 
In his reflections on forgiveness and truth commissions, Desmond Tutu 
expresses the following: “In forgiving, people are not being asked to forget. 
On the contrary, it is important to remember, so that we should not let such 
atrocities to happen again” (Tutu, 1999, p. 271). 
Another finding is that ‘bottom-up’ interviewees showed that 
respondents valued the rule of truth commissions as part of reconciliation. 
Several interviewees highlighted that reconciliation provided very good 
political and discursive socialisation opportunities. They become a key part of 
all Bosnian refugee identities and thus, truth commissions become part of new 
changed Bosnian refugee identities. For example, one respondent observed 
that truth commissions had an important role to play with respect to providing 
safe spaces for truth-telling and in facilitating cathartic experiences for 
survivors of human rights abuses: 
 
“Truth Commissions can provide space for dialogue” 
(Respondent 4). 
 
Another responded when asked what can be done to bring peace in his 
home country: 
 
“Confess the truth. Forgive. Not forget.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Another finding shows a strong commitment to forgiveness among 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives. The journey towards forgiveness suggests that 
there is much room for further investigation on the role of forgiveness in post-
violence societies. For example, one respondent shared with me her story 
about forgiveness and how it is connected to her Christian faith: 
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“Yes, I have forgiven them. What I am thinking about now is my life, my 
future...What helped me was the Bible. It says ‘forgive anybody who 
has wronged you and love your enemies’. As a Christian, I had to 
forgive and love those that persecuted me and pray for my enemies” 
(Respondent 8). 
 
One older respondent (Respondent 3), who had lost her son in the war, 
said that she wished to share her story with others to teach tolerance and 
peaceful relations: 
 
“I need to also contribute because in order for me to live up to today, 
there are people who have sacrificed and helped me to live this long. I 
need to be able to contribute to the society. When you are given, you 
should also be able to give out. I would like to see myself building a 
peace process through sharing my story and experiences.” 
 
Another finding is that returning ‘home’ is very personalised, which is 
asymmetrical to previous observations from the ‘top-down’ policies to 
’depersonalise’ the returning process. Participants for this thesis highlighted 
their human rights journeys. It is evident that they valued being given the 
space to tell their stories and share lessons about their lived experiences. For 
example, a prominent theme indicated was that they felt that storytelling 
provided an avenue for awareness-raising about their experiences as 
refugees. They also highlighted the importance of educating people about 
human rights concerns. 
Another finding from the interviews is that the truth commissions are 
not just about blame and allocating blame – these are about international 
awareness of norms from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. These lessons also 
connect with some of the key features of truth commissions. For example, 
truth commissions can provide an avenue for awareness-raising on human 
rights issues through the public gathering and documentation of narrated 
statements from those affected by human rights abuses. Engaging refugees 
in this transitional process would empower them to tell their stories and share 
lessons about their experiences, which can contribute towards some of the 
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goals of truth commissions, preventing future violence and human rights 
abuses. Furthermore, engaging refugees in truth commissions would 
empower them to contribute to the shaping of their countries’ post-violence 
human rights discourse. 
In addition to the social themes, the interviewees highlighted how 
repatriation also needed to include peacebuilding. Income-generating 
activities are not only essential for the development of areas of return 
devastated by years of conflict and displacement, but can also be instruments 
of peacebuilding, especially when members of the different communities are 
brought together. When asked about what role he has in rebuilding his 
country one interviewee commented: 
 
“My return to my town and trying to live there together with other 
people from other nationalities.” (Respondent 6). 
 
In other words, in post-conflict countries, such economic programmes 
do not strive merely to assist in the economic development of those regions, 
but to do so while also building peacebuilding ties across the different 
communities. 
Another finding is that ‘bottom-up’ perspectives link experience with a 
‘top-down’ process of peacebuilding. As one interviewee noted, the 
engagement of refugee returnees in peacebuilding should not be limited to 
achieving a peace agreement requirement of repatriating refugees or to the 
mere numbers of refugees that are repatriated (Respondent 6). Rather, it 
should include the forced migration experience of the returnees and how they 
engage in the process of peacebuilding. It is not peculiar to Bosnia that one of 
the consequences of civil war was the flight of professionals and skilled 
personnel, for example. Thus, the returnees are engaged in the health, 
education, security, technology, and agriculture sectors, among others. The 
majority of the skills and resources that returnees deploy in these sectors 
according to each one of them were acquired during their stay in exile. One 
interviewee, for example, was volunteering as a nurse when she left Bosnia 
(Respondent 8). She expressed the hope that through the volunteering, she 
would acquire the necessary work experience to enable her to gain 
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employment in the future. She currently lives in Bosnia and returned from the 
UK with a diploma in nursing. Moreover, the returnees are actively engaged in 
the rebuilding of their lives and that of the larger society. It is important to 
recognise that resilience as a long-term, complex, effortful process. The way 
that we often times portray the process of recovering as ‘bouncing back’ can 
trivialise the intensity of the experienced trauma and its impact. The focus 
here is based on how different populations create resilience communicatively 
instead of trying to gauge their abilities to ‘bounce back’ from disaster. 
Resilience is not based on how quickly you recover, but how you deal with the 
situation and face adversity in order to better your situation and survive 
The key lesson is that ‘bottom-up’ perspectives should help us to 
shape ‘top-down’ processes – that means norm diffusions upwards. The 
potential negative impact of return raises a difficult moral dilemma for 
international agencies. It is imperative for peace and stability that displaced 
people return to their pre-war homes. Similarly, Black (2001) and Cox (1998) 
have argued that international policy should be focused on “the long-term goal 
of ethnic reconciliation,” instead of ethnic reintegration. 
Because Bosnia is constituted by many different and very localised 
realities, one should be careful about generalisations. Trends and 
representative examples can be identified, however. The increased number of 
returnees has also increased the opportunity for harassment and attacks. 
Several violent incidents have occurred since returns took momentum. In two 
much-publicised incidents in May 2001, when mosques in Trebinje and Banja 
Luka were about to be rebuilt, an organised crowd of protesters stopped the 
cornerstone ceremonies by throwing rocks and assailing Bosniaks and some 
members of international agencies in attendance. Nationalist parties 
threatened by the process of minority return often implicitly or openly 
supported or directed the violence. As a whole, however, what is most striking 
about these episodes is not so much that some violence against minorities 
occurred, but that this violence was, overall, rather limited. 
 
7.7. The Role of UNHCR 
Findings from the respective documents survey and interviews also 
revealed some key observations in relation to the role of UNHCR. One key 
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finding is that voluntary repatriation is seen as such a ‘natural’ process that 
governments, policy-makers, donor countries, practitioners and researchers, 
have typically disregarded, or at least overlooked, the meaning of repatriation 
from the returnees’ 'point of view’. It is assumed that beyond the technical 
aspects of reintegration, such as physical, legal and material safety as well as 
socio-economic development, the return of forced migrants to their country of 
origin does not raise any particular challenge to those concerned. Policy and 
political discussions of repatriation tend to make claims about refugees 
without asking about their own priorities. This gap in perspectives is a source 
of tension and distrust, and emphasis can be misplaced by trying to promote 
return without reference to such empirical understandings. 
Ensuring that refugee repatriation is voluntary involves more than 
ticking off a box on a form. UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation set 
out two clear conditions for repatriation to be considered voluntary. First, 
whether a return is voluntary “must be viewed in relation to (…) condition in 
the country of origin (calling for an informed decision).” An informed decision 
on return conditions must be based on information that is “objective, accurate, 
and neutral,” must “not [be] propaganda” and “care must be taken not to paint 
an overly rosy picture of the return.” Refugees should also be fully informed of 
the limits of UNHCR’s protection and assistance following return. 
Second, whether a return is voluntary “must be viewed in relation to 
(…) the situation in the country of asylum (permitting a free choice).” 
Refugees “need to know about what will happen in the event they decide not 
to volunteer for repatriation” and that “repatriation is not voluntary when host 
country authorities deprive refugees of any real freedom of choice.” 
According to Takahashi (1997, p. 595), “UNHCR, in particular, played a 
disappointing role, giving undue emphasis to repatriation as the goal to be 
achieved.” Consequently, this at times averted focus from UNHCR’s 
protection mandate. As noted, this chapter also presents a serious 
misalignment between ‘top-down’ and perspectives of refugees (as revealed 
through the primary interviews). This misalignment between ‘top-down’ 
approaches and the needs of the returnees are illustrated in Table 9. UNHCR 
should have built more comprehensively on the knowledge, skills and 
capacities of displaced people themselves, by placing them at the centre of 
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operational decision-making, and building protection strategies in partnership 
with them. Such an approach would aim to recognise refugees not as 
dependent beneficiaries who are to be ‘saved and assisted, but rather as 
equal partners who have an active role in protecting themselves and 
organising for their own basic needs. It has to be noted, however, that both 
the host countries and the internal political environment were the primary 
constraints for successful implementation of durable solutions. This situation, 
combined with serious economic and financial difficulties, limited the 
opportunities for resettlement, local integration and return. 
 
Table 9: ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Norm Diffusion? Comparing Alignments 
and Misalignments of Perspectives on Repatriation 
 
 UNHCR  Refugees  Misalignment  
Identity  ‘Top-down’ 
Principle of 
non-refoulement 
‘Bottom-up’ 
The decision to return 
is typically made after 
comparing information 
about conditions and 
prospects in the host 
country with those in 
the country of origin. 
The notion of ‘safe 
return’ should focus on 
the safety of return 
rather than the 
voluntariness of 
repatriation. 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
State-centric 
 
‘Bottom-up’ Refugees 
should be more 
extensively involved 
in monitoring the 
safety and ensuring 
the voluntariness of 
return.  
Host and donor states’ 
interests have been a 
significant factor in the 
preference for 
repatriation over other 
durable solution. Over 
time UNHCR developed 
a repatriation culture, a 
bureaucratic structure, 
discourse, and formal 
and informal rules that 
made repatriation the 
most desirable 
preferred solution and 
nearly synonymous with 
“protection.” 
Identity ‘Top-down’ 
Peace 
agreements  
‘Bottom-up’ 
Justice and 
reconciliation 
State motives have 
taken priority over 
refugees' best interest 
in the decision to 
promote repatriation as 
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a durable solution. 
 
 Top-down 
approaches  
Bottom-up 
approaches  
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
First, safety and dignity are essential to ensure successful repatriation. 
UNHCR is concerned with the voluntary nature or the principle of 
non­refoulement, which comes from UNHCR’s traditional reluctance to 
embrace refugees’ agency, rather than with safe conditions are home. 
Second, as confirmed by a primary interview with a UNHCR official 
(Interview 2), UNHCR is state-centric: 
 
“UNHCR is not beneficiary-driven (…). When you think it should be the 
organisation’s second nature, but you are forcing UNHCR to talk to 
those people about their hopes, dreams etc.” (Interview 2) 
 
Furthermore, in interview 2 the respondent highlighted that host and 
donor states’ interests have been a significant factor in the preference for 
repatriation over other durable solutions. Over time UNHCR developed a 
repatriation culture, a bureaucratic structure, discourse, and formal and 
informal rules that made repatriation the most desirable preferred solution and 
one that is nearly synonymous with ‘protection.’ 
Third, a reoccurring theme in the interviews with UNHCR officials was 
that peace agreements are intended to regulate or resolve basic 
incompatibilities and contentions between warring parties. To meaningfully 
resolve conflict, peace agreements must include more than the simple 
intention to cease hostilities and should engage with the root causes of the 
conflict, justice and reconciliation. Engaging refugees in this transitional 
process would empower them to tell their stories and share lessons about 
their experiences, which can contribute towards some of the goals of truth 
commissions, preventing future violence and human rights abuses. The 
bottom line is to build person-to-person ties, rebuild relationships between 
people who fought each other for years, and more importantly, to promote the 
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kinds of relationships that will withstand any negative political event that might 
occur in the future. 
From the international perspective, however, return was considered 
essential in BiH for various reasons. There was concern over the burden of 
high numbers of Bosnian refugees on third countries and moreover the belief 
that the return of refugees and displaced persons was essential to 
peacebuilding. The fulfilment of the right to return became a crucial measure 
of the success of the Dayton Agreement and the hope for a restored 
multicultural Bosnia. From UNHCR and international community perspective it 
was also considered necessary to send a message that ethnic cleansing 
would not be tolerated by the international community. 
According to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Migration Profile for the year 
2011, there were 1.7 million people of Bosnian origin scattered all over the 
world if we also include descendants of Bosnian migrants. According to the 
same source, 1.2 million Bosnian refugees are currently living outside the 
country. Safety, security, limited tenancy rights and freedom of movement, 
failures of justice, and discrimination are emphasised in the literature on 
Bosnian refugees and DP as being among the biggest concerns and 
impediments for return, especially when it comes to minorities. 
Recognition of the difficulties of return after wars of exclusion as in 
Bosnia has led some observers to suggest that repatriation should not be an 
aim of peace settlements in such cases. Refugees must find permanent 
settlement so as not to become recruits for those opposed to the peace 
process, but the settlement does not have to be in the town or even the 
country of their origin. A former UNCHR official specialising in property rights 
argued in 2000 that the international community should have spent more time 
and energy on the ‘normalisation of living conditions’ for displaced persons 
and refugees, which might well have included resettlement elsewhere in 
Bosnia or in another country (Chandler, 2000). 
7.7.1. Barriers to return 
The documents survey in particular also highlighted major barriers to 
return. In particular, the documents survey showed that while the right to 
return is compelling from the point of view of the displaced population, there 
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are two reasons why return remained difficult and possibly counter-productive. 
First, minority return remained hard to accept for both Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats. The very premise of refugee return was unacceptable to 
them, since one of the major reasons behind the war was to establish 
ethnically pure states. For the Bosnian Serbs, the main reason against 
permitting the return of the Bosniak displaced population derives from the war 
itself. Bosnian Croats, that – in numerical terms – represented the smaller of 
the constituent peoples, are especially sensitive to population dynamics. 
Since their pre-war proportion was about 19 per cent and the population was 
estimated at 8 per cent after war, it is hardly surprising that many Bosnian 
Croats fear for their survival, particularly if a significant number of other 
ethnicities returned to areas now predominantly populated by them (ICG, 
1999a, pp. 3-4). The return of those displaced by the war would dilute the 
hardliners’ control. The HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) consistently 
blocked the return of Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks to those municipalities it 
controlled almost exclusively, while discouraging the return of Bosnian Croats 
to any other region. 
If return home remained a compelling right from the point of view of the 
victims of the war who were expelled because of their ethnicity, the 
documents survey highlighted important reasons making their return 
extremely difficult. From a security point of view, analysts from the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, highlighted that the return of 
minorities presented a potential destabilisation to the community in place and 
might therefore be viewed as a threat. Young, military-age males of a different 
ethnic group could be the foundation for a possible fighting force able to inflict 
considerable damage in the case of a new war (ICG, 1999b, p. 36). But even 
aside from the important politico/military implications of minority return, there 
is a second reason that makes the return of refugees a difficult task. The 
housing opportunities and economic conditions of the country made the 
organisation and implementation of return a logistical nightmare. The extent 
and nature of destruction and displacement created a situation where those 
displaced from one area occupied the houses and apartments of those who 
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had been similarly displaced or had become refugees abroad.32 Moreover, the 
war destroyed the industrial infrastructure of the country, making 
unemployment probably the single most important problem shared by families 
of every national group. 
Although there was widespread agreement – and found in the 
documents survey - on a resolution of the broader problems at the root of 
refugee movements before repatriation can be deemed a durable solution, 
little is actually known about the process of reintegration of returnees following 
repatriation. It appears common sensical that once the problems which 
caused the refugee movements in the first place are 'solved', refugees will 
want to return and repatriation should happen smoothly. Indeed, this supports 
one of the key argumentations of this thesis – namely that any ‘top-down’ 
policies that are designed to provide durable solutions must be receptive to 
norm diffusion emanating from the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees. 
There are many obstacles to minority returns and some of these seem 
to reflect a lack of acknowledgement of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives. International 
officials, for example, often blamed the political obstruction of local politicians 
to ‘top-down’ policies and in general the difficult objective conditions in which 
Bosnia finds itself after the war (International Crisis Group, 1997; Cox, 1998). 
Indeed, there is no scarcity of local problems to explain the delays and 
difficulties in implementing Annex 7 of the DPA – which would seem to 
reinforce the argument that understanding ‘bottom-up’ perspectives remains 
critically important. In addition to the often-noted dominance and obstruction 
of nationalist elites, the underdevelopment of several regions of the country, 
the dearth of the rule of law, and concerns for personal security contribute to 
explaining the difficult return process. At a structural level, the difficulty of 
making return happen is due to the incoherent political system created by the 
DPA. 
It is perhaps not surprising that return has been particularly difficult in 
Eastern RS, one of the most under-developed areas of the country, with very 
few economic opportunities. Many municipalities and villages in Eastern RS 
witnessed a process of migration from the countryside to Sarajevo that began 
                                                             
32 The empirical findings presented in the previous chapter also confirm the importance of 
housing considerations in shaping the ‘bottom-up’ views of refugees. 
 242 
prior to war. The war acted as a ‘social accelerator’ of a process that was 
already underway, causing the urbanisation of tens of thousands. In Sarajevo 
alone, there are an estimated 60,000 DPs. After the war, the cleavage 
between urban and rural regions increased even more, with Sarajevo 
receiving much of the reconstruction assistance and the Eastern RS almost 
none. When funds for reconstruction finally became available and dwellings 
were rebuilt, many decided not to return. In the summer of 2002, 
municipalities in Eastern RS around Sarajevo (Sokolac, Rogatica, Visegrad, 
etc.) had about 600 rebuilt apartments and houses that remained empty 
because the owners had decided not to go back, leading to an obvious waste 
of resources. 
International agencies’ favourite explanation is to point at local 
politicians as obstructing return. In just one example of this, the international 
community explained: 
 
 “…the fact that substantial minority return... has not taken place to 
date is not the responsibility of the international community: it is the fault of 
the politicians and officials in BiH and neighbouring countries who continue to 
actively, persistently, and in some cases violently obstruct it” (Office of the 
High Representative, 1999, para. 1). 
 
Moreover, when minority return conflicted with other broader political 
goals, the international choice was to give returns lower priority (see Chapter 
6). This statement was confirmed with an interview for this thesis with one of 
UNHCR representatives: 
 
“It is very difficult within the context, for UNHCR to put our agenda (…) 
It is very difficult for UNHCR to provide for returnees because we are 
constrained by the political situation in which we operate.” (Interview 2). 
 
The documents survey also suggests that since 2000, there was visible 
signs of improvement in return. According to UNHCR, in 2001 alone, more 
than 90,000 people returned to their home of origin, a trend that continued in 
2002 (UNHCR, 2002). This finding showed (constructivist explanations) that 
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socialisation of norms and behaviours matter. The example is Bosnia’s 
improved implementation of property legislation (as would theory on norms life 
cycle suggest – see Chapter 3). Furthermore, better coordination among 
international agencies and the fact that the brutality of the war is slowly fading 
in the collective memory have all contributed to a breakthrough in minority 
return. Interestingly, this has occurred in a context in which there was less, 
not more international assistance available. The perception that such 
assistance would be further decreased in the near future has encouraged 
many displaced persons to initiate return movements, thus posing a serious 
challenge to the idea that the more international resources are available, the 
easier it is to achieve the desired results. 
The documents survey also revealed an interesting rural dimension. 
Return first occurred to destroyed rural villages with little strategic interest. 
Because the majority of these villages would still be inhabited by one 
ethnicity, local authorities are not so opposed to allowing minorities to come 
back. Destroyed rural areas are politically much less sensitive than return to 
urban cities. As Cox (1998b, p.28) noted, “minority return may be tolerated to 
empty villages without economic or strategic significance, or in small numbers 
to large urban centres, but outside those marginal situations it is consistently 
opposed.” 
 
7.8. Linkage to conceptual models 
A factor which can contribute to repatriation not becoming a durable 
solution as prescribed by UNHCR is that many refugees return to a post-
conflict society which is still affected by unrest and friction, and where their 
physical safety may be endangered as was in the case of Bosnian refugees. 
This lack of safety can play a role in the refugees choosing to give up their 
repatriation, because they did not feel safe in their home country. 
The notion of ones’ belonging or home indicates that the reasons that 
inform the return should be voluntary as far as they emanate from the refugee. 
The voluntary nature should be visited from the incentives that are usually 
offered by UNHCR, the input of the ‘home government’, and the ability of the 
community to inculcate the returnees upon their return. 
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The findings from the interviews and documents show that actors both 
act upon and act within existing structures, and ideas play a significant, 
constitutive role in helping to shape peoples’ shared beliefs about the best 
way to address an abusive past. A constructivist approach to the issues of 
refugee return includes issues of identity by treating rules, norms and ideas as 
constitutive, not just constraining, and by stressing the importance of 
discourse, communication and socialisation in framing actors’ behaviour. This 
approach allows seeing how returnees are constructed as actors which 
influences their opportunities and space for claim making and thus 
contributing to peacebuilding. This is the ‘bottom-up’ method that returnees 
can use to exercise their local agency though property rights, reconciliation 
and truth commissions. 
By creating new terminologies and concepts like ‘safe return’ which 
stipulated that conditions in the home country did not have to improve 
substantially but only appreciably so that there would be a ‘safe’ return 
UNHCR has been constructing a ‘top-down’ policy of repatriation as the 
refugee regime’s dominant solution towards refugee problems. Agencies and 
governments deprive refugees of their active role in deciding their fate. 
Therefore, refugees remain passive agents in the entire process. 
It may be that UNHCR's decision to speak only about ‘voluntary 
repatriation’ is based on a well-meaning hope that its silence on mandated 
repatriation will induce states to avoid that solution. Due to a strong focus on 
repatriation as the preferred durable solution, refugee protection and the 
standard of voluntary repatriation have generally been compromised. In 
conclusion, UNHCR’s ‘top-down’ preferences have adopted and promoted 
repatriation above other durable solutions for refugees, largely due to host 
state pressure and in order to remain a key actor in the international refugee 
regime by appeasing donor states. 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
Return had a special role in the post-war panoply of issue areas 
needing attention in Bosnia because the plight of refugees had been a central 
facet of the debate over international intervention in the war. The practical 
repercussions of massive displacement from Bosnia to Western Europe and 
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the moral concerns raised by heavy media coverage of the circumstances of 
displacement meant that, politically, the right to return had to be among the 
international actors’ main goals for a post-Dayton Bosnia. However, as seen 
in the research presented in this chapter ‘top-down’ policy and political 
discussions of repatriation tend to make claims about refugees without asking 
about their own priorities. This misalignment in perspectives is a source of 
tension and distrust, and emphasis can be misplaced by trying to promote 
return without reference to such empirical understandings as this thesis 
explores. If refugees face substantial ‘push’ factors, and are even forced to 
migrate, their movement may be disconnected from local economic conditions. 
Fundamentally, a development strategy aimed at facilitating repatriation of 
refugees should be designed so as to build on the individual choices of 
returnees. Returnees should be empowered to select when to repatriate, as 
well as where they will reside. 
 
1) To what extent are UNHCR’s durable solutions in relation to return being 
successfully accomplished? 
 
The reasons for the promotion of repatriation as the most desirable of 
the three durable solutions reflect the international community’s ‘top-down’ 
attitude towards forced migration and the refugee problem. The data from the 
primary research shows misalignment between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives. First, the notion of ‘safe return’ should focus on the safety of 
return rather than the voluntary nature of repatriation. While there have been 
cases where refugees have voluntarily repatriated to Bosnia, in general, 
refugees were increasingly being pressured to return home and the 
repatriation programmes were not always conducted in line with the professed 
principles of the international community. 
Second, as seen from the discussion of the case study, host and donor 
states’ interests have been a significant factor in the preference for 
repatriation over other durable solutions. Over time, in order to deal with the 
unprecedented number of refugees, UNHCR developed a repatriation culture, 
a bureaucratic structure, discourse, and formal and informal rules that made 
repatriation the most desirable preferred solution and one that is nearly 
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synonymous with ‘protection.’ As UNHCR statute stipulates, refugee return is 
intended to be voluntary, however, many repatriations of the Bosnian 
population have involved returns that have appeared UNHCR-sanctioned 
refoulement (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 1997). 
Third, state motives have taken priority over refugees’ best interest in 
the decision to promote repatriation as a durable solution. The refugee’s 
decision to use voluntary repatriation, even if they make a free and well 
informed decision, and return in safety and under conditions of legal, physical 
and material safety, is a daunting task. 
 
2) What is the perspective of key stakeholders and how much influence do 
refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both 
enabled and constrained by the structures? 
UNHCR’s responsibility for finding durable solution falls within its 
protection mandate. The fundamental principle is that UNHCR will facilitate a 
return process only when participants have affirmed that their return is 
undertaken voluntarily. However, the degree to which each refugee decision 
is voluntary is a particular concern when refugee returns are strongly 
politicised, as in the minority return in Bosnia. This research noted that without 
proper conditions in the country of return, refugees do not and perhaps should 
not return home. This presents a policy challenge as governments must then 
seek to do what is best for refugees. Often, policy-makers urge refugees to 
return home even when conditions are not best for return. In the Bosnian 
case, refugees were entirely ignored in the repatriation process. The previous 
phase of repatriation and experiences shows the absence of refugee’ consent 
and consultation. The following findings are clear from the interviews. 
First, as the primary research confirmed, even where return is a goal of 
the refugees themselves and contributes to reconciliation and peacebuilding 
the path ahead is unlikely to be smooth. One important point is that it appears 
that the issue of the rights of refugees to protection lies solely in the hands of 
UNHCR officials – the refugees from Bosnia were not greatly involved. 
UNHCR who undertook protection responsibilities on the ground, had limited 
contact with the refugees as, in most cases, refugees were not informed 
about their rights or conditions back home. 
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Second, as the interviews with the refugees reveal, the respondents’ 
life experiences indicate that they want a dignified return to their home country 
in order to regain their property and other belongings. They are willing to 
participate in the next phases such as reconciliation and truth commissions. 
 
3) What actions are needed to ensure a more effective and consistent 
achievement of return as a durable solution? How can UNHCR policies be 
adapted to enhance prospects for return of refugees? 
The politics and ideology of repatriation underlined efforts of UNHCR 
and states to encourage and mediate the return of refugees to their original 
homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the expense of implementing other 
solutions including local integration and resettlement to third countries. 
Repatriation meant mostly encouraging ‘minority returns’. Minority returns 
become inseparable from the notion of post-conflict reconstruction, 
reconciliation, and peace building. 
UNHCR is by nature a ‘state-centric’ organisation. It is not only 
impacted by states’ policies, but it is totally dependent on donor states to fund 
its operations and any repatriation programmes. Skills training in exile, on the 
other hand, allows refugees to make important contributions to peace building 
in their countries of origin. In a 2006 statement to the UN Security Council, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted that “refugees return with 
schooling and new skills … Over and over, we see that their participation is 
necessary for the consolidation of both peace and post-conflict economic 
recovery” (UNHCR, 2006). Second, peace education programmes for 
refugees in exile could enhance prospects of reconciliation and conflict 
resolution upon return. For example, returnees will be better equipped to 
reconcile with former community members and mediate conflicts during fragile 
post-conflict and reintegration processes. 
The study found that UNHCR uses a distorted definition of 
‘voluntariness’ and that UNHCR has a ‘repatriation culture’ (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004, p. 75). In particular, as the political pressure to return 
refugees from host states rises, there is concern that repatriation may at times 
not be voluntary. 
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter provides a summary discussion and critical 
evaluation of the research findings, implications of the research, and 
recommendations for further research related to durable solutions. The 
concept of durable solutions is that it ultimately seeks to facilitate an end to 
the refugees’ suffering and their need for international protection and 
dependence on humanitarian assistance (Black and Koser, 1999). A 
misalignment between ‘top-down’ policy and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees must be taken seriously since it contributes to signalling the need for 
change in refugee policy design. This chapter essentially undertakes there 
major tasks: (i) revisits the conceptual bases of the thesis and discusses the 
operation of the norms life cycle in practice in light of the respective findings 
from this thesis; (ii) reassesses and argues that there are notable obstructions 
impacting upon the five-stage process and: (iii) argues for reconceptualization 
of refugees as norms entrepreneurs. 
As an opening point to the conclusions of this thesis, it is important to 
reiterate the contributions to knowledge that this thesis makes. First, the 
thesis re-affirms the assertion that refugees remain a significant, and growing 
international concern, yet also seeks to demonstrate that they continue to be 
largely ignored as a relevant group (see Chapter 5, section 5.4, p.157; 
Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 188; Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 225). The thesis, in 
particular, provides a contribution to knowledge in identifying this relevant 
group as potential norm entrepreneurs. Second, the thesis also shows how 
UNHCR plays a very important role in the entire process of serving refugees, 
from orientation and assistance upon arrival to registration and involvement in 
the status determination process, to the search for durable solutions such as 
naturalisation, third country resettlement, or voluntary repatriation. The thesis, 
therefore, re-affirms that studies of the role of UNHCR in delivering durable 
solutions represent an important contribution to knowledge. Third, and 
nevertheless, the findings in this study also suggest that although UNHCR 
was continually portrayed as a powerful entity involved in nearly every aspect 
of refugee matters, then but, the organisation’s dependency on ‘top-down’ 
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policies, donors and host states limits this power (Chapter 2, section 2.3, p. 47; 
Chapter 5, section 5.6, p.169; Chapter 6, section, 6.5 p.198; Chapter 7, 
section 7.7, p. 235). UNHCR’s key identities and constituent roles were 
established in part through a continual process of interaction with the refugees 
it is mandated to protect. Yet, the thesis also illustrates how this was not 
without its issues and UNHCR faced numerous defining challenges during the 
period of investigation undertaken in this thesis. This included, for instance – 
the visibility of refugee flows into Europe; combined with the difficulties in 
finding long-term political solutions that ensures that conflicts often become 
very protracted. While the thesis shows that presenting refugees as threats to 
security is not something new, the thesis identified clearly the existence of 
xenophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric from key Western states that 
significantly hindered efforts to find durable solutions for refugees at a time 
when mass displacement numbers reached unprecedented levels. Through it 
all, UNHCR as an organisation, aspired if not entirely fulfilled its mandate to 
serve persons of concern in existing situations around the world and to help 
states meet their responsibilities and obligations for protection. Yet, as the 
interview findings demonstrate, central to forging any long-lasting solution 
enhancing the effectiveness of the policy of durable solutions required 
engaging refugees and their home or host governments in dialogue (see 
Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 225). 
 
8.2. Reflections on Research Questions  
This thesis aims to help fill this gap by engaging in a conceptual 
discussion of refugee agency as well as arguing for a stronger awareness of 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to durable solutions, drawing on constructivist theory 
in order to enable a more comprehensive understanding of the ways in which 
refugees exercise agency. By recognising the dominant understanding and 
discussions about forced migration, this thesis provides a ‘bottom-up’ 
contribution to the (usually ‘top-down’) refugee debate. Significant in this 
context, this thesis demonstrates how the voices of refugees themselves are 
sometimes not heard properly; even though, at times, they challenge the 
narrow, simplistic, and patronising representations of refugees, yet more often 
than not remain outside political and academic conversations. 
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The refugees’ damaged relationship with the state of origin places 
them in positions of experiencing rather distinctive circumstances which 
shape how refugees view and exercise agency. The lack of protection from 
their home country and their presence in exile leaves them in a state of limbo, 
and frequently at the mercy of humanitarian actors, the host state and 
international donors. In theory, refugees have three alternatives to terminate 
this state of limbo: integration in their current host state, resettlement to a third 
country, or repatriation to their home country. 
There is very little information about UNHCR’s or its implementing 
partners’ interactions with refugees. Instead, most of the communication 
between the field and Headquarters focuses primarily on operational and 
logistical components that pertain to the performance of UNHCR as an actor 
on the ground. Detailed accounts of cooperation between host state and 
UNHCR are far more frequent than descriptions of interactions between 
UNHCR and the refugees. In fact, when reports do mention displaced 
individuals, they usually reference them as (numerical) anonymous objects, 
which reflect the overarching discursive treatment of refugees in the 
humanitarian sphere. Taking refugees’ agency more seriously means pushing 
against common treatment and representations of refugees as hopeless, 
silent victims, which has become deeply engrained within the international 
refugee regime. Within this victim-discourse, which drives humanitarian 
responses and state’s willingness to offer shelter, refugees become 
anonymous objects stripped presumably of their agency. By focusing on the 
ways in which refugees manoeuvre their circumstances, this thesis challenges 
these common assumptions, which shaped policies and practices during the 
period under scrutiny. Above all, the empirical investigations and findings 
demonstrate the existence of notable misalignments between the ‘top down’ 
viewpoints governing UNHCR durable solutions and the ‘bottom up’ 
perspectives of refugees (see Table 10). These misalignments therefore lead 
to two important outcomes from a conceptual point of view. First, the 
misalignments lead to gaps in norm creations and diffusion where the top 
down norms are different from those thought important by the refugees on the 
ground. Second, and at the same time, there is so far lack of willingness of 
refugees to undertake norm entrepreneurial activity and seek to engage 
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actively in seeking to change the governing ‘top down’ norms even though the 
primary research shows they often have the skills to do so. The refugees were 
thus not acting as active norm entrepreneurs engaging in norm diffusion 
upwards and thus the interface between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
remained weak with misalignment likely to continue beyond the period under 
scrutiny. From a conceptual perspective, these findings have important 
implications for the way we think about the relevance of the Norm Life Cycle 
(see Figure 1 and 2) and the five stage process of norm diffusion (see Figure 
3).  
Turning to the Norm Life Cycle, then the primary research for this 
thesis shows that while there is evidence of refugees forming their own norm 
from the ‘bottom-up’. In this way, the Norm Life Cycle should not be seen as a 
purely one way traffic with norm being created from the ‘top-down’. However, 
the findings also show how the Norm Life Cycle in this particular case is 
broken due to the lack of transition of the refugees in active norm 
entrepreneurs in practice leading to ‘breaks’ in the norm diffusion life cycle 
(see Figure 1). Misalignments continue to exist, and the new ‘bottom-up’ 
norms are created, but do not reach the tipping point where they cascade and 
are internalised ‘upwards’ to UNHCR level (see Figure 1).                        
In addition, the findings show how the Norm Life Cycle concept, 
however, contains inherent limitations and deficiencies, which must be 
acknowledged here, where possible, bridged as best as possible, if the 
concept is to be meaningfully applied. For one, and as is acknowledged by 
Finnemore and Sikkink, this thesis confirms the dangers of the Norm Life 
Cycle concept is that it can be seen to portray norm development as a linear 
process (see Figure 1). It should be emphasised, however, that norm 
development is not a linear process, and the norm life cycle is useful more for 
illustrative purposes than for predictive purposes. Norm development can be 
progressive or regressive, and norms can emerge and cascade before 
becoming irrelevant or replaced, and thus never becoming internalised (see 
Figure 1). 
More importantly, what this thesis shows is that such norm 
development can be explained and linked to the existence of active norm 
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entrepreneurship (see Figure 2). As applied in this case the norms emerge 
from both UNHCR’s ‘top-down’ and refugees’ ‘bottom-up’ perspectives. In 
studying norm entrepreneurship among refugees, it is important to recognise 
the political, material and ideational conditions that constrain their work; their 
positionality and fragility in their societies. First, it has changed the attributes 
of actors, helping them develop visibility, capacity, and connectedness. 
Second, it does this through the formation of a community through which 
refugees form common goals and interact with each other to strengthen their 
knowledge, expertise, practices, and connections. By networking with each 
other, refugees are able to gain alternative perspectives on issues and to 
engage with UNHCR in multiple ways. Norm emergence occurs when actors 
who are termed norm entrepreneurs become convinced of the importance of 
an idea or principle and seek to convince the international community of its 
importance. They do this by means of persuasion, where by framing the new 
norms in terms which are either congruent with existing norms or play upon 
values which are widely subscribed to, they attempt to sway members of the 
international community towards acceptance of the norm. This brings the 
norm to the stage of tipping point. If a norm continues to gain momentum and 
support in the international community, however, eventually it will reach a 
threshold where a critical mass of states comes to support it. Unfortunately, 
as seen in this study, the norms discussed in this study are obstructed and 
never reach the tipping point and therefore never diffuse. Figure 1 and Figure 
2 were reacted to show this obstruction. As this thesis shows, even where the 
potential for active norm entrepreneurship might exist, it is not transferred into 
active norm entrepreneurial behaviour then tipping points in norm diffusion will 
not be crossed. 
Yet, this also has implications for the resonance of the Five Stage 
Process concept utilised in this thesis (see Figure 3). The investigations in this 
thesis show how refugees might be involved in the first two stages of norm 
conception and even norm contestation (see Figure 3). Indeed, the 
identification of distinctive misalignments between the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of refugees and the ‘top-down’ norms of durable solutions policy 
show that there is strong awareness of the existence of new norms being 
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created at the refugee level. However, the lack of political activism and 
practical norm entrepreneurship behaviour, combined with lack of awareness 
of these new norms from the ‘top-down’ also means that the third stage 
onwards, cascading and internalisation cannot be detected within the confines 
of this thesis (see Figure 3). The refugees in this study never managed to 
reach a tipping point to cause a norm cascade. Hence, this case study shows 
the practical challenges and the realities where norms do not ‘cascade’ (that 
is to become widespread and robust). There is therefore an active break in 
the Five Stage Process model in this instance (see Figure 3). 
What this demonstrates and as this thesis argues, is that a stronger 
awareness of the interface between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ dynamics is 
essential to understanding the nuances of practical norm diffusion and the 
possibilities for removing misalignments that ultimately restrict the 
effectiveness of durable solutions policies and practices.   
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Figure 1: Norm Life Cycle (in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 896) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Norm Diffusion from ‘bottom-up’ perspective (produced by author) 
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Figure 3: Five-stage process (adopted from W. Andy Knight, 2011) 
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Top-down Policies 
Several notable observations can also be drawn from this study in 
relation to the role of ‘top-down’ processes and policies in relation to durable 
solutions. First, and in general sense, it is important to note that since the 
1967 Protocol, refugee protection has also suffered from continual limitations. 
Not least because there have been ongoing revisions of workable definitions 
of ‘refugees’ over time (Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p.13) that has gradually resulted 
in more restrictive management of management among ‘top-down’ policy-
makers based in states and international organisations.  
Second, and as Chapter 5 discusses, it is evident that a ‘top-down’ 
decision-making process of refugee settlement is carried out by policy-makers  
of international institutions, that often poorly reflects the views and efforts of 
the refugees themselves. As the presented findings from the interviews (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.4, pp. 157-159) suggest often authorities lacked sufficient 
expertise in their respective management tasks. This was compounded by the 
fact that often refugees felt that there was little communication with these 
respective officials contributing to a lack of awareness at the top of the 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees and locals. 
Third, and as Chapter 6 demonstrates, through the ‘top-down’ 
approach, states increasingly implemented more restrictive policies. The 
document survey and primary interviews with senior policy-makers also 
confirmed the view that “a disproportionate amount of energy and resources 
tends to be focused on determining who is a refugee,’ rather than on their 
treatment pre- and post-recognition.” (Edwards, 2005, p. 294). In particular, 
the findings also confirmed a notable under-estimation among senior policy-
makers around the issue of sending displaced peoples back to their home 
countries because they do not qualify as refugees is problematic (see Chapter 
6, section 6.2.2, p.185). Moreover, the empirical investigations showed 
repeatedly how it is often the case that many of the refugees coming into 
refugee-hosting societies are themselves from nations that go through various 
cycles of exploitation, which leads to more chaos and more persecution (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.3, pp. 188-189). 
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Fourth, the analysis in this thesis, often highlights the relatively short-
term prioritisation that dominates the perspectives of ‘top-down’ policy-makers 
(both at the state and international organisational levels). Many ‘top-down’ 
approaches focus on refugee solutions that avoid addressing the long-term 
safety and growth of the home country (see Chapter 7, section 7.7.1, p. 239). 
Rather, and as the primary interviews indicate, it was often the case that 
refugees were either forced to return to a country still in disarray or to resettle 
(without necessarily incorporating them into their own communities). This 
contributed to a sense of distance and alienation among interviewed refugees 
in relation to the rationales and implementation of UNHCR’s durable solutions 
policy (see Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 225). 
Lastly, this study demonstrates how throughout the period being 
studied refugee protection did not (and incidentally still does not) contain an 
obligatory nature to it. The study shows how UNHCR explained the 
importance of refugee protection for three functions: to provide international 
protection to meet specific needs of refugees, to be a durable solution for 
large numbers of refugees, and to express international solidarity (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.7, pp. 26-31). In short, all forms of protection maintained 
a temporary, unsustainable focus on them. Indeed, little seems to have 
changed in the years after the Bosnian war and this particular case study. As 
Edwards elaborated, many western governments increasingly were:  
 
“Implementing hard-line or restrictive asylum policies and practices in 
order to deter and to prevent asylum- seekers from seeking refuge on 
their territory, including by interception and interdiction measures, visa 
countries, carrier sanctions, ‘safe third country’ arrangements, 
administrative detention, and/or restrictive interpretations of the refugee 
definition.” (Edwards, 2005, p. 293). 
 
However, what this study demonstrates very clearly is that there is always a 
very strong potential for a misalignment of views and perspectives between 
‘top-down’ policy-makers and refugees themselves which effectively always 
then undermine the effectiveness of any search for durable solutions. Above 
all, and as Chapters 5, 6 and 7 denote, the effectiveness of any durable 
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solutions is nearly always undermined when ‘top-down’ policy-makers have 
always been unwilling to step completely out of their comfort zones and to 
actively seek long-term, durable solutions to refugee problems. 
Bottom-up Approach 
Nevertheless, while policy-makers of many nations continue to use 
their resources to protect their citizens instead of assisting refugees, this 
study shows how the international community has often been more active and 
sympathetic to the view that it is possible to achieve durable solutions to 
refugee problems while also keeping respective country’s citizens protected 
(see Chapter 3, section 2.2, p. 42). In particular, several general reflections 
can also be made in relation to ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees. 
First, the empirical findings drawn from the primary interviews also 
show that several key themes, such as, integration, self-sufficiency, 
sustainable livelihoods are regularly raised as refugee priorities and central to 
the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees. At the same time, they are also – at 
least at face value – themes that feature in the discourses of international 
institutions when discussing modern-day refugee protection. The challenge – 
as this thesis shows – is that at the moment such ‘bottom-up’ perspectives still 
remain largely misaligned with ‘top-down’ policies (see Chapter 5, section 5.6, 
p. 169). If the international community can focus on aligning the promotion of 
these values (and even on the promotion of a ‘bottom-up’ approach), then 
there would be a stronger hope for a prosperous future for refugees.  
Second, the analysis (see Chapter 7) also emphasises that refugees 
must be recognised as having a role in having shaped conflict resolution. In 
particular, the interviewees for this study were able to comment strong on 
aspects relating to political mobilisation in exile and involvement in just 
campaigns, such as, reconciliation or truth commissions. On the other hand, 
and as Chapter 6 shows, there is often prevailing rhetoric - especially from the 
‘top-down’ that portrays refugees as powerless and vulnerable victims utterly 
deprived of meaningful choices. Institutions such as UNHCR often use 
language that suggests that durable solutions are ‘provided’ to refugees, 
overlooking the agency of refugees. At the same time, they also emphasise 
the importance of resilience and self-reliance, suggesting “self-reliant 
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refugees are more likely to achieve durable solutions” (UNHCR, 2005, iv). 
Being self-reliant improves and strengthens refugees’ livelihoods, on the one 
hand, and reduces their vulnerability and dependence on humanitarian 
assistance, on the other. 
 Third, as the primary research suggests durable solutions might be 
incompatible with ‘bottom-up’ interests and identities of refugees as durable 
solutions are dominated by state-led responses to forced displacement that  
do not recognise refugees as full and equal persons (see for example Chapter 
5, section 5.3, pp. 155-157). Above all, the ‘top-down’ durable solutions seem 
to underestimate the strength of particular ‘bottom-up’ identities of the 
refugees themselves. It can be argued that without tangible efforts and a 
strong determination to create a better, inclusive society, the lives of those 
who are pushed to the margins of society could well be endangered.  
Fourth, what is very striking from the primary interviews, is when 
refugees are faced with challenges, then refugees put their hope into action to 
increase their chances of improved livelihoods (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 
188). The interviews revealed notable examples of how the tenacity of 
refugees to flourish against the odds forced them to engage in all sorts of jobs 
and money-making activities to make a living. Indeed, this also shaped their 
own self-images and ‘bottom-up’ identities as autonomous and successful 
actors and ‘entrepreneurs’ (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, pp. 192-194). In doing 
so, the refugees regularly highlighted how they saw themselves as 
contributing to the growth of the local economy and to their own quality of life 
from the ‘bottom-up’. Such tenacity to improve quality of life and holistic well-
being is a commitment to reach a certain degree of self-reliance, which would 
see them integrate into the local community.  
Finally, the last general reflection relates to the simple point that from 
the ‘bottom-up’, the refugees did not see themselves as being reactive, 
victims or helpless, reliant on state or international support. Conversely, the 
primary interviews revealed that the interviewed refugees saw themselves as 
more active, innovative, autonomous and ultimately self-reliant actors and 
entrepreneurs.  
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The next section revisits the concept of durable solutions and 
discusses aspects in relation to the research questions outlined in this thesis 
(See Introduction/Chapter 1, section 1.4). 
 
8.2. Research Problems Revisited 
1. To what extent were UNHCR’s durable solutions successfully 
accomplished? 
 
Resettlement 
As discussed in Chapter Five, third country resettlement represents a 
durable solution and a cornerstone of UNHCR policy towards refugees in the 
period under scrutiny. Yet, as the interviews among senior policy-makers also 
indicated, ultimately the effectiveness of its operation depends on the 
willingness and cooperation of foreign governments in order to be 
implemented. Several aspects were detected as key to determining the 
success of third country resettlement from the ‘top-down’.  
First, success of durable solutions could not be based on simplistic 
assumptions. This included, for example, acknowledging the key factor that 
choice and settlement of asylum states may not always be contiguous to or 
reliant upon assumption of the distances from the refugees’ home state. Thus 
state policies towards third country resettlement offered both constraints and 
opportunities (see Chapter 5, section 5.3). 
Second, the main criteria used for judging success of durable solutions 
utilised by ‘top-down’ policy-makers seem to be more general and holistic 
than first appears. In particular, two aspects seem to be regularly cited by the 
senior international policy-makers during the interviews. Namely: (i) that 
success of third country resettlement should be seen more broadly as, for 
example, “the enjoyment of civil, economic, social and cultural rights similar to 
those enjoyed by nationals and the opportunity to eventually become a 
naturalized citizen of the resettlement country” (UNHCR, 2011c, p. 307). And 
(ii): that the success of any resettlement policy should be seen rather 
mechanistically as a contribution to a wider international effort whereby: 
“Resettlement is also a mechanism whereby wealthier countries can help 
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preserve asylum by sharing responsibility for the global refugee problem” 
(Swerdlow, 2006, p. 1830). In simple terms, the analysis of the senior policy 
level shows a rather ambiguous set of criteria on which to judge success of 
durable solutions at least at the political level. 
Third, and nevertheless, the rather general criteria for success did not 
prevent the international policy-makers from utilising rather restrictive 
definitions of refugees as the basis of the actual operation of policy. From the 
perspective of this thesis then, the analysis suggest that there were plenty of 
opportunities for any misalignment of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives 
to exist on the basis of ‘top-down’ policy actions. Of course, international law 
provides for refugee protection and provides nations with a clear definition of 
how refugees who seek asylum should be treated and protected, although the 
analysis in this thesis indicated that not all nations treated refugees the same 
(see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2, pp. 153 - 154).  
Next, what the document analysis and primary interviews reveal 
however is that where any criteria are cited by UNHCR and ‘top-down’ policy-
makers is not always that found in the voices coming from the ‘bottom-up’ 
interviews with refugees. As Chapter 5 discusses, UNHCR recognised three 
equally important functions of resettlement. The first function cites 
resettlement as “a tool of international protection” used to assist refugees 
whose “life, liberty, safety, health or other fundamental rights are at risk in the 
country where they have sought refuge”. Secondly, resettlement as a durable 
solution is able to extend protection to more refugees throughout the world – it 
adds one more option to addressing forced migration. Finally, resettlement 
“can be a tangible expression of international solidarity” along with being a 
“responsibility sharing mechanism”. Sharing the responsibility of refugee 
protection alleviates problems impacting countries of asylum (UNHCR 
Resettlement Handbook, 2011, p. 45). Yet, as Chapter 5 also shows few of 
these criteria featured strongly in the responses from the actual ‘bottom-up’ 
refugees as what should be the criteria for success of any durable solutions – 
verifying the existence of a communication gap between the top-down and 
bottom-up over what constitutes a successful policy of durable solutions. 
Yet, the findings from the ‘top-down’ process that show the ambiguities 
in ‘top-down’ processes (see Chapter 5, sections 5.6, p. 169) further verify  
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important observations made in the existing literature. The findings confirm 
the view of Mariano-Florentino (2006, p. 583) for example, that these tensions 
between the policies of host states and indeed even UNHCR “places refugees 
in harmful, sometimes fatal positions due to legal, political, and bureaucratic 
dynamics” (Mariano-Florentino, 2006, p. 583). In addition, the findings also 
show how ‘top-down’ policy-makers are not really fully aware of the dynamics 
shaping the ‘bottom-up’ behaviour of refugees in relation to resettlement 
leading to some misalignment. On this basis the role of refugees in adapting 
to host communities is not fully understood either, supporting the contention of 
Smyth (2008) that, 
 
[It] it is difficult to consider how host communities and their institutions 
change in response to the presence of refugees without considering 
how the host community accommodates their resettlement (Smyth, 
2008, p. 328). 
 
Local integration and asylum 
The findings in Chapter 6 reveal that initially, European countries 
adopted open asylum policies. As seen from Chapter 6 and Table 11, 
however, as the refugees’ stay became prolonged, and experienced poor 
asylum domestic security conditions and limited international support to meet 
their socio-economic needs, the host states shifted towards more restrictive 
asylum policies. This leads to the last of the traditional solutions, which is 
settlement in the country of first asylum, and thus rationalises its inclusion for 
discussion and analysis in this study.  
As with third country resettlement, local integration is contingent upon 
approval of the host government (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2, pp. 185-186), 
which may not be forthcoming in situations of mass influx. In particular, the 
interviews with senior ‘top-down’ policy-makers regularly cited that local 
integration was strongly influenced by key variables, such as, the likelihood of 
scarce resources as well as religious and ethnic tensions. However, the 
findings from interviews with refugees revealed that their attitudes towards 
local integration were influenced by specific aspects.  
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First, it seems clear that, from the ‘bottom-up’ notions of successful 
local integration were strongly related to refugee perspectives on the degree 
of prevailing uncertainty existing with regard to the outcome of the respective 
asylum process (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, pp. 188-189). More specifically, 
the duration of the process and the conditions under which the respective 
refugees experienced while the asylum process was being completed. The 
issue for example of whether an individual is approved or denied status was 
repeatedly identified as a prevalent and continuous aspect of stress for 
asylum seekers/refugees (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 189). Indeed, it was 
highly influential in shaping their ‘bottom-up’ perspective towards the entire 
concept of durable solutions, and their respective identity as refugees. 
Second, all the interviews noted how important the constant exposure 
to risk experienced by asylum seekers was to shaping their ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives towards local integration. All the interviewees highlighted that 
they were faced with risk and the need to continuously overcome obstacles 
(see Table 11). In particular, there was a notable misalignment between 
discourses used by senior ‘top-down’ policy-makers who referred to ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’ and the ‘bottom-up’ identities of the refugees who say 
themselves as self-reliant actors who had shown by positive action by moving 
with their feet and not just words. Indeed, this is also confirmed by the 
document analysis in this thesis. Although ‘bogus asylum seekers’ is a 
rhetorical category established in international frameworks, it did nonetheless 
feature in state discourse and in policy documents analysed for this thesis 
(see Chapter 6, section 6.5, p. 202). 
Third, all of the interviews cited how important the existence of 
sufficient resources was to successfully completing local integration. 
However, it was also discernible among the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees that this also contributed to a lack of success as regards their 
perspectives towards durable solutions. Several of the interviews, for 
example, discussed how the ongoing lack of resources contributed to barriers 
toward eligibility for asylum (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 188). Indeed, the 
labelling of asylum seekers and by continual concerns over lack of resources 
were two major reinforcements for the tensions between the ‘top-down’ and 
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‘bottom-up’ perspectives on justifications for the current restrictive definition 
for refugees in particular. 
 
Repatriation 
In terms of repatriation, the findings suggest that the repatriation of 
refugees is a complex, long-term process that requires greater attention and 
support, not only from humanitarians, but also from development actors and 
political leaders. Three aspects are critical to the analysis of repatriation as a 
durable solution. First, on a huge scale, housing stock, infrastructure and 
industry had been devastated or completely destroyed, and many returnees 
found their homes entirely gone (see Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 228). Second, 
for returning refugees, repatriation is not simply a return ‘home’, but entails 
the daunting task of rebuilding their lives again in a country that has 
undergone political, economic and social upheaval (see Chapter 7, section 
7.6, p. 230). Third, migrants returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
confronted with a difficult reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recurrent ethnic 
animosity and discrimination. 
Refugee repatriation is often one of the many activities included in the 
theory and practice of peacebuilding. It is quite likely that in most instances 
people displaced by violent conflict will want to return home once the conflict 
is over, and the international community clearly has an important role to play 
in assisting such return. However, my findings suggested that there was a 
notable misalignment between discourses used by senior ‘top-down’ policy-
makers who used peace agreement as an indicator that it was safe to return 
as well as state motives took propriety over the ‘bottom-up’ identities of the 
refugees and their willingness to return (see Chapter 7, section 7.7, p. 236). 
The findings from the interviews suggest that repatriation of refugees 
can have a significant role in the peace building process via truth 
commissions and reconciliation. 
As the above analysis suggests, it was that case that in relation to all 
three durable solutions - resettlement, local integration and repatriation – 
there existed major tensions between the drive to finding solutions from the 
‘bottom-up’ perspective and the ‘top-down’ inhospitable international political 
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climate. Too often, efforts to enable durable solutions focused primarily on 
formally recognising the refugee. However, at the same time, the refugees 
also believed that were being arbitrarily or blindly excluded from any decision-
making. Without specific breakthroughs in achieving successful solutions in 
voluntary return, resettlement and local integration, attention largely focused 
in particular on interim solutions. 
 
2. What is the perspective of key stakeholders and how much influence do 
refugees, as agents, have in the diffusion of norms, given they are both 
enabled and constrained by the structures? 
 
Resettlement 
It seems clear from the evaluation of UNHCR and drawing upon the 
interviews with ‘top-down’ policy makers that a number of prevailing 
international norms are in place. First, that resettlement is universally 
perceived and understood as a tool to absorb the refugees into the local 
community by either the host state or the third party state (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.7, p. 27). Second, that global refugee policy is dominated by and 
has mostly adopted a statist perspective in which state views are the most 
important and ultimately which asserts that refugees’ agency is (and should 
be) minimal (see Chapter 3, 3.4.2, p. 110). Third, and following on from these 
two international norms lies the common perspective and understanding that 
claims that refugees are subservient actors that are totally dependent on 
UNHCR and host states (see Chapter 5, section 5.5). 
However, as the findings from the ‘bottom-up’ interviews suggest, 
refugees face multiple challenges (Table 11). Indeed, more specifically, their 
‘bottom-up’ identities are shaped and influenced by experiences of both the 
journey from their home country and the resettlement process in a new culture 
(see Chapter 5, section 5.4, pp. 157 - 166). Indeed, it is important to note that 
those experiences have both individual and collective remembering that 
impacts not only the individual but also any family members involved 
(Codrington, 2011). In this way, this study highlights how ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives can have both individual and collective force ‘horizontally’ across 
family units and indeed communities. There is thus strong potential for the 
 266 
bottom up perspectives of refugees to influence norms and for them to then 
be transmitted upwards by refugee communities using electoral, lobbying or 
simply cross community behaviour.  
Furthermore, the findings also show that the refugees themselves 
regard and perceive themselves as highly adaptive, entrepreneurial actors. As 
Chapter 6 discusses, refugees adapt their behaviours that allow them to 
maintain their basic conceptions of life; and are therefore involved in a 
process that possibly leads to change through their innovative behaviours. Yet, 
the study also reveals there is a missing link at the moment. Although many 
refugees highlight that although they say themselves as having the skills and 
adaptive nature to undertake international norm change, it was also the case 
that – at the time of the study - the refugees did not see themselves as policy 
entrepreneurs that were actively seeking to change international norms. They 
remained potential but not real policy entrepreneurs. 
 
Local integration and asylum 
A similar picture is detectable in terms of local integration and asylum. 
As Chapter 6 identified, local integration and applying for asylum represents a 
gradual process through which refugees saw themselves as becoming active 
participants in the economic, social, cultural, civil, cultural and spiritual affair of 
the host state (see Chapter 6, section 6.5, p. 198). It also requires a focused 
conversation or debate, between the refugees and the state that seeks to 
integrate the former in the latter society. 
First, the interviews also revealed how many refugees saw their 
identities being shaped by less than successful instances of local integration. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 showed how countries of asylum did not regularly 
grant refugees the right to local integration. Often there were discernible limits 
to their generosity to temporary asylum in closed refugee camps.  
Second, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, several of the interviewees 
highlighted how people can be forced out of their communities for many 
reasons. One of the leading causes of the refugee situation is a civil war 
which renders a state incapable of providing security for lives and properties, 
thus leading citizens to decide to seek asylum in a different country (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.5, p. 167). Thus, the interviews with refugees shed light 
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on the immense pressure and threat to their lives, and how the refugees 
calculated and evaluated options such as where to seek refuge, either within 
or outside their home country. Importantly, the findings from the interviews 
informed the nature of the misalignment between ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees and the ‘top-down’ policies of UNHCR. As Chapter 6 discusses, the 
‘bottom-up’ decisions of refugees were mostly associated in the interview with 
practical factors, such as, losses incurred or perception of potential future 
losses, the duration of the flight, and their proximity to the site of violence. The 
findings reveal the refugees to be making clearly identifiable rationale 
decisions that informed their practical choices towards local integration and 
helped shaped their own self-images and identities. Hence, the international 
norm of refugees as reactive victims is completely debunked by the findings of 
the interviews and the thesis more generally. 
Third, as Chapter 6 illustrates, refugees look for opportunities to 
improve their lives through making choices towards and developing 
responses to, their new environment (see Chapter 6, section 6.3, pp. 188 - 
189). However, in line with constructivist approaches, the findings also show 
how such responses are made not only in terms of their legal, material and 
subsistence statuses, but also in relation to their individual and collective 
subjectivities, identities and all aspects of their existential experience (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 190). Forced to leave their ‘homes’ because of 
violence, refugees must often cope with new environments, new language, 
new social and economic roles, new community structures, new family 
relationships and new problems. However, the narratives from the refugees 
reveal that as individuals and members of groups they actively employ a wide 
range of strategies which as argued in this study does not reflect their 
passiveness (Chapter 6, section 6.3, pp. 190-194). Their respective strategies 
were not simply a means for survival, but a means to order their lives even 
under constraints. These vary from reliance on remittances from family and 
friends abroad, active involvement in economic activities, involvement in 
searching for opportunities to increase their resources especially skills and 
education. The discussion in Chapter 6 illustrates that refugees are not idle, 
but are people willing to rebuild their livelihoods, given favourable conditions. 
The evidence from the data contrasts the sustained portrayal of refugees as 
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one of helpless victims pouring across international borders in desperate need 
of assistance and perpetuates what is referred to as ‘myth of dependence’ 
(see also Table 11). 
Fourth, from the perspective of individual immigrants, the legal position 
and related rights allocated to them may have significant positive or negative 
consequences on their behaviour and their efforts to integrate. The majority of 
the primary interviews with refugees openly highlighted how long periods of 
uncertainty about application for a residence permit (and dependency in the 
case of asylum seekers) and having no access to local and/or national 
political systems and decision-making, for example, resulted in negative 
implications for the migrant’s preparedness and efforts to integrate. In this 
way, more negative norms featuring notable levels of caution and resistance 
were apparent in the interviews of the refugees – something that ‘top-down’ 
policy makers may have under-estimated. Equally, from the perspective of the 
receiving society, such exclusion policies are an expression of basic 
perceptions that see immigrants as ‘outsiders’, an attitude that is not 
conducive for constructive policies in the socio-economic and cultural-
religious domain. 
 
Repatriation 
Turning to repatriation, then several of the previous observations are 
also reinforced. Once again, and as Chapter 7 discusses, the strength of 
perceiving refugees as self-reliant, even entrepreneurial agents within 
repatriation analysis is confirmed. And again, this is primarily based on the 
bottom up, deliberative nature of their decision-making. The findings in 
relation to repatriation further demonstrate their identification as motivated 
self-reliant actors, rather than as impulsive, reactive victims. In particular, a 
number of reflections are important here: 
First, drawing on social constructivism and scholarship on forced 
migration and the politics of peacebuilding, this study has argued that 
returnees are active agents with the capacity to process social experiences 
and invent new ways of coping with life even under conditions of constraint 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.4, p. 15). In order to create a better understanding 
of returning forced migrants and their engagement in peacebuilding, this study 
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challenges the established ‘top-down’ notion of refugee returnees as passive 
victims of violence, as recipients of aid and as lacking resources (see Chapter 
3, section 3.4.2, p. 110). 
Second, the findings on repatriation particularly show how any decision 
to repatriate represents a complex process for refugees and involves 
balancing any perceptions relating to the ‘risky’ attraction of returning home, 
with several other options, including the ‘safety’ of remaining in exile as 
refugees. Several of the interviewees discussed how the repatriation decision-
making process required refugees to undertake some type/kind of cost–
benefit analysis. This of course, was also based on the (restrictive) 
information available to them in order to inform their judgements of whether 
continued exile represented a better option then returning home (see also 
Table 11). It was essentially confirmed as a ‘bottom-up’ process based 
essentially on ‘bottom-up’ perspectives rather than any awareness of the ‘top-
down’ UNHCR policies of durable solutions. 
Third, that any decision to return home also marked the beginning of 
the end of the refugee cycle. According to the interviews, most respondents 
argued that once home, refugees essentially began the equally complex task 
of rebuilding their lives. However, once again, the interviews also revealed 
some nuances relating to how international norms on repatriation needed to 
change since the criteria cited by the interviewees were often rather specific 
from a bottom up perspective. For many refugees, repatriation did not 
represent a homecoming, as their ‘home’ was probably destroyed during war 
(see Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 225). The notion or international norm of a 
return ‘home’ must be seen in a number of ways. At its simplest, the 
interviews with the refugees indicated that bottom up perspectives of a 
successful return home did not simply represent a physical return to the 
refugees’ country of origin. Rather they were equated with wider more 
discernible practical outcomes, such as, the return of property. In this way,  
more generally, ‘home’ may have cultural or spiritual meaning as well as 
being the returnee’s own property (see Chapter 7, section 7.6, p. 226). 
The misalignment between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives in 
all three durable solutions - resettlement, local integration and repatriation – 
suggest paternalism and privileging international institutions and states over 
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respect and support for refugees’ choices. This means, in turn, that 
opportunities are missed to help transform these movements from makeshift 
strategies into viable, long-term durable solutions. 
 
3. What actions were needed to ensure a more effective and consistent 
achievement of durable solutions? How can UNHCR policies be adapted to 
enhance prospects for durable solutions? 
 
Resettlement 
In terms of resettlement, the findings suggested that there were two 
actions were necessary to enhance the effectiveness of durable solutions. 
First, all the refugee interviews cited that it was important to formally 
draw on the ‘bottom-up’ experiences of refugees in the receiving society, their 
intentions and aspirations to integrate, all of which are related to the 
conditions upon arrival. In particular, this greater awareness of ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives would be central to changing one of the key international norms 
underpinning durable solutions at that time; namely: that resettlement cannot  
be viewed as simply ‘burden-sharing’ but also as sharing of responsibilities. 
This would acknowledge that refugees enrich society which remains a 
prevailing force shaping ‘bottom-up’ discourse and identities among refugees 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.7 p. 26). If the refugees themselves were willing to 
become more active policy and norm entrepreneurs then there would be a 
greater propensity to see the evolution of a more informed international 
refugee protection regime. Second, the findings from the interviews show a 
strong consensus around the need to promote the refugees’ capacities to 
contribute to their host state’s development, and empowerment of and 
refugees as holders of rights. In this way, the chances of refugees to become 
empowered norm and/or policy entrepreneurs would be enhanced (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.4.1, p. 106). 
 
Local integration and asylum 
Turning to local integration, a number of actions were clearly identified 
from the primary research. First, there is a need to understand more readily 
how the bottom up identities of refugees and thus their willingness to integrate 
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locally are shaped by physical and social performance attributes. In simple 
terms, as soon as immigrants arrive in their new country they have to acquire 
a place in the new society, both in the physical sense (a house, a job and 
income, access to educational and health facilities, etc.). This is well 
understood and is actually a source of contention in discourses in host 
societies. Yet, the findings also show how this needs to be extended in a 
social and cultural sense. As Chapter 6 argues, if newcomers see themselves 
especially as different and are perceived by the receiving society as 
physically, culturally and/or religiously ‘different’, they will aspire to acquiring a 
recognised place in that new society and becoming accepted. 
Second, the findings reveal how the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of 
refugees want to see a balance within local integration solutions that requires 
the need for help but also recognises the success of refugee autonomy, 
innovation and self-reliance (see Table 11, also Chapter 6). Local integration 
solutions must include measures for assistance regarding economic 
incorporation; yet the measures must also be enablers of refugees self-
images that emphasise that the with a goal of assisting displaced persons is 
to attain and respect of economic independence, as well as social and 
economic parity with the rest of the citizens.  
Third, and more generally, UNHCR, as part of the UN system, can play 
an important role in improving the effectiveness of the capacity building. 
Although the findings suggest that considerable work had to be undertaken in 
the context of this study in relation to building awareness of its role and 
effectiveness in delivering durable solutions in the future. 
 
Repatriation 
It is imperative to understand the conditions for the ‘voluntary’ 
repatriation of refugees. It is possible that refugees could return home after 
considering their options, but their repatriation would depend on their personal 
aspirations and the available information on the wider structural changes that 
may have occurred in their countries of origin; however, most refugees do not 
have the experience of such a balanced decision-making process when they 
repatriate. 
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The international community’s ‘top-down’ approach should consider the 
extent and ways in which humanitarian organisations and other members of 
the international refugee regime can contribute to broader foundations of 
peace building and development, crucial prerequisites for any durable 
repatriation. In situations where safe and voluntary returns are feasible, the 
repatriation process should be made a more participatory one requiring 
discussion with the potential returnees. Refugees should also be more 
extensively involved in monitoring the safety and ensuring the voluntariness of 
return. 
Furthermore, the engagement of refugee returnees in peacebuilding 
should not be limited to achieving a peace agreement requirement of 
repatriating refugees or to mere numbers of refugees that are repatriated. 
Rather, it should include the forced migration experience of the returnee and 
how they engage in the process of peacebuilding. 
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Table 10: Findings from the Case Study 
 UNHCR 
Top-down 
approaches 
Refugees 
Bottom-up 
approaches 
Misalignment  
Leaving 
and 
resettle
ment 
Political 
protection 
and solutions 
perspective 
Fear, security 
and linking 
with relatives 
and friends 
abroad 
Protection becomes meaningful in 
the context of being able to access 
rights. This means ensuring that 
refugees move in a safe and 
dignified manner and that they are 
empowered, well-informed and 
properly prepared for third country 
resettlement and integration into 
welcoming communities. 
Leaving 
and 
resettle
ment 
Burden-
sharing 
 
Resilience 
and self-
reliance 
 
Seeing refugees as an investment, 
and not as a burden, unlocks huge 
potential benefits for the countries 
that host them as well as for the 
refugees themselves. Refugees 
are actively seeking solutions to 
their problems by inventing 
creative self-reliance strategies. 
Leaving 
and 
resettle
ment 
Passive 
definition of 
resettlement  
Complex 
notion of 
resettlement 
as fluid, 
haphazard 
and multi-
phase 
process 
Constant movement and being 
displaced multiple times. Ensuring 
the safe and dignified movement of 
refugees is central to any 
resettlement operation. 
Local 
integrati
on and 
Asylum 
Safe third 
country ruling 
Uncertainty 
about asylum 
claim 
process; fear 
of negative 
decision 
Uncertainty with regard to the 
outcome of the asylum process, 
specifically whether an individual is 
approved or denied status, is a 
prevalent and continuous aspect of 
stress for asylum seekers. 
Local 
integrati
on and 
Asylum 
To attain 
asylum is to 
gain 
protection for 
‘genuine’ 
asylum 
seekers. 
Feeling 
marginalised, 
insecure and 
vulnerable 
The constant exposure to risk 
required asylum seekers to 
continuously overcome obstacles. 
Bogus asylum seeker is a 
rhetorical category that is not 
established in international 
frameworks and yet is referred to 
in state discourse and in policy 
documents. 
Local 
integrati
Asylum to 
offer full 
Lack of 
resources 
The lack of resources contributes 
to barriers toward eligibility for 
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on and 
Asylum 
access to 
resources. 
and barriers  asylum. Labelling of asylum 
seekers reinforces the justifications 
for the current restrictive definition. 
Repatria
tion 
Principle of 
non-refoulem
ent 
The decision 
to return is 
typically 
made after 
comparing 
information 
about 
conditions 
and 
prospects in 
the host 
country with 
those in the 
country of 
origin. 
The notion of ‘safe return’ should 
focus on the safety of return rather 
than the voluntariness of 
repatriation. 
Repatria
tion 
State-centric 
 
Refugees 
should be 
more 
extensively 
involved in 
monitoring 
the safety 
and ensuring 
the 
voluntariness 
of return.   
 
Host and donor states’ interests 
have been a significant factor in 
the preference for repatriation over 
other durable solution. Over time 
UNHCR developed a repatriation 
culture, a bureaucratic structure, 
discourse, and formal and informal 
rules that made repatriation the 
most desirable preferred solution 
and one that is nearly synonymous 
with protection’. 
Repatria
tion 
Peace 
agreements  
Justice and 
reconciliation 
State motives have taken priority 
over refugees' best interest in the 
decision to promote repatriation as 
a durable solution. 
 
Source: Author’s Own 
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8.4. Directions for Future Research 
This thesis exposes failings in the international system with regard to 
refugee policy from the ‘bottom-up’ perspective. It shows misalignments 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives. The underlying assumption 
is that international organisations and institutions as well as states are the 
main and most significant components of the international refugee regime, 
while the presumably central figure of the regime – the refugee – is at worst 
somewhat overlooked and at best underestimated. Yet, this thesis also 
demonstrates that there are discernible directions that may contribute to 
future research trajectories.  
First, academics and practitioners need to develop further and more 
robust analytical frameworks that acknowledge and capture the diversity of 
refugees’ experiences and the ways in which they can and do exercise their 
agency. Second, despite the fact that refugees are framed, represented and 
expected to behave in a certain manner by state and humanitarian actors, the 
reality is that their actions are as much shaped by the circumstances in which 
they operate, as their own desires, beliefs and interests. This suggests that 
selective attention put on the constraining feature of structures, which 
presumes that refugees are rendered ‘agency-less’ is ill-suited to fully grasp 
the complexity of the developments on the ground. In short, we need to 
further understand the roles of refugees as active agents and have stronger 
analytical tools at our disposal for conceptualising refugees as norm agents 
and norm entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, much more can and needs to be done to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of refugee agency and hopefully this thesis will 
offer a stepping stone for future systematic engagements with this subject. As 
UNHCR confirms: “(…) rights include the right of every person to participate in 
deciding and shaping their lives (UNHCR, 2013, p.3). In order for durable 
solutions programme to be successful, there needs to be a change in policy to 
start to actively listen to refugee perspectives and the recent work of the 
UNHCR affirms this (UNHCR, 2014). This change in policy would, in turn, 
create a partnership that can be a model between UNHCR and host countries, 
and refugees, which can in itself promote integration and empower a 
traditionally powerless group. By juxtaposing refugee perspectives and 
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policies, the study compared ‘lived experience’ with top-down policies on 
paper and practice thus making a contribution to refugee policies and 
programmes. 
The practice turn focuses on the process of ‘making norms’ through 
everyday practices, arguing that habit and routine help actors to order a 
complex social world and are thus stronger shapers of norms than interests 
and identity. 
Moreover, there is a need to explore the interface between ‘top-down’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics especially in light of the current restrictive approach 
of states towards refugees. In particular and from a practitioner perspective, 
this case investigation demonstrates the need for UNHCR to further evaluate 
the political realities that result from having such a highly state centric 
approach to handling refugees during crises that ultimately leads to the 
uneven distribution of refugees in the world. At the very least, by 
understanding the importance of the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of refugees and 
its practical interface with UNHCR policy, then discussions around norms and 
norm diffusion that might one day affect any international treaties on refugees 
might become more sophisticated. And ultimately make durable solutions 
towards refugees actually more durable in practice. 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide with UNHCR officials  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Name 
Position 
Organisation 
 
2. DISPLACED PEOPLE QUESTIONS 
1) What do you think are the major issues and problems that the international 
community is facing currently in respect to displaced people, i.e. refugees? 
 
2) What would you say are the important challenges in the international 
community’s response to internally displaced persons’ needs? 
 
3) How do the rights of IDPs and refugees to participate in deciding and shaping 
their own lives come into play? 
 
4) What trends do you foresee in the future with respect to refugees and 
attitudes towards refugees, especially from the perspective of receiving 
countries? (New conflicts: Syria, Ukraine, Iraq)  
 
5) Are there other countries, in addition to Bosnia (and Sierra Leone), where 
large numbers of refugees are returning home? What contributes to it? 
(Afghanistan, Liberia, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Southern Sudan) 
 
 
3. PEACEBUIDLING QUESTIONS 
1) What UNHCR peacebuilding projects, activities, or initiatives have you seen 
that have worked well? Probes: 
Why? Internal factors and External factors. 
 
2) What were the major lessons (positive and negative) learned through the 
project? Are there concrete recommendations that could increase the success 
of future programmes?  
 
3) Country specific: Have constitutional, legal and legislative reforms on the 
right to return evolved since the introduction of the programmes, and if so, 
how?  
 
4) Does evidence suggest that the right to return programmes have informed 
these policies? 
 
5) Do the views of persons of concern take priority?  Which groups or 
views/problems get priority? 
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6) Does UNHCR consult displaced people, local NGOs, civil society on specific 
programmes?  
 
7) How are budgets developed when the means are limited? 
 
 
4. UNHCR 
1) Do you see UNHCR as a supervisor, guardian and monitor of international 
norms and standards?  
 
2) How do international norms become effective in post-conflict environment?  
 
3) What are the major issues or problems that affect project implementation? 
 
4) What is progress and achievements compared with the expected results? 
 
5) Which constraints or challenges to implementation exist and to which extent 
are they related to logistical capacity and experience of UNHCR and other 
partners, coordination, resource allocation etc.? 
 
6) Do grassroots NGOs working on the rights of displaced persons invoke 
international programmes in their policies or organizational objectives?   
 
 
5. DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
1) Humanitarian crises have become ever more numerous and complex. What 
does “durable solutions” in such a complex 21st century context mean?  
 
2) Describe the durable solutions strategy in general and the three specific 
durable solution strategies for refugees – 1) return to their place of origin, 2) 
local integration into the communities where they settled, and 3) 
resettlement to a third location. 
1. What are the motivators and drivers to return? Do internally displaced 
people return to the place of origin? 
2. How to ensure effective resettlement?  
3. How to ensure effective integration and asylum process? 
 
3)  To what extent have the durable solution strategies contributed to 
improvements in the quality of life of refugees and IDPs?  
 
4) How do you know that the solutions work? How do you check? 
 
5) Are the host states willing to work with the UNHCR on durable solutions 
programmes? 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide with refugees and asylum seekers and/or 
those who decided to come back to the country of their origin 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Gender:  
Age:  
Marital status:  
Level of Education:  
Occupation: 
Ethnicity: 
Name of Town/City of settlement?  
Place of origin (Province/village):  
Returned refugee? If yes, 4b 
 
2. FLIGHT 
1. When did you leave Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
2. Where did you go when you left BiH? 
3. What was the mode of settlement: camp? 
4. Do you consider you had a choice? 
5. Why did you choose that country? 
6. Describe your available resources at arrival: Material resources (money, 
property etc) personal resources (health, age,) Social resources (Children, 
partner and other family members).  
 
3: UNHCR  
1. Describe aid received from UNHCR 
2. Are you satisfied with the quality of knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the 
UNHCR staff working in your country or operation? 
3. From your perspective, are UNHCR staff providing adequate services to 
refugees? 
4. In your view what could be improved about services, help given to refugees? 
What else can UNHCR do to help? 
 
4a: RESETLEMENT AND ASYLUM in SECOND or THIRD COUNTRY 
1. How do you cope with the challenges of life in a new country? 
2. How has living in a new country affected your health and the health of your 
family? 
3. What services and organizations for refugees have you visited or used in a 
new country? 
a. What was your experience with each institution like? 
4. Were you engaged in the process of seeking resettlement to a third country? If 
yes: How has the process of seeking resettlement been for you? 
5. Have you ever wanted to go back to your country of origin? 
 
OR 
4b: RETURN and CONDITIONS at HOME 
1. When did you return to / number of years since you returned? 
2. Why did you return? 
3. Who did you discuss your return decision with? Who did you consult? 
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4. Describe aid received upon return from UNHCR, UNDP and government and 
others: Were you able to return to the place where you lived before exile? 
If no why? 
5. Describe the resources that you had with you immediately after coming back 
(Material, personal, cultural and social) 
6. Can you briefly describe your main concern once you arrived back here in 
Housing? 
Financial/Money? 
Legal matters/ownership of property left behind? 
Emotional matters? 
 
5: INTEGRATION ACTVITIES 
1. Are you aware of the existence of different UNHCR programmes? 
2. Describe any involvement in the peace process that led to the end of the war? 
3. Briefly describe what justice means for you? 
4. What is peacebuilding? 
5. Briefly describe your perception of the process of justice and reconciliation in 
your local community? 
6. Have you retrieved/ in the process of retrieving properties from others since 
you arrived? If yes how would you describe the process? 
 
6: FUTURE 
1. Any norm/value from the exile community that you think when applied to 
your country could help in the rebuilding process and change for the better? 
2. Briefly describe what you perceive to be your role in rebuilding and how you 
can achieve that? 
3. Are there any constraints towards your intent to contribute towards the process 
of peace building?  
4. Where do you consider your home?  
5. In your opinion, how safe is the country today?  
6. In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war, what is the 
general state of security like in the country today?  
7. Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your personal safety today? 
 
7: PEACEBUILDING 
1. In what ways can the human rights stories that refugees tell about past ill-
treatment they faced in their home countries be part of the work of truth and 
reconciliation commissions in their countries? 
2. What do you think can be done to bring peace in your home country, to help 
people to feel safe and be able to work and take care for their families? How 
can people in your country live in peace with one another? 
3. How can refugee communities contribute towards peace, national 
reconciliation and fair treatment of all people in their home countries? 
 
 
 
 
